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iABSTRACT
We live today in the information age with users being able to access and share
information freely by using both personal computers and their handheld devices.
This, in turn, has been made possible by the Internet. However, this poses security
risks as attempts are made to use this same environment in order to compromise the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Accordingly, there is an urgent
need for users and organisations to protect their information resources from agents
posing a security threat.
Organisations typically spend large amounts of money as well as dedicating
resources to improve their technological defences against general security threats.
However, the agents posing these threats are adopting social engineering
techniques in order to bypass the technical measures which organisations are
putting in place. These social engineering techniques are often effective because
they target human behaviour, something which the majority of researchers believe is
a far easier alternative than hacking information systems. As such, phishing
effectively makes use of a combination of social engineering techniques which
involve crafty technical emails and website designs which gain the trust of their
victims.
Within an organisational context, there are a number of areas which phishers exploit.
These areas include human factors, organisational aspects and technological
controls. Ironically, these same areas serve simultaneously as security measures
against phishing attacks. However, each of these three areas mentioned above are
characterised by gaps which arise as a result of human involvement. As a result, the
current approach to mitigating phishing threats comprises a single-layer defence
model only. However, this study proposes a holistic model which integrates each of
these three areas by strengthening the human element in each of these areas by
means of a security awareness, training and education programme.
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1CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION
21.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a synopsis of the study. The chapter presents the
problem area of the study, the problem statement, the research objectives, the
research methods and design and, finally, the outline of the dissertation.
1.2 Description of Problem Area
The world in which we live today has changed radically compared to a few decades
ago. Using current computer devices, information is now literally at our fingertips. To
a large extent this has been made possible by the Internet. Using Internet search
engines it is now possible to find the information available on virtually any topic in an
instant, instead of having to search physically through books in a library. There are
also no longer any geographical barriers to communication with individuals, as
commonly used technologies such as email, social networks, streaming video and
instant messengers have made this possible. In addition, the members of the
general population now rely on using their sophisticated smart phones to access and
share information. In other words, the world as we once knew it has, metaphorically
speaking, been reduced to the size of one’s computer monitor or mobile phone
screen. This transformation has resulted in what is now known as the Information or
Digital Age. Instead of information being made available in paper-based format (e.g.
books, newspapers) only, it is now in an electronic format that may be stored and
transferred using computer technology. Provided that there is an Internet connection,
it is now possible to access information easily and at any given time. Unfortunately,
this access to information has had undesirable consequences with threat agents
making use of the opportunity to steal information from individuals. Thus, this has, in
turn, increased the need to secure information and computer systems against threat
agents - information security.
Information security involves protecting information against a wide variety of threat
agents in order to both minimise risk and ensure business continuity (ISO/IEC
27002, 2005, p. viii). Today, most organisations use computer systems to exchange
sensitive information. This information is regarded as an organisational asset. As
such, individuals, organisations and governments depend largely on information
3being embedded in secure, private and trustworthy information technology (IT)
infrastructures (DACS, 2008).
There are several types of agents who pose security threats to information. Threat
agents may be classified into human threat agents and natural disasters (Microsoft,
1999). However, the human threat is the most dangerous of these threats as the
motives behind these threats are usually malicious, for example, denying services
involving IT, stealing information and damaging information. In order to do this threat
agents use means such as viruses, social engineering techniques, malware attacks,
hacking and phishing (Microsoft, 1999). On the other hand, in order to secure
information against these attacks, organisations usually apply technological controls
and have security policies in place (Microsoft, 1999). However, this study attests that
it is not possible for these controls alone to avert information security threats,
especially phishing.
Apart from the common procedure of hacking, phishing represents an alternative
way of gaining unauthorised access to information. There is significant evidence in
the literature to substantiate the claim that phishing is a burgeoning problem in
industry (Sophos, 2005; Litan, 2006). In view of the fact that there are no boundaries
to the Internet, phishing may affect all users who are connected to the Internet, as
well as posing a constant threat that may affect every individual within an
organisation (Ohaya, 2006; Orgill, Romney, Bailey, & Orgill, 2004; Pickworth, 2009;
Safecode, 2008; Threat Insight Quarterly, 2005). Organisations and their customers
have lost millions of dollars as a result of phishing. The power of phishing lies in its
ability to circumvent technological defences because it exploits human behaviour
and knowledge. Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst (2006) believe that users generally have
great difficulty in distinguishing legitimate websites from spoofed websites. However,
despite this, organisations continue to focus primarily on securing their computer
systems using technological controls and, thus, neglecting the human element.
Typically, phishing involves a fraudster who uses social engineering techniques in
the context of an email message in order to steal confidential information from a user
by imitating as a legitimate entity (Kumaraguru, Rhee, Sheng, Hasan, Acquisti,
Cranor, & Hong, 2007). These types of fraudsters are referred to as phishers. Most
of the organisations cited in such emails are well-known financial institutions.
4Phishing is at its most effective using the email because the email message may be
made to appear authentic through the use of the corporate logos and terminology
typical of the institution from which the email is purported to originate. Typically,
phishers use a fabricated story to convince their victims either to resolve a particular
problem or to claim a substantial prize. The user is usually also required to complete
this process by clicking on a hyperlink contained within the email. This hyperlink then
directs the user to a spoofed website which requires the victim to log in using
personal information (e.g. username, password, account number). The user believes
that the spoofed website is genuine because it looks almost identical to the actual
website. However, unbeknownst to the user, the spoofed website records his/her
personal information which will then be used by the phisher for the phisher’s own
ends. Chapter 4 discusses phishing in more detail.
Individuals are placing both themselves and organisations at risk mainly as a result
of a lack of knowledge of information security practices, as well as a lack of
knowledge about the possible consequences of their actions and behaviour. It would
appear that the cultures in several organisations encourage users to rely primarily on
technology in order to prevent phishing attacks when, in fact, technology is only a
part of the solution to resolving the problem. There are numerous factors that may
possibly contribute to a successful phishing attack, including weak organisational
policies, negligent human behaviour and inadequate technology-related controls.
This study broadly categorises these factors as human factors, organisational
aspects and technological controls (HOT). Many literary sources have emphasised
that it is the human factors that comprise the greatest security risk and that this is the
result of a lack in user education (Jakobsson, 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2007;
Kumaraguru et al, 2009; Ohaya, 2006; Orgill et al, 2004; Robila & Ragucci, 2006;
Sheng, Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, Cranor, Hong, & Nunge, 2007; Van der
Merwe, Loock, & Dabrowski, 2005a).
In view of the fact people are considered to be the weakest link in security, they are
usually the target of social engineering attacks (Orgill et al., 2004). Another concern
is that the attack methods and the tools used by phishers are constantly changing as
technology evolves, with each new threat contributing to the difficulty of securing an
information system. Since phishers make effective use of technology in order to trick
their victims, it may be argued that a user’s lack of knowledge regarding the secure
5use of technology further adds to the difficulty of protecting users. In addition, users
and organisations may not even be aware of the dangers that phishing presents or
how to identify these threats, despite the numerous literature studies that may
educate users on how to do this (Alsaid, 2006; Bergholz, 2009; Drake, Oliver, &
Koontz, 2004; Fette, Sadeh, & Tomasic, 2007; Garera, Provos, Chew, & Rubin,
2007; Krammer, 2006; Patel, 2007).
1.3 Problem Statement
It is evident, in view of the brief background presented in the previous section, that
there are numerous dangers and consequences which may arise from phishing
attacks. In addition, the previous section also discussed those areas which phishing
exploits. Phishing poses an increasing security threat to the information of both
individuals and organisations. Organisations are usually affected financially by these
attacks.
A cyber security study conducted by Deloitte revealed that chief information security
officers (CISOs) are of the opinion that phishing and pharming currently pose the
highest cyber security threat to their organisations (Deloitte, 2012). However, the
concern is that organisations are not necessarily implementing a holistic anti-
phishing approach to mitigate the risk posed by phishers, as organisations typically
follow a single-layer approach by focusing primarily on technology controls,
educating humans or implementing a security policy. However, despite the fact that
organisations may have such measures in place, all these require both human
cooperation and knowledge, as humans are usually involved in each of them.
However, employees may either ignore security policies or they may be unaware of
them, while technological controls may not be managed and/or used correctly by the
different users. In addition, the organisation (i.e. management) may not perceive the
importance of information security or even understand security risks. This, in turn,
creates an opportunity for phishing to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
1.4 Objectives
The primary objective of this research study is to create a holistic anti-phishing
framework to help protect organisations against phishing attacks. This study
categorises security controls into human, organisational and technological
6dimensions (HOT). It would be ideal to address each of these dimensions in a
holistic manner and not in isolation. This may be addressed by means of an
educational intervention as it is essential that all the users in an organisation are
educated in each of these areas so as to launch a multi-layered defence approach.
The anticipated framework should form a stronger layer of defence against phishing
attacks as compared to the current single-layer model. In order to achieve the
primary research objective, it is necessary to address a number of secondary
research objectives. These objectives include the following:
 Identify, through literature, those areas that phishing threat agents exploit.
 Identify current protection measures that have been put in place by
organisations to guard against phishing attacks.
 Identify the major elements that should play a role in protecting organisations
against phishing attacks.
 Identify any weakness in these major elements.
 Identify, through a literature review, how to integrate these elements into a
single holistic approach.
1.5 Methodology
The methodology used in this dissertation includes several research methods. Much
of the content of the framework devised in the study was derived from the literature
studied. Accordingly, this section will describe this particular process. Initially, an
extensive literature review was conducted in order to gain an understanding of
information security. Following this, a comprehensive investigation into relevant
literature was undertaken in order to ascertain the current state of phishing.
Identifying Relevant Literature
In order to assist in identifying source material for a literature review, Webster and
Watson (2002) recommend the use of a systematic structured approach. They
maintain that the major contributions to a particular research area are most likely to
be found in leading journals. Journal databases may accelerate the identification of
relevant articles. The majority of the literature used in this study comprised journal
7articles. With the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) journal as a starting
point, several research articles relating to the information security discipline were
studied. Conference proceedings were also studied as they have a reputation for
quality. Other journal papers from IEEE Explore, Emerald etc. were also used in the
study while certain papers were indexed through specialised search engines, for
example, Google Scholar, Emerald, NEXUS and ISI Web of Knowledge.
Webster and Watson (2002) recommend that researchers should work backwards by
reviewing the citations of articles that have been identified from the leading journals.
Thus, following this recommendation, it emerged in this research study that particular
writers are regularly cited in papers. This, in turn, helped to ensure that relevant
literature was not unintentionally excluded. Ultimately, when the researcher reaches
a point where he/she is not finding any new concepts in a particular area of research,
this may serve as an indication that the literature review is nearing completion
(Webster & Watson, 2002).
Organising the Literature Studied
Webster and Watson (2002) maintain that a concept-centric approach will determine
the structuring and organisation of the framework of the literature review. In contrast,
certain researchers adopt an author-centric approach and present a summary of the
relevant articles. However, Webster and Watson (2002) argue that the author-centric
approach fails to synthesise the literature studied and they recommend that, in order
to make the transition from author-centric to the more suitable concept-centric
approach, researchers should compile a concept matrix of the articles that have
been read. Furthermore, they recommend synthesising the literature studied by
discussing each concept which has been identified with units of analysis. In this
research study, the concept-centric approach was used mainly in terms of organising
the content related to the areas of human, organisational and technological controls
in the literature on information security.
8Figure 1.1: The funnel method of structuring a literature review (adapted from Hofstee 2006,
p. 96)
Hofstee (2006) recommends using the “funnel” method when structuring a literature
review (Fig. 1.1). In order to do this, work may be either grouped or categorised
according to commonality. This work includes articles, books or any type of
secondary source. This approach is extremely useful when reviewing extensive
numbers of articles. In Figure 1.1, as mentioned, the categories of work
(balls/circles) that were identified for this specific research project included journal
articles, conference proceedings, books and web-based articles. The funnel method
was used to identify the problem of phishing that exists in the research area of
information security. Thus, it was essential first to understand key concepts in the
information security literature before further “funnelling” into phishing. By working
backward, as recommended by Webster and Watson (2002), it emerged that
phishing is a technique of social engineering.
Figure 1.2 below illustrates the systematic process that was adopted in identifying
and organising the relevant literature. Information security literature was initially
investigated as the broad research area. It emerged that social engineering
9techniques were effective techniques which may be used to acquire information from
individuals. Thus, phishing was identified as a sub-component of social engineering.
Figure 1.2: The systematic process that was adopted in reviewing key areas in relevant
literature
Research Strategy
The research strategy adopted in this study strongly supports that of design science
as described by Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004). This became evident from
the way in which it adheres to the main research guidelines of design science.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), design science creates and evaluates the IT
artefacts which are intended to address the organisational problems which have
been identified. In view of the fact that field studies enable behavioural science
researchers to understand organisational phenomena in context, the process of
constructing and exercising innovative IT artefacts enables design science
researchers to understand both the problem addressed by the artefact and the
feasibility of their approach to the solution of the problem.
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As the research objective of this research study aims to develop an anti-phishing
framework, the design science process will assist in producing the required output to
ensure that it results in a trustworthy artefact, thereby meeting the research
objective. Table 1.1 below outlines Hevner et al.’s (2004) design science research
guidelines as applied to this study. The sentences in bold describe the research
study’s contribution in accordance with the specific guideline.
Table 1.1: Design science guidelines (adapted from Hevner et al., 2004)
Guideline Description of guideline in accordance with
the study
Design as an
artefact
Design science research must produce a viable artefact in
the form of a construct, a framework, a method or an
instantiation. This research aims to devise an anti-
phishing framework.
Problem relevance The objective of design science research is to develop
technology-based solutions to important and relevant
business problems. The anti-phishing framework aims
to address phishing attacks on an organisational level.
Design evaluation The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artefact must
be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation
methods. The components of the framework were
evaluated by three organisations by means of
interviews which were conducted
Research
contributions
Effective design science research must provide clear and
verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artefact,
design foundations and/or design methodologies.
Research rigour Design science research relies on the application of
rigorous methods in both the construction and the
11
evaluation of the design artefact. In this study the
framework was constructed by studying literature on
information security, as well as internationally
accepted best practices and theories. The framework
was evaluated by means of semi-structured
interviews.
Design as a search
process
The search for an effective artefact requires utilising the
means available in order to reach the desired ends while
satisfying laws within the problem environment. A
thorough research study was conducted over a four
year period.
Communication of
research
Design-science research must be presented effectively
both to technology-oriented as well as to management-
oriented audiences. This research is to be
communicated to those individuals who are
responsible for information security. In addition, the
results of this research will be communicated at
conferences.
Research Evaluation
The components comprising the anti-phishing framework were evaluated by senior
security individuals in three organisations by means of semi-structured interviews.
The findings are discussed in section 6.7.
1.6 Layout of the Dissertation
The following table presents a brief overview of the chapters in this dissertation:
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Table 1.2: Outline of the dissertation
Chapter Title Description
1 Introduction Introduces the research field, problem statement,
research objectives and methodology adopted in
the study.
2 Information Security
Today
Focuses on exploring information security, the
primary research area of the study. The objective
of this chapter is to highlight the importance of
information and also the reasons why it should
be protected by both organisations and users.
Information security threats, controls and best
practices are introduced and explained.
3 Technological
Controls, Human
Factors and
Organisational Aspects
in Information Security
Introduces and explores the three main areas
that must be considered within the ambit of
information security, namely, technological
controls, human factors and organisational
aspects.
4 Phishing Describes the most important aspects of phishing
and its related techniques. The risk which
phishing poses to an organisation and its
customers are examined while real-world
examples of phishing are discussed. The anti-
phishing measures found in literature are
categorised into three areas, namely, human
factors, organisational aspects and technological
controls
5 Introducing an
Integrated Approach to
Phishing Mitigation
Introduces the concept of an integrated human,
organisational and technological (HOT) approach
in order to address phishing holistically instead of
using a single-layer defence model. Three
important links between the HOT dimensions are
established. Finally, those theories are examined
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which offer guidance in understanding the way in
which the relationships between each of the
dimensions may be managed more effectively.
6 A Holistic,
Organisational Anti-
Phishing Framework
Describes the educational components required
to address the HOT dimensions in each linkage.
Human behaviour and some methods pertaining
to the way in which human behaviour may be
changed are briefly described. Security
awareness, training and education programmes
are described in detail. Finally, the anti-phishing
framework is evaluated by three organisations by
means of interviews and the findings discussed.
7 Conclusion Formally concludes the study. The chapters are
summarised and further research is discussed.
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CHAPTER 2INFORMATION SECURITY TODAY
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on exploring Information security - the primary research area of
this study. The objective of this chapter is to highlight the importance of information
and also the main reasons why it should be protected by both organisations and
users. Information security threats, controls and best practices are introduced and
explained. In addition, the developmental stages of information security, which shape
the context in terms of which technological controls, organisational aspects and
human factors, are introduced. The role which these components play in ensuring
information security in organisations today is briefly examined as this establishes the
foundation for this study.
2.2 The Importance of Information and Information Technology
Before it is possible to understand why information security is essential, we need to
understand the importance of information, especially in view of the fact that it is
regarded as one of the most vital components of an information system (Whitman &
Mattord, 2010). In addition, the role which information technology plays in
organisations must also be understood. This section intends to realise these two
objectives.
Information today may exist in many forms, including the written form or printed on
paper, while it may also be stored and transmitted electronically, shown on films or
spoken in conversation (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. viii). For many years, organisations
have been digitising their paper-based records in the interests of more efficient and
effective storage, despite the fact that certain regulations still require that an
organisation retain all physical copies of documents. There are numerous
advantages to organisations digitising their files, including the fact that this enables
organisations to reuse, modify, transfer and access records more quickly as
compared to the traditional file systems. There is also less physical space required to
store the organisational and client records in the office. Today, many enterprises,
governments, corporations, financial institutions, hospitals and private businesses
store their copies of electronic data on computers and networks. These electronic
copies may contain confidential information regarding employees, customers,
products, research and financial information (Binarycse, 2010, Feruza & Tao-Hoon,
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2007). One may argue that, with old filing systems, it was relatively easy to locate
data because the data would be found stored by the user in a single location such as
a filing cabinet or office drawer. However, digitising data has resulted in a situation in
which data may be stored electronically in multiple locations such as hard drive
folders, network drive folders, jump drive folders, intranet folders, and email account
folders (Wacaser & Mazzeo, 2007). Thus, one begins to realise the need to secure
data.
Information refers to processed data that is both meaningful and useful to people
(Shelly & Vermaat, 2011). O’Leary and O’Leary (2010) define information as “data
that has been processed through a computer system”. Although these definitions are
correct, they do not reveal the actual attributes of data and, furthermore, they neglect
to mention the importance of information. If one understands what data consists of,
one may begin to understand the importance of information and the reasons that
information may be sought after.
The international ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) standard regards information and the
supporting processes, systems and networks as important business assets and also
as an essential aspect of an organisation’s function. Certain researchers have
equated the importance of information with the life blood of an organisation (Von
Solms & Von Solms, 2005). Similarly, according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008),
“information has become the new currency of business”.
Information may be considered personal, confidential and sensitive as it may contain
important personal details including, but not limited to, individual information such as
race, social security number, credit card number, date of birth, salary, pin number,
usernames, passwords, gender, sex, pregnancy status, marital status, ethnicity,
social origin, sexual orientation, age, physical and/or mental health, religion, culture,
language, birth, medical, criminal or employment history, financial transactions,
fingerprints and blood type. On the other hand, information relating to organisations
may include design blueprints, formulae, health information, financial records,
criminal and employment history and military secrets. Depending on the type of
information, it may be in the format of text, images, sound, video and so on.
Information is typically stored on information systems. One may imagine the illegal
purposes for what such information may be used, should it fall into the wrong hands.
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Ultimately, the main purpose for which this information would be used by threat
agents would be for financial gain (mydebt.co.za, 2011).
The description of information contained in the previous paragraph may be regarded
as referring to ‘legitimate’ information required by both organisations and their
customers. However, not all information is considered as ‘legitimate’. In view of the
fact that information is easily accessible using the Internet, there are people who are
making use of the opportunity to publish and share ‘illegitimate’ information
deliberately. This information may be downloaded from either websites or from peer-
to-peer (P2P) software applications. Depending on the intentions of the individual
who receives or makes such information available, the information may be used to
instruct others in unlawful, immoral or unethical activities. For example, one may find
material on, among other things, hacking systems, committing violent crimes and
terrorist acts and pornography. Some websites which are known for sharing
malicious information include the Church of Euthanasia and The Anarchy Cookbook.
People who willingly share this type of information on the Internet may be considered
a threat. On the other hand, people who use this information are often inexperienced
and, thus, their attack methods may be labelled as ‘unstructured attacks’. However,
such attacks may still cause serious financial harm to an organisation. Most of the
abovementioned examples of sharing illegitimate information emphasise the need to
provide suitable protection for information.
For many organisations, information and the related technologies represent
organisations’ most valuable, but often least understood assets. Successful
organisations recognise the benefits of information technology (IT) and use such
technology to increase their stakeholders’ value (COBIT 4.1, 2007). Since 1994,
Information Technology (IT) has emerged as a key driving force as regards an
organisation’s decisions and strategies (King Report, 2001, p. 11). As a result, the
organisation’s information is among its most valuable assets and is essential to the
success and wellbeing of the organisation (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006). An asset
refers to anything which has value for an organisation. Assets may be physical, for
example the staff members, computer systems or any other tangible objects
(Whitman & Mattord, 2012, p. 9). Alternatively, an asset may be logical, for example,
websites, computer programs or information.
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The computing environment has evolved from computer-centric to information
technology-centric to the current information-centric environment of today (Thomson,
2003). As a result, many organisations today are totally dependent on their IT
systems to capture, store, process and distribute company information (Von Solms,
2006). According to Legrisa, Inghamb, and Collerette (2001), there are many
reasons why enterprises decide to invest in information systems (IS), including
pressure to cut costs, to produce more without increasing costs and to improve the
quality of services or products, all with the aim of ensuring that the organisation
continues to function. According to Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 2), “today’s global
markets, business operations are enabled by technology. From boardroom to
mailroom, businesses make deals, ship goods, track client accounts, and inventory
company assets, all through the implementation of systems based upon IT. IT is the
enabler of the storage and transportation of information from one business to
another”. These researchers compare this transportation process to a vehicle. If the
vehicle breaks down on a crime-ridden road, even for a short period, business
transactions will be disrupted. Thus, organisational assets have become more
vulnerable to threat agents from both within and outside of the organisation itself and
may result in the organisation losing money. Typically, significant attention is focused
on those efforts that address the risks which affect business information from an IT
infrastructure perspective. This is as a result of the fact that IT has come to play an
integral role as regards the storage, processing and transmission of valuable
business information assets (Posthumus & Von Solms, 2004).
This section described the attributes of information. It also highlighted the importance
of information and, thus, the reason why information is sought after by threat agents.
IT plays an important role in the storage and processing of information as well as in
the transmission of information from one organisation to another. If the IT
infrastructure of an organisation is either disrupted or weakened in any manner, this
may compromise the security of the organisation’s information. This section also
discussed the security concerns that information may also be used for illegal
purposes, depending on who has access to the information. The IT environment,
which makes this information available, is also used as a channel by threat agents in
order to acquire information. The following section discusses information security
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and also the importance of information security. Common security threats and the
controls used to combat those threats are also described.
2.3 Information Security Explored
The previous section described information and its attributes in detail and also
established information as an organisational asset. The role of IT in an organisation’s
information was also described. This section endeavours to define information
security and to describe modern information security threats. The importance of
information security is also highlighted.
Section 2.2 established that IT enables the acquisition, processing, storage and
dissemination of data (i.e. text, images, video, numeric, sound) through the use of
computers and telecommunications. However, it is important that these processes
are made secure so that the data is not compromised in any way by people, either
intentionally or unintentionally. According to Ai Cheo Yeo, Rahim, and Ren (2009),
as the dependence on information processing and the interconnection of various
information systems via the Internet increase, so, too, does the risk to information
systems. As a result, information is now exposed to a growing number, and also a
wider variety, of threats and vulnerabilities than ever before.
Before addressing the issue of information security, it is important to distinguish
between a security threat and a security attack. According to Whitman, Mattord, and
Green (2012, p. 8), a security threat is generally a category or object, person, or any
other entity that poses a potential risk of loss to an asset while an attack is an
intentional or unintentional action that may represent the unauthorised modification,
damage or loss of an information asset.
“The quality or state of being free from danger” may be regarded as a general
definition of security (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 3). On the other hand,
information security is defined as “methods for protecting information and/or
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification or destruction” (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). These two definitions are
extremely similar. In the first case, the general definition focuses primarily on
humans being safe and protected from danger while the definition of information
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security focuses on protecting information and the systems which use, store and
transmit that information. It is interesting to note that the latter description neglects
the human element. Threat agents target users by exploiting weaknesses in the
same systems which aim to protect users. This, in turn, raises the question as to
whether information and physical computers should be protected from security
threats or whether the humans who use information and systems should be
protected from both themselves and from threats. According to Whitman et al. (2012,
p. 8), a computer may be the subject of an attack as a computer may be used as the
tool with which to conduct an attack. A computer may also be the object of an attack
as it may comprise the actual entity which is being attacked. In cyber forensics,
where the computer is used a tool with which to commit a serious crime, the
information stored on the computer is both vital and useful as it may be used by the
investigators as evidence to prosecute the criminal lawfully.
In order to understand the need for information security, the following example is
cited. Imagine if one’s laptop or external hard drive were stolen by a thief (i.e.
security threat). Firstly, there is the considerable inconvenience of having to find a
suitable or exact replacement for the stolen asset. This may be costly and the victim
may not have the necessary funds at the time. However, even more concerning is
the type of information which stored on the device that has been lost. This
information may represent many hours of work spent on a task, a customer’s
financial information, logging in details, personal photographs of a memorable
holiday or wedding day and so forth. It is, thus, clear from these typical examples
that it would not be possible either to buy or replace with any ease the data or
information unless it were backed-up on a separate device. In addition, the
information stolen may be of either an extremely sensitive or personal nature. One
may imagine the unlawful activities that the thief may carry out using this information.
This emphasises that there is greater value in securing information as compared with
focusing on the replacement of physical components. It may be argued that
protecting the physical assets would, ultimately, secure the information stored on its
device. However, in the examples cited above, the asset which is the most valuable
is the information and not the laptop itself.
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People may not perceive any risk in openly sharing information. For example,
imagine removing the garbage from one’s house and placing it outside on the
pavement for collection. The underprivileged person on the street who rummages
through the garbage may not perceive it as ‘rubbish’ and, indeed, may even take
some items, or a single item, that may be of some to use to him/her. In an
information security context, the contact number that people often share openly on a
social networking website may have more value for the threat agent than one may
imagine and it may even create an opportunity for the threat agent to acquire further
information by using it to access other areas in the Internet arena. As such, it is
essential that organisations and users understand the importance of ensuring that
their information is both private and secure.
According to Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 4), information security includes the
broad areas of information security management, computer and data security and
network security. The terms ‘information security’ and ‘computer security’ are often
used interchangeably as they each involve similar aspects. According to Whitman
and Mattord (2010), information security has its roots in the history of computer
security while computer security began when computers were first introduced into
business. These computers were particularly large and, thus, security focused
primarily on physically securing the location of the hardware (i.e. the computer itself)
and protecting it against threats. Physical controls were used (e.g. locking doors) to
protect the location of the computer from unauthorised intruders. Other threats to
computer security included natural hazards such as fire and floods, power failures,
hard disk crashes and so on, which could damage the computer equipment. It may,
thus, be argued that computer security focuses on securing the physical ‘computer’
while information security, on the other hand, focuses on measures to secure
‘information’, including physical security and educating humans. Most information
today has been digitised and, thus, the need to secure information has increased. It
may, however, be argued that the two terms discussed are the same because,
ultimately, computers store the information and, therefore, if computers are protected
then, naturally, the information on the computers is protected. However, this is not
always the case. In the past information may have been restricted to a single
computer. However, today information is transmitted over networks and stored on
multiple servers in locations that not even the user is aware of. In addition, the
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human element also poses a risk as threats may manipulate people instead of
computers in order to gain information. The latter will be discussed in section 3.4.2.
The main objective of information security is to protect the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of data or information against a wide variety of threats (ISO/IEC
27002, 2005). This, in turn, would ensure business continuity, minimised business
risk as well as maximised returns on investments and business opportunities
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010). As depicted in Figure 2.1, confidentiality, integrity and
availability (also known as the CIA triangle) are widely recognised as the three
characteristics that describe the utility of information (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.
6), with these three characteristics rendering information valuable to an organisation.
The next paragraph distinguishes between each of these characteristics.
Figure 2.1: The CIA triangle (source unknown)
‘Confidentiality’ is the term which is used to prevent the disclosure of information to
unauthorised individuals or systems. Confidentiality is necessary for maintaining the
privacy of those people whose personal information a system holds. For example, a
credit card transaction on the Internet requires the credit card number to be
transmitted from the buyer to the merchant and from the merchant to a transaction
processing network. In this case, the system attempts to enforce confidentiality by
encrypting the card number during transmission, by limiting the places where it may
appear (in databases, log files, backups and printed receipts), and by restricting
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access to the places where the card number is stored. If an unauthorised party
obtains the credit card number by any means, a breach of confidentiality may be said
to have occurred. Confidentiality breaches may take many forms, including the
following:
 Allowing someone to look over one’s shoulder at one’s computer monitor
when confidential data is displayed on the monitor
 Stealing or selling a laptop that contains sensitive information concerning
employees
 Divulging confidential information over the telephone, even if the caller is not
authorised to have access to the information.
According to Janczewski and Colarik (2007, p. 430), integrity is the confirmation
that data which has been sent, received, or stored is complete and unchanged by
malicious incident. On the other hand, Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 6) define
integrity as the “quality or state of being whole, complete, and uncorrupted”. These
authors maintain that data integrity is violated when
 an employee accidentally, or with malicious intent, deletes important data files
 a computer virus infects a computer and corrupts data
 an employee is able to modify his/her own salary on a payroll database
 an unauthorised user vandalises a website
 a voter is able to delete a large number of votes in an online poll.
There are other ways in which integrity may be compromised without malicious
intent. For example, a user may accidentally type someone's name incorrectly on a
system. Faulty programming or noise on the transmission channel or media may
also cause data to lose its integrity (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 7).
Lastly, it is essential that information is readily available, particularly when it is
needed. Availability requires that the computing systems used to store and process
the information, the security controls used to protect the information and the
communication channels used to access the information, are functioning correctly at
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all times. High availability systems strive to remain available at all times, thus
preventing service disruptions as a result of power outages, hardware failures,
natural disasters, denial-of-service attacks and system upgrades. These service
disruptions are often termed ‘downtime’. According to Janczewski and Colarik (2007,
p. 430), availability is particularly vital in contexts in which communication network
failures may cause breakdowns in other critical networks such as air transport or the
power supply.
The implementation of a suitable set of controls is required if the vital CIA attributes
described above are to be a reality. These controls include policies and procedures,
processes, organisational structures as well as hardware and software functions. In
addition, it is essential that these controls be established, implemented, monitored,
reviewed and improved, when necessary, to ensure that the specific security and
business objectives of the organisation are met. This should also be done in
conjunction with other business management processes (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005).
Security controls are discussed later in section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Why Information Security is Needed
As discussed earlier, organisations depend on both IT and the information systems
to carry out their mission and conduct their business functions successfully (NIST
800-37, 2010). Today, most information is stored electronically on computers and
transmitted over both networks and the Internet. However, the information stored on
information systems may be subject to a variety of threat agents that may, in turn,
have a serious impact on the operations and performance of the organisation
concerned (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). This may further compromise the
organisation’s mission, functions, image and reputation and organisational assets, as
well as individuals, other organisations and nations (NIST 800-37, 2010). Today,
organisations and individuals use the Internet in order to offer or perform e-
commerce. Financial institutions provide their customers with credit cards which
enable them to buy goods and services online. If the customer’s credit card details
are compromised in any way by a threat agent, this information may be used to steal
the victim’s money. An increasing number of organisations are allowing their
registered members (their clients) to gain access to their personal records through
using websites. For example, users have the freedom to access, modify and update
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their personal information, including financial investments, telephone accounts,
insurance, and so on. However, should this confidential information regarding the
business or its customers be compromised, this may lead to loss of business, law
suits, mistrust, damaged reputations and even bankruptcy (Feruza & Tao-Hoon,
2007; Sophos, 2005).
In view of the fact that information is regarded as an organisational asset, it is
imperative to define, achieve, maintain and improve information security in order to
maintain a competitive edge, cash flow, profitability, legal compliance and a positive
commercial image (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). The aim of information security is both to
ensure business continuity and to minimise business damage by preventing and
minimising the impact of security incidents (Von Solms, 1998). Chapter 3 discusses
the way in which organisations achieve this. This subsection highlighted the
importance of information security and described how it may result in the protection
of the organisation and its customers. The next paragraph describes some common
information security threats.
2.3.2 General Information Security Threats
The sophistication and extent of the damage that modern security threats pose to
organisations and users will be revealed in this section while general information
security threat agents and their attack methods will also be discussed. In addition,
the section will also distinguish misconceptions regarding the types of threats.
Today, if one were to enquire randomly of a colleague or friend what they considered
constituted a human threat agent to computer systems most would immediately refer
to ‘hackers’. It is, thus, a misconception among the general population that all threat
agents to computer systems may be regarded as hackers who are, typically,
stereotyped as the male teenager with bad skin, long hair and glasses, operating
from a cluttered bedroom with the aim of accessing, disrupting and damaging
computer systems and networks. Hackers are usually regarded as the perpetrators
of serious crimes. However, hackers may feel offended by this misclassification as
they often gain unauthorised entry into systems merely for the fun and challenge of
doing so. It is believed that hackers are interested in gaining fame or notoriety as a
result of their activities. Crackers, on the other hand, gain unauthorised entry into
systems and disrupt and damage these systems for malicious reasons (O'Leary &
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O'Leary, 2010). Thus, crackers, as compared to hackers, are considered more of a
threat as their motives are the more dangerous.
According to Van der Merwe et al. (2005a), historically, most crime committed over
the Internet has either been the result of curiosity or malicious technical attacks
performed by crackers. According to Janczewski and Colarik (2007, p. 308),
crackers use various methods to attack a computer system’s security maliciously. A
virus is one such method. However, Van der Merwe et al. (2005a) believe that this
situation has changed as a result of the immense growth and popularity of using the
Internet for financial applications and, thus, a new generation of computer criminals
has been born, namely, the spammers and the fraudsters (Levy & Arce, 2004).
Spam refers to unsolicited email traffic that is typically used to advertise the
availability of products or services from an online vendor (DeFino, Kaufman,
Valenteen, & Greenblatt, 2010). Spam is distributed by spammers who acquire lists
of legitimate email addresses and exploit an SMTP open mail relay (DeFino et al.,
2010). On the other hand, fraudsters are people who involved in Internet fraud - a
practice indulged in by individuals who spam potential victims in the hope that they
will take the ‘bait’. Using social engineering techniques, the bait may be prize
winnings, lottery draws or safeguarding the money in an individual’s account. One
such type of fraud that has shown tremendous growth over the past few years is the
practice of ‘phishing’ (also known as ‘spoofing’). Phishing will be discussed later in
Chapter 4.
Cyber crime refers to a crime that is committed using digital technology and
infrastructure (HTCIA, 2010). Cyber attacks on information systems are often
aggressive, disciplined, well-organised, well-funded and extremely sophisticated.
Janczewski and Colarik (2007, p. xiii) define cyber terrorism as “premeditated,
politically motivated attacks by sub national groups or clandestine agents, or
individuals, against information and computer systems, computer programs, and
data that result in violence against non-combatant targets”. Janczewski and Colarik
(2007, p. xiv) distinguish between cyber crime and cyber terrorism attacks using the
following scenario:
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Imagine that an individual gains access to a hospital’s medical database and
changes the medication of a pro-business, anti-environmental executive of a
Fortune 100 company to one that he or she is allergic to and also removes the
allergy from his/her electronic record.
Referring to the Janczewski and Colarik’s scenario, if the executive’s record were
changed intentionally as a result of poor relations between the individual concerned
and the victim, then this would be considered murder in addition to cyber crime.
However, if the individual changing the records were later to announce that he/she
were intent on committing more such acts if his/her demands were not met, then this
would be labelled as cyber terrorism. However, if the activities were carried out by an
agent of a foreign power, then the action would be labelled as information warfare.
Cybercrime is an intercontinental growth business. The US Treasury Department
estimates that cyber crime costs the global economy $300 billion, more criminal
revenue than the revenue of the international narcotics cartels (Whitehouse, n.d).
Today, malicious code, computer hacking, phishing and denial of service attacks
(DoS) have become more common and more ambitious than ever before and also
increasingly sophisticated (Geer, 2005; ISO/IEC 27002, 2005; Sophos, 2005). They
may be executed in a variety of ways, including computer-assisted fraud, espionage,
insider threats, sabotage, vandalism, and fire (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Janczewski
and Colarik (2007, p. xv) discuss typical modern cyber-attacks as follows:
 Virus and worm attacks: A virus is defined as a piece of programming code
which is usually disguised as something useful and that causes some
unexpected and, usually, undesirable event. A computer virus attaches itself
to a program or file and, thus, it may spread from one computer to another,
leaving infections as it travels (Janczewski & Colarik, 2007, p. 308). A virus is
typically delivered via email attachments, web browser scripts and
vulnerability exploit engines. Viruses are capable of preventing an infected
computer from booting up. Other malicious objectives of viruses include
information theft, rendering hardware useless and corrupting software. Worms
may spread across computer networks, but by themselves and without being
attached to host files.
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 Denial of service (DoS) attacks: The attacker sends a large number of
information requests to a target. This, in turn, causes the target system to
become overloaded that it is not able to respond to legitimate requests for
service (Whitman & Mattord, 2012, p. 65).
 Website defacing: This involves informational websites that service
governmental and commercial interests and results in the spread of
disinformation and propaganda, and/or disrupts information flow.
 Unauthorised system intrusions: These may lead to the theft of confidential
and/or proprietary information, the modification and/or corruption of data and
the inappropriate usage of a system for launching attacks on other systems.
According to Janczewski and Colarik (2007, p. xvi), the objectives of the above-
mentioned types of attack may vary from revealing the vulnerabilities inherent in
systems, political statements about the conduct of the entities being attacked or
stealing information. Gorge (2007) further highlights the dangers that cyber-attacks
may pose. Gorge cites the example of a threat agent being able to change the
formulations of popular prepacked food or prepacked medicine. In order to do this,
the threat agent would gain unauthorised entry into the computer systems of either
food processing or drug manufacturing organisations and change the formulations.
The potential consequences to the population may include
 illness
 commercial impact
 fear
 impact on the trustworthiness of the industry and government.
A report of Deloitte identified the most common external security threats in their
annual global security survey (Deloitte, 2009, p. 31). The results are summarised in
Table 2.1 below:
29
Table 2.1: Top 8 repeated external breaches
THREAT ONE OCCURRENCE (%)
REPEATED
OCCURRENCES (%)
Email attacks (i.e., spam) 10 24
Phishing/pharming 7 22
Viruses/worm outbreaks 11 15
Employee misconduct 11 11
Spyware 7 11
External financial fraud
using information systems
4 10
Social engineering 5 7
Physical threats 7 6
Source: Adapted from Deloitte (2009, p. 31)
Most information security attacks listed in Table 2.1 evidently involve the use of the
Internet. The report also reveals that most of the attacks targeted email. Phishing is
also reflected as one of the highest repeated threat occurance. The Internet may,
metaphorically, be seen as a highway which threat agents may use to attack their
victims. With the increase in the use of networks in order to exchange confidential
information between organisations, network breaches are becoming more common.
According to Dye, McDonald, and Rufi (2008), the serious consequences to an
organisation affected by a network breach may include the following:
 Network outage, causing a loss of communication and business transactions
 Loss of personal or business funds
 Theft of intellectual property for example, project bids, patents, strategic
plans, and so on
 Exposure of confidential customer data.
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Insider threats are often regarded as posing the most serious security risk which an
organisation may possibly face. This is as a result of the fact that insider threats
agents may have legitimate access to facilities and information, be trusted and
possess knowledge about both the organisation and the location of valuable and
critical assets (Colwill, 2010). Johnson (2006) points out that the incidence of insider
attacks is greater than all other sources of information security breaches combined.
Insiders know how to achieve the greatest impact whilst leaving little evidence. A
malicious insider has the potential to cause more damage to the organisation than
the outside attacker, as well as possessing many more advantages than the outside
attacker. Insiders will know how, when and where to attack and how to cover their
tracks. A good example in this regard is the insider sabotage which was committed
by the Chief Network Software Engineer of Omega Engineering, Timothy Lloyd
(Goertzel, 2008). Omega is a manufacturer of high-tech measurement and control
instruments used by NASA and the US Navy. In July 1996, Timothy Lloyd was
dismissed from his job after 11 years of service. However, before leaving, he planted
a logic bomb (malicious software) on Omega’s server and also stole the only
available backup tape for the server's data files. The logic bomb was triggered
unknowingly three weeks later by an engineer who switched on the computer
terminal. The logic bomb deleted all of Omega’s design documents, source code and
production programs, resulting in millions of dollars in financial losses.
Colwill (2010) maintains that even harmless insider activity may cause serious
accidental damage. For example, inappropriate Internet use, which not only wastes
an organisation’s time and resources, may also contribute to the following:
 Places the organisation’s network and systems at risk of virus infections and
malware
 Leads to potential lawsuits across a wide range of areas, for example,
criminal action, copyright infringement and claims of sexual harassment,
racism, bullying or defamation
 Impacts significantly on an organisation’s reputation and future revenue.
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Unskilled staff may, potentially, become a threat to an organisation, as such
individuals may not be able to use their tools and resources correctly. A lack of
skilled staff has been identified as the third most significant cause of the failure on
the part of users of IT to ensure the security of their physical assets and information
(Furnell & Clarke, 2005). As mentioned in section 2.3, the integrity of data may also
be compromised as a result of human error or negligence. For example, a user may
unintentionally mistype data into a computer system, thus posing a security risk to
the organisation. A 2006 Computing Technology Industry Association survey found
that security managers attribute approximately 60% of security breaches to human
error ‒ an increase of 47% from the previous year (Crawford, 2006). It is, thus, clear
that technologies are focusing on becoming automated in order to reduce human
involvement. One does not have to look very far to see the implementation of these
technologies. For example, the point of sale (POS) terminals at grocery stores
includes bar code scanners, which reduce any involvement on the part of the
operator in having to insert the price of an item manually.
Piracy is also a concern for information security. Software piracy takes place when
an individual, either knowingly or unknowingly, copies a piece of software in violation
of the copyright agreement associated with that software. Software piracy costs the
IT industry billions of dollars in lost sales each year and it is estimated that piracy
cost the software industry a combined $13 billion US dollars in 2002 (National
Chamber Foundation, 2005). The piracy challenges that industries face in terms of
software, music, movies, games and so on being made available illegally and at no
cost on online peer-to-peer sharing websites are well known. Users in general are
practising unethical behaviour by sharing such information using networks and the
Internet. This, in turn, is cultivating a society in which people may believe that it is the
norm to share material that is licensed and owned by organisations. Such activities
adversely affect the revenue of the industries concerned, while certain governments
have felt the need to intervene in the type of content that is published on the Internet.
The United Nations (UN) acknowledges that there are certain types of information on
the Internet that should be restricted, including slander and hate speech, while China
has banned websites such as Google+ and YouTube for fear that these websites
may potentially contain information unsuitable for its people. In some countries,
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using the Internet as a means to speak out against the government is an offence
punishable by death.
Yet a further information security concern is the fact that threat agents are able to
create spoofed websites which are made to appear as legitimates websites. Sophos,
an anti-virus company, claims that freely downloadable, do-it-yourself phishing kits
exist. If this is true, then anyone with malicious intent may acquire these kits on the
Internet. Mitnick and Simon (2002) classify those individuals who make use of these
kits as “script kiddies”. The kits are purported to contain all the graphics, web source
code and text required to construct spoofed websites which are designed to possess
the same look and feel as legitimate, online banking websites. The kits also include
spamming software which enables potential fraudsters to send out hundreds of
thousands of phishing emails as bait for potential victims (Garera et al., 2007).
Combining these kits with certain creative social engineering techniques would
enable threat agents to launch their own phishing attacks.
This section described a variety of the threats encountered in today’s digital world.
These threats are extremely sophisticated and harmful and far exceed the traditional
computer viruses seen decades ago. As an organisation’s dependency on the use of
telecommunications and the exchange of information electronically increases, so too
do threat attack methods and techniques. Threat agents are using technology to
their own advantage as methods or techniques to seek out and acquire confidential
information. The technology may, in turn, be perceived as the “middle man” who
stands between the two human parties i.e. the victim and the threat agent. It is, thus,
essential that information security take into account both aspects, namely, the
legitimate people using systems (i.e. the end-users) and those trying to gain
unauthorised entry into systems (i.e. the threat agents).
There are a number of techniques that threat agents use in order to acquire
information and data from their victims with threat agents creating viruses, malware,
spyware, spoofed websites, fake identities, fake emails, and suchlike with the aim of
deceiving individuals in order to obtain their personal information. Accordingly,
security controls are needed to help protect people and organisations against these
threats. The next section briefly describes the controls used to combat general
security threats.
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2.3.3 Information Security Controls
How does an organisation protect its sensitive information? The answer to this
question will be discussed in this subsection. Defenders of information endeavour to
prevent attacks by applying controls, safeguards or countermeasures (Whitman et
al., 2012, p. 9). Controls, safeguards and countermeasures are all synonymous
terms which may be used to describe security mechanisms, policies and procedures.
Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 299) define a control as “a security mechanism,
policy, or procedure that can counter system attacks, reduce risks, limit losses, and
resolve vulnerabilities”. Thus, management implements controls in order to mitigate
risks. These controls are necessary to protect organisational information from
threats, including accidental human error. According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), once
information security requirements and risks have been identified and decisions made
regarding the treatment of risks, it is essential that appropriate controls be selected
and implemented to ensure that risks are reduced to an acceptable level. The
selection of security controls is dependent on organisational decisions which are, in
turn, based on the criteria for risk acceptance, risk treatment options and the general
risk management approach applicable to the organisation concerned. In addition, it
should also be subject to all relevant national and international legislation and
regulations (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). The selection and implementation of appropriate
security controls for an information system or a system-of-systems are important
tasks that may have major implications for the operations and assets of an
organisation, as well as the welfare of individuals and nations (NIST 800-53, 2009).
Whitman et al. (2012, p. 3) classify general information security controls into the
following areas:
 Network security. Protecting the networking components and connections
 Physical security. Protecting the physical items, objects or areas of the
organisation from unauthorised access and misuse. For example, locking
doors and employing security personnel to prevent intrusions.
 Personnel security. Protecting staff from unauthorised people who wish to
gain access to the organisation and its facilities.
 Operations security. Protecting the details of a particular operation or series
of activities.
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 Communications security. Protecting the organisation’s communications
media, technology and content.
Clearly, most of the security controls mentioned above would, inevitably, make use
of technological controls. However, this is indicative of the unfortunate situation
where information security is treated as a single-layer approach in terms of which an
organisation may believe that security threats may be prevented by implementing
technological controls (Hinson, 2003). Intrusion detection systems, firewalls, anti-
virus software, virtual private networks, encryption and biometrics are all security
technologies which are in use today. Network administrators regularly have to
investigate different databases in order to ascertain whether there are any new
vulnerabilities and then apply patches to their systems in order to avoid attacks.
Different security staff is frequently responsible for and dedicated to the monitoring
and analysis of the data provided by a single system. However, security staff may
not analyse the data on a periodic basis and also not communicate the analysis
reports to other staff timeously.
Section 2.3 indicated that it is essential that information and/or information systems
be protected from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or
destruction. In order to prevent unauthorised access or use of information,
technological controls, including passwords (access control), may be in put in place
to ensure that relevant staff only may access and use the information. However, this
is not a simple solution. The interconnection of public and private networks and the
sharing of information resources increase the difficulty of achieving effective access
control (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Furthermore, ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) states that many
information systems have not been designed to be secure. ISO/IEC 27002 (2005)
further states that technical controls provide limited information security.
Physical controls are associated with the physical aspects of security, for example;
the lock on the door of an office containing sensitive documents. Technical controls
are controls of a technical nature, usually software based, for example, forcing a
user to authenticate by using a unique username and password before the user is
allowed access to the operating system. The third category, operational controls,
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collectively includes business, administrative, managerial and procedural controls
and consists of all those controls that involve human behaviour in one form or
another. Thus, these controls include those controls that involve the creation of
information security policies and procedures as well as the administration of other
controls. Despite the fact that they do not deal directly with operational issues, both
physical and technical controls usually require some form of human involvement.
Within an organisational context, these controls would, thus, have to be supported by
procedures outlining the employees’ involvement in the use of these controls.
Having discussed information security and its importance in this section, it is clear
that it is essential that the associated threats be controlled in a proper manner. It is
evident that each of these controls requires human involvement. The consequences
of inadequate controls or the lack thereof may be detrimental to the survival of an
organisation. The following section will explain the information security best practices
which several organisations currently follow.
2.4 Information Security Best Practices
In general, organisations could manage and protect their information effectively by
adopting internationally accepted and recognised Codes of Practice for Information
Security Management. For example, the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) international
standard represents one such ‘best practice’ that establishes guidelines and general
principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining and improving information security
management within an organisation (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). The objectives outlined
in ISO/IEC 27002 provide general guidance on the commonly accepted goals of
information security management. The control objectives and controls indicated in
this standard are intended to meet the requirements which have been identified by
certain risk assessments. This standard may serve as a practical guideline for
developing both organisational security standards and effective security
management practices and helping to build confidence in interorganisational
activities. Despite the fact that ISO/IEC 27002 is, in general, a widely spread
respected standard, Japan is by far the most vociferous advocate of ISO/IEC 27002
(Everett, 2011).
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Both Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT 4.1, 2007),
and King III (2009) also represent international best practices. Adherence to such
best practices may play an integral role in protecting organisational information
assets. COBIT 4.1 contains good practices across a domain and process framework
and presents activities in a manageable and logical structure (COBIT 4.1, 2007, p.
4). COBIT (2007) represents the consensus of experts and is strongly focused on
control rather than on execution. According to the standard, the best practices help
optimise IT-enabled investments, ensure service delivery and provide a measure
against which to judge security incidents. The King III Report gives a summary of
best international practices in corporate governance.
However, these best practices, international standards and guidelines are not
necessarily a one-size-fits-all solution for organisations to adopt in their addressing
of information security challenges. Every organisation is unique and, thus,
organisations often tailor their own security frameworks by adopting specific
components from these internationally accepted standards (Experian, 2009). Similar
to software development versions, these specific best practices, standards and
guidelines discussed are updated and then released as a result of the ever-changing
nature of businesses and technology. However, the main challenge in ensuring that
organisations either apply or follow these standards lies in the fact that that they are
not legally obliged to do so and, therefore, it is not incumbent on organisations to
comply with these standards. As a result organisations may inadvertently put both
their own and their customers’ information at risk because of non-compliance. There
are, however, laws and regulations, such as the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act, 2002 (ECT), which are legislated and should be adhered to by law.
Many organisations in the United States are legally required to protect the security of
personal information. The two major federal laws on privacy enacted in recent years
include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. These acts include security regulations that apply to a broad
range of financial services companies and health care organisations.
Certain organisations are accustomed to adopting popular best practices and
standards such as ISO/IEC 27002, COBIT 4.1 and the King III Report. However, not
all organisations are applying such measures. Secondly, even if they do have such
measures in place, they may not be adhering as strictly to the measures as they had
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originally planned to do. This is an issue of some concern. According to Von Solms
(2000), in order to manage information security properly an organisation should be
able to measure the effectiveness of its information security while making use of best
practices and guidelines and international information security certifications and by
cultivating an information security culture. In the next section, the developmental
history of information security is briefly explained. The stages of information security
over several decades is categorised into technological, organisational and human
aspects.
2.5 The Developmental Stages of Information Security
In section 2.3.3, information security controls and the importance of these controls
were described. However, this section did not broadly categorise the specific types
of controls that organisations apply. There are several literary sources which
categorise information security controls in various ways although there is some
commonality in the specific types of controls used. Von Solms (2000; 2006)
discusses the development of information security controls over the past 40 to 50
years by categorising this development into a number of incremental, overlapping
waves. These waves include technical, management, institutional and information
security governance. The following subsections further describe the technological,
organisational and human aspects of information security controls by using
adaptations of Von Solms’s work.
2.5.1 Technological Controls
Technological controls are implemented in order to protect the integrity of data.
Technological controls refer to controls of a technical nature and which are usually
software-based, for example, forcing a user to authenticate access to a computer
system by using a unique username and password before allowing the user access
to that system. This is known as an access control as the operating system’s built-in
security serves as a technical control. According to Von Solms (2000), these
developments constituted as the ‘First Wave’ which he regards as a technical wave.
This wave began in the early eighties when computers were mostly mainframe-
based. Similar to the previous example, security on this level involved using the built-
in facilities of mainframe operating systems such as access control lists, user-ids and
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passwords. Technical staff members such as computer security experts, mainly
technologists, were responsible for information security issues (Geer et al., 2003)
and they implemented the necessary technical controls and also carried out the
necessary maintenance. However, other non-technical issues such as best practices
and policies were not addressed at this early stage.
2.5.2 Organisational Aspects
According to Von Solms (2000), the technical wave has continued to manifest in the
subsequent waves. It is worth noting that, despite the fact that technical controls do
not address operational issues directly, the use or implementation of these technical
controls usually requires some form of human involvement. Thus, within an
organisational context, these controls would have to be supported by procedures
outlining employees’ involvement in using these controls. Accordingly, Von Solms
(2000) maintained that the ‘Second Wave’, which lasted from the early eighties to the
middle nineties, may be regarded as the management wave. The development of
distributed computing and the later explosion of the Internet, the World Wide Web
and e-commerce resulted in the need to address information security concerns on a
higher level and, specifically, on the level of top management. This, in turn, resulted
in the need for, at the very least, all employees within an organisation to participate
in the information security management of the organisation concerned as well as
possibly requiring the participation of shareholders, suppliers, specialists, third
parties, customers or other external parties (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Ohaya (2006)
believes that security managers should ensure that the need for privacy and security
are perceived at a macro-level within an organisation.
The formulation of information security policies and procedures, the establishment of
organisational structures and the appointment of information security managers and
staff were the norm at this stage (Von Solms, 2006). Kankanhalli (2003) revealed in
his study that management support is positively related to the implementation of
preventative security efforts. Kankanhalli also found that financial organisations
invest more resources in controls designed to prevent bad security practices in
comparison to larger organisations that tend to invest more in preventive measures.
According to Von Solms (2000), the Third Wave started in the late nineties with this
wave coming to be known as the ‘Institutional Wave’. Aspects such as best
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practices, codes of practice for information security management (e.g. COBIT 4.1,
ISO/IEC 27002), international information security certification (e.g. CISSM, CISSP),
and information security culture and security metrics were evident at this stage.
The ‘Fourth Wave’ relates to both the development and the crucial role of information
security governance (Von Solms, 2006). At this stage, top management and boards
of directors became personally accountable for the effective functioning of their IT
systems of which they based their planning and decision making. As a result, at this
stage, the responsibility for information security concerns shifted to the highest level
possible, namely, the board of directors. This change is significant, particularly in
view of the fact that, during the technical wave, information security was the
responsibility of the technical staff only.
In this section, the importance of organisational aspects is further emphasised by
indicating the involvement required on the part of top level management as regards
addressing information security concerns as opposed to the technical wave which
had involved technical staff only.
2.5.3 Human Factors
The human factor is an increasingly popular area of interest that has emerged in
information security research. Human factors are related to the way in which humans
treat and manage information in a secure manner. In this regard, Mitnick and Simon
(2002) state that “[h]umans are the weakest link”. This, in turn, stems from human
related attributes such as behaviour, knowledge and negligence and/or the attitude
of the humans involved as regards to safeguarding their information. Consequently,
there is considerable information security literature available which has explored the
area of human factors (Colwill, 2010, Gonzalez & Sawicka, 2002; Hawkey, Botta,
Werlinger, Muldner, Gagne & Beznosov, 2008; Hinson, 2003; Jakobsson, 2007;
Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Schneier, 2008). Thus, the area of human factors
constitutes another important component of this research study.
In general, the technical controls and organisational aspects mentioned above
require some degree of human involvement in the use of these controls. As stated in
section 2.3, human error presents a threat to an organisation. Kraemer et al. (2009)
identified and characterised elements related to human errors in a conceptual
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framework. Their results showed that organisational factors such as communication
breakdowns, security culture and policies are frequent causes of errors within an
information security context. Thus, in order to address these human factor concerns,
education is required and, to do this, organisations usually implement security
awareness, training, and education programmes. Such programs are discussed in
later chapters.
In this section, three main areas, namely, technological controls, organisational
aspects and human factors, are highlighted and established as a basis of this
research study. As noted by Von Solms, overlaps are evident in each of the waves
discussed above. Similarly, human involvement is evident in each of the
technological, human and organisational areas. This, in turn, indirectly emphasises
that human factors merit the most attention when the issue of information security is
addressed. Each of these three areas will be described in further detail in the next
chapter.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter emphasised the value of information by classifying it as an ‘asset’ of an
organisation. The chapter further explored the background to information security
and also described modern information security threats and controls. It is clear that,
in view of the importance and sensitivity of certain types of information, it is essential
that information be protected by appropriate methods and controls and that failure to
establish adequate protection may have serious financial implications for an
organisation and also its clients. Three main areas emerged on this study is based.
These areas were categorised as technological controls, organisational aspects and
human factors. Of these three areas, literature highlighted the fact that, in general,
most of the security controls used by organisations are technological-based. The
three main areas are explored in greater detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROLS, HUMANFACTORS AND ORGANISATIONALASPECTS IN INFORMATION SECURITY
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3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter established the important role of information, IT and
information security in organisations. The chapter also categorised the general
security threats and countermeasures which may be used to combat such threats
into three main areas, namely, technological controls, human factors and
organisational aspects. In this chapter, these three main areas are discussed in
more detail. The chapter begins by describing the general technological controls
which are used by both organisations and users in order to counter security threats.
This is followed by a discussion of the human factors and finally, the role of
organisational aspects, mostly in the form of security policies and procedures, within
an organisation. It will become evident from this discussion that these dimensions
tend to overlap and that these overlaps are the result of human involvement.
3.2 The Role of Technology in our Lives Today
This section begins by describing the important role played by technology in our daily
lives. The technological controls which are to counter security threats are then
described. The section aims to argue that technology may be regarded as useful
only if users find it easy to use.
From the beginning of time man’s quest has been to strive continually to find new
ways of improving our lives. Modern technologies, inventions and/or methods have
radically changed the world in which we live and individuals are becomingly
increasingly dependent on technology to perform many of their routine tasks. In other
words, technology has significantly influenced our daily lives, perhaps for the better
but perhaps for the worse. The ongoing development and improvement of new
technological products offer a wide range of new possibilities to make our daily lives
healthy, safe, independent, efficient, entertaining and comfortable. In other words,
energy-friendly and sustainable solutions are helping to improve the environment in
which we live (TUE, 2012). For example, improved healthcare has resulted in human
beings living longer and also receiving effective treatment and complicated surgical
procedures which may have been impossible years ago. In addition, technology has
provided us with new methods of communication and entertainment (TUE, 2012).
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The explosion of the World Wide Web, smart phones, online shopping, social
networking sites, 3D television and games etc. have taken the world by storm.
Within an organisational environment, technology is being used by organisations to
enhance their business operations and, simultaneously, to protect their systems from
security threats. However, there is also a ‘dark side’ in the use of technology with
threat agents also making use of technology for malicious and illegal purposes that
may inflict severe damage on both people and information systems. Sexual
predators may make use of social networking websites to lure young children into
engaging in sexual activity (e.g. sexting) while fraudsters may also use the Internet
to lure people into giving up their money to some cause (e.g. scams). All of these
threats make use of techniques to inveigle individuals into performing some actions.
These techniques will be discussed in section 3.4.
The effectiveness of technology depends on the ability of people to use the
technology correctly as well as to trust in its usefulness. Technology is often
stigmatised as being too complex to use. To address these concerns, developers
require an understanding of both the human and technological aspects of
technology. The human aspects would include usability, ergonomics, perception,
cognition, decision making, social psychology, consumer behaviour and
environmental psychology (TUE, 2012), while understanding the technological
aspects requires a comprehensive knowledge of the technical details of the product
as well as of the environment in which the product will function. For example,
developing software requires that a programmer possess technical knowledge as
regards graphical user interface design, programming languages, operating systems
and troubleshooting, and so on, while understanding the human aspects requires
that the programmer consider the people who are going to be using the finished
product. This is extremely important as technology must be easy to use while it must
also be of some use or benefit to the users as it will otherwise either not be used
correctly or it will not be used at all.
This section indicated that most technologies are designed to support humans in
their performing of their tasks. However, it is essential to understand that, although
technology has many benefits, it also has limitations, risks and vulnerabilities. There
is no perfect technology which exists and, as a result, humans are constantly striving
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to develop new technological products with the aim of improving previously released
versions (e.g. cell phone functions, software updates). Thus, technological
development is an ongoing process which is constantly seeking for new
improvements. This, in turn, also affects the human element as humans need to be
educated as regards any new technological development in order to operate the
technology correctly.
The next section describes some of the common technological controls which are
used by organisations and users to help protect their information.
3.3 Technological Controls used by Organisations and Users
The previous section pointed out that technology is used across many domains and
also that it has both benefits and drawbacks. This section discusses some of the
common technological controls which are used by organisations to protect both their
information and their information systems. Some of the limitations in these
technological controls are also revealed.
Generally, information security controls may be subdivided into the following three
categories, namely, physical controls, technical controls and operational controls
(Thomson, 1998, p. 29; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004a). Information security
literature often refers to technological controls as ‘technical controls’ and includes
both hardware and software aspects in the concept. Technological controls may be
defined as those control measures that either use or implement a technical solution
in order to reduce the risk of loss within an organisation (Whitman & Mattord, 2010,
p. 335). Section 2.2 established that information is an organisational asset and, thus,
organisations tend to use technical controls to protect their both information and their
computer systems from threats. However, section 2.3.2 pointed out that threats also
use technology but for alternative motives such as carrying out attacks on victims.
This may be one of the reasons why most organisations treat information security as
a technical issue solely and why organisations expend a large portion of their
resources on implementing technological controls. It is generally believed that
technical solutions such as firewalls, anti-virus programs etc. are sufficient to secure
information (Hinson, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2012).
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Technological controls do play an essential role in the protection information as
these technological measures are able to control access and to protect information
to some extent. However, it is often overlooked that technology are used and relied
upon by people (Hinson, 2003; Mann, 2008). In addition, the manner in which
technological controls are used and managed by people presents another cause for
concern. This point is emphasised by Hinson (2003) who states that few
organisations understand their information security problems in sufficient detail to
ensure that they specify the appropriate technical solutions aligned with their
requirements. The following subsection briefly discusses common technological
controls which are applied at an organisational level.
3.3.1 Access Controls
Access controls typically involve four key processes, namely, identification,
authentication, authorisation and accountability. Identification involves identifying the
entity that is requesting access to a logical or physical area (Whitman & Mattord,
2010, p. 335). This is a single piece of unique information such as a name or initials
and a surname. Authentication involves confirming the identity of the entity seeking
access to a logical or physical area and usually involves verifying either a password
or a private identification number (PIN). Once authentication has taken place,
authorisation determines the actions which the entity is allowed to perform in the
logical or physical area. One of the most common methods of authorisation is
performed by a system which verifies the entities details and then grants access to
resources or privileges based on the access rights (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.
336). Finally, accountability documents the activities, through system logs, of the
authorised entity and systems. The management of these access controls is
documented in a formal access control policy with this policy dictating the way in
which access rights are granted to both entities and groups.
Organisations also usually apply access controls in the physical environment. In this
context the processes of identification, authentication, authorisation and
accountability may be described using a practical example. An individual enters a
building and will have to be identified by security personnel as either a visitor or a
member of staff (identification). The individual provides his/her name and surname to
the security personnel. The security personnel then verify the individual’s details
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(authentication) and offer the individual permission to enter the building. The security
personal will also direct the individual to certain parts of the building which the
individual is allowed to enter (authorisation). This may be enforced by using a card
which allows the individual access to certain areas of the building. The security
personnel also records the individual’s name as well as the date and time of entry in
a log book (accountability).
Several other forms of technology are available to protect information but they are
usually used to identify and restrict outsider access. The latter statement is
supported by the following. An information security breaches survey which was
carried out by United Kingdom government Department for Business Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (BERR, 2008). This survey reveals the following in respect of the
businesses surveyed:
 55% have a documented security policy in place
 40% provide ongoing security awareness training to staff
 14% use strong, multifactor authentication
 11% have implemented BS7799/ISO27001
 99% back up their critical systems and data
 98% use software that scans for spyware
 97% filter incoming email for spam
 97% protect their websites with a firewall
 95% scan incoming email for viruses
 94% encrypt their wireless network transmissions.
This survey reveals that technological controls are used mainly to prevent outsider
access. However, the survey also reveals that organisations appear to have
neglected potential insider threats. Social engineers would almost certainly take
advantage of the opportunity offered by this omission.
3.3.2 Firewalls
A ‘firewall’ is a term which is often used in the engineering discipline. A physical
firewall is a concrete or masonry wall which is constructed in buildings and which is
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used to restrict a fire from spreading to other parts of the building (Whitman &
Mattord, 2010, p. 345). Firewalls are also used in the aircraft and automotive
industries where a firewall typically comprises insulated metal/material which keeps
the heat from the engine compartment separated from the interior where the
passengers are seated.
In the context of information security, firewalls are used by organisations for the
purposes of network security. As such, firewalls may protect the computers on an
organisational network from unauthorised intrusions. The firewall may be either a
physical computer terminal (e.g. proxy server) or a software program. Microsoft
operating systems have built-in firewall software. Firewalls include technologies such
as packet filtering which examines every incoming or outgoing packet header, thus
preventing specific types of information from moving between the outside world
(mistrusted public network such as the Internet) and the organisation’s internal
network (trusted internal network such as the Intranet). These packets may be
accepted as necessary or rejected by a filter. Filtering may be based on IP address,
packet type, port request, and so forth (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 346).
The selection of what the filter must accept or reject is determined by its
configuration rules. These rules may be automated to block suspicious websites and
to restrict certain websites from being accessed by the employees within the
organisation. The web filter software may classify prohibited websites into categories
for example, pornographic websites, unethical, phishing, and so forth. In addition, the
firewall may also block users from both excessive downloading and the use of
instant messaging services and video streaming. Configuring firewalls is an
important and complex task which is performed by IT/technical staff members who
have usually undergone specialised training in network administration.
3.3.3 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) act in the same way as burglar
alarms in the real world (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 353). For example, if a
building window or door is broken then an alarm is activated. This alarm may be
either audible (noise or beeps) or visible (lights flashing). However, the alarm may
also be silent but inform the security company concerned. In the context of
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information systems, technical staff members configure the alarm and its alarm
levels. The alarm may also be configured to notify an external information security
service organisation. There are several different and complex IDPS configurations,
namely, host-based, network-based, signature-based and statistical anomaly-based
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 355). Whitman and Mattord (2010 p. 354) maintain
that a system which incorporates IDPS technology should prevent attacks by
accomplishing the following:
 Terminate the network connection or the threats user session when attacked
 Change the security environment by reconfiguring network devices such as
firewalls, routers and switches to block the threat from gaining access to the
system
 Change the threats content to render it benign. For example, remove an
infected email attachment before the email reaches the recipient.
3.3.4 Remote Access Protection
Before the Internet, organisations and individuals were able to connect with each
other through the use of private networks (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 357) through
dial-up or leased-line connections. Dial-up connections are less sophisticated than
Internet connections as a simple username and password are sufficient for
authentication and, as a result, there was a need to strengthen this authentication
process. Technologies which have improved this process include RADIUS systems,
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) systems and other systems
which make use of strong encryption technologies. According to Whitman and
Mattord (2010, p. 357), the most prominent of these approaches are RADIUS and
TACACS.
3.3.5 Wireless Networking Protection
Computer networks have evolved from the traditional physical connections which
used cables to the wireless connections of today. The modern smart phone is a good
example of this radical change. According to Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 359),
wireless network technology is an issue of concern for information security
professionals. Wireless networks are of benefit to organisations as they are
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extremely cost effective as compared to cables. However, security threats also take
advantage of the fact that there are no physical connections. Certain threats to
wireless networks are known as ‘war driving’ (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 359). The
threat moves/drives along a geographical area or building scanning for any open or
unsecured wireless network. It is, thus, essential that an organisation ensure that it
uses relevant encryption protocols to secure its wireless network (e.g. Wired
Equivalent Privacy, Wi-Fi Protected Access). VPNs and firewalls may also be used
to safeguard the wireless network (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 361).
At this stage, the technological controls which have been discussed are at the
organisation level. Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 16) believe that these controls are
necessary to a corporate security programme. The next paragraph discusses the
technological controls which are often applied at the user level, for example, security
on the individuals’ own personal devices.
3.3.6 Anti-Virus Solutions
As a result of the general lack of information security knowledge, end-users tend to
think any computer-related problem is caused by viruses and, thus, most end-users
are familiar with the role of anti-virus programs. Traditionally, anti-virus programs
were limited to detecting and removing viruses only. However, modern anti-virus
programs have become extremely sophisticated in their defence mechanisms. It is
common for these mechanisms to be set active automatically and, thus, they do not
require very much human involvement.
Depending on the protection level of anti-virus software (e.g. Internet Security) and
the manufacturer (e.g. Kaspersky), most anti-virus programs incorporate a variety of
integrated defence tools. For example, Avast Internet Security 7 includes controls,
namely, a firewall, mail shield, script shield, web shield, file system shield, P2P
shield, instant message shield, behaviour shield and network shield (Hubpages,
2012). These shields are also not uncommon in other anti-virus programs. Some
anti-virus programs may also remove malware. The hyperlinks contained in phishing
emails may be infected with malware. Mail shields are capable of detecting and
removing phishing emails and spam (Hubpages, 2012). Figure 3.1 below illustrates
that the ‘web shield’ control is able to scan websites automatically and to display the
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results to the user. This, in turn, assists end-users in identifying whether a website
may be regarded as either a legitimate (safe) or a spoofed website (forged) based on
the web shield’s rating.
Figure 3.1: Web link scanner integrated in anti-virus program
3.3.7 Web Browsers
Web browsers enable users to navigate through web pages. However, Wadlow and
Gorelik (2009) believe that web browsers also pose security problems to developers
and users. There are a variety of popular web browsers, for example Microsoft
Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, Apple Safari, Google Chrome and so on.
Most of these web browsers are similar in functionality, but they are also competitive
as far as security is concerned as most have similar built-in technological defences
against threats (Accuvant Labs, 2011). Browser developers have devised several
ways in which to combat security threats, especially phishing attacks with developers
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focusing primarily on heuristics in order to detect an attempted visit to a fraudulent
site, phishing website warnings and an increase in login security (Wadlow & Gorelik,
2009).
Plug-ins is programs which extend the capability of a browser are often used to
enhance multimedia (Shelly & Vermaat, 2011). Most browsers, for example, Mozilla
Firefox, have made provision for browser plug-ins or add-ons. Should users require
additional functionality or security protection, they are able to download plug-ins for
free. Popular browser plug-ins include: Adobe Acrobat Reader, Adobe Flash Player,
Java, Quicktime, and Microsoft Silverlight (Shelly & Vermaat, 2011). However, web
browser plug-ins also has security weaknesses. According to a report by Alfreds
(2012), Adobe Flash is one of the programs which are the most vulnerable to threats
on Windows-based computers. The literature has indicated several developments
which have focused on browser security and especially involving browser plug-ins. A
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome web browser plug-in termed Adblock Plus
automatically blocks unwanted advertisements (known as adware) from appearing in
web pages. If these advertisements are clicked on they may, potentially, redirect
users to harmful websites.
Most web browsers incorporate phishing filters and pop-up blockers. Another
security feature in web browsers is warning alerts. These alerts display information
to the user. An example of a web browser warning is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.
In this example, the URL <http://www.yotube.com> was used instead of
<http://www.youtube.com>. These are techniques which are often used by phishers
and which rely on negligence on the part of the user as regards paying adequate
attention to the structure of URLs. In this example, the web browser served as an
effective security control as it had detected the URL <http://www.yotube.com> as a
spoofed-website.
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Figure 3.2: Web browser security warning
When browsing the Internet, the web browser may require cookies to be enabled.
According to Wadlow and Gorelik (2009), a cookie is a legitimate mechanism for
storing information about either a user or a session. E-commerce websites allow
users to purchase goods and services online using credit cards or digital cash. E-
commerce websites are popularly known to store user data as cookies, for example,
when users log onto websites using their usernames and passwords. However,
cookies also pose security risks as the information may be stolen, forged, poisoned,
hijacked or abused as regards denial of service attacks by threats (Wadlow &
Gorelik, 2009). In order to control this, it is recommended that users remove this
information stored by the web browser. This process is known as ‘clear history and
cookies’ and most browsers have easy to use functions to achieve this. According to
Ollmann (2008), most web browsers should
 disable all window pop-up functionality
 disable Java runtime support
 disable ActiveX support
 disable all multimedia and auto-play/auto-execute extensions
 prevent the storage of non-secure cookies
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 ensure that it is not possible to run any downloads automatically from the
browser and that downloads must instead be downloaded onto a directory for
anti-virus inspection.
3.3.8 Email Client
The email client is one of the most frequently used software applications on the
computer systems of users and is used to transmit messages electronically over the
Internet. However, some messages may, potentially, contain security threats. Most
email clients are capable of automatically blocking emails containing ‘dangerous’
attachments and suspicious images, thus preventing users from executing or viewing
harmful content (Ollmann, 2008). These images may contain embedded hyperlinks
and, if clicked on by the user, may direct them to either spoofed or malicious
websites. Email clients, such as Microsoft Outlook, maintain a list of ‘dangerous’
attachment formats and are able to prevent users from opening them (Ollmann,
2008). In order to ensure that the email client continues to do this, it is essential that
users ensure that their software is regularly updated. Email clients may also include
digital signatures. According to Shelly and Vermaat (2011, p. 395), digital signatures
are often used to ensure that an imposter is not participating in an Internet
transaction. The purpose of a digital signature is to verify whether the sender is
whom he/she claims to be. This is made possible by an encrypted code attached to
an email in order to identify the sender.
Popular web-based email clients such as Google Mail and Yahoo Mail may be
subject to a wider variety of security threats, for example phishing, spam mail,
viruses than email application clients. The use of an organisationally accepted email
client gives trained technical staff the opportunity to increase security as they are
able to configure the email client to block unwanted or suspicious emails. Technical
staff should disable HTML functionality in all email client applications which are
capable of either accepting or sending Internet emails (Ollmann, 2008). Security may
also be further enhanced if emails are in plain-text format while, ideally, the font style
should be fixed as ‘Courier’ (Ollmann, 2008). Ollmann (2008) further adds that users
should not be able to use other email rendering options such as Rich-text format or
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Microsoft Word editors as these formats possess security flaws which may be
exploited by phishers. Ideally, users should not be able to access the contents of the
email attachment directly from within their email client application (Ollmann, 2008).
3.3.9 Software Updates
Updating the software on a computer system may also be regarded as a control
measure designed to prevent viruses from exploiting any software vulnerabilities in a
computer system. It is essential that programs be updated often in order to increase
the protection level against modern security threats. These updates include
enhancements to security, modifications to device drivers, bug fixes (code errors),
application software and, most importantly, the web browser and email client (Shelly
& Vermaat, 2011). Typically, most application programs, including operating
systems, have an automatic update feature (Shelly & Vermaat, 2011). For example,
Microsoft Update not only seeks updates for Microsoft-related products but also for
the manufacturers of other application programs which may be installed on the
user’s computer system. This feature is also evident in mobile phone platforms. For
example, Blackberry® smart phones alert users with notifications of the available
software updates for applications installed on their device. In addition, users should
ensure that their computer update settings are configured to be set to update on the
Internet automatically in order to reduce the risk of users forgetting to update their
software manually.
3.3.10 Password Manager Software
Password manager software may also serve as an effective technological control,
especially as users often forget their passwords and unsuspectingly submit sensitive
information to spoofed websites as a result of ignorance. A popular password
manager application, for example LastPass, allows users to create different user
profiles for each website. As a result, the password manager application is able to fill
in the user’s personal information automatically on websites, both accurately and
safely. An added benefit is that the password manager will perform such activities on
legitimate websites only and not spoofed websites. As such, it protects users against
identity theft as the personal data is encrypted on the user’s computer.
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3.3.11 Hide IP Address Software
Threat agents may gain access to a user’s computer by using the computer’s
Internet Protocol (IP) address. However, software programs exist which are
designed to conceal one’s computer’s IP address. This, in turn, allows one’s online
identity to be kept a secret as the program creates a fake IP address.
3.3.12 Utility Security Suite Software
It is common practice today to find computer devices being sold with security
software having been preinstalled by the manufacturer, for example, Hewlett
Packard security suite. Using this software, users are able to encrypt their hard
disks, backup the data, and increase the system access security with fingerprint
scanners or face recognitions. However, this, in turn, emphasises the importance of
users being knowledgeable about how to use these programs.
It emerged from this section that there is a wide variety of technological tools
available with which to combat security threats and protect systems on both a
personal level and an organisational level. However, there are many more
technological tools which exist other than those discussed in this section and this
growth is expected to continue. In this vein, Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 13) indicate
that developers will continually invent improved security technologies, thus making it
increasingly difficult for security threats to exploit technical vulnerabilities. However,
in each of these controls there are a few potential problems. Firstly, there are
potential problems in the technology itself (i.e. software vulnerabilities) which threat
agents seek to exploit with each new feature creating more security problems and
additional complexity (Orgill et al., 2004).
Secondly, all of these technological controls are operated and managed by people
and, as a result, there is a reliance on these people possessing the required skills to
use these technological controls correctly. However, this is difficult to manage
especially in view of the fact that technology is changing rapidly. Thus, in order to
address this concern, many software developers are focusing on automating
technology (Herath & Rao, 2009). This, in turn, again emphasises the need for
technology to function correctly. Clearly, these two problems mentioned above
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provide threat agents with an opportunity to exploit the human element (i.e. the
operator behind the technology) in order to acquire information. The human factors
will, thus, be discussed in the following section.
3.4 Human Factors in Information Security
Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 25) state powerfully that “[d]espite our intellect, we
humans - you, me and everyone else - remain the most severe threat to each other’s
security”. Thus, this section will discuss the role that human related factors play in
information security. In order to do this, social engineering techniques will be
discussed in detail as an understanding of social engineering techniques will reveal
the human attributes that are vulnerable, in particular to both social engineers and to
phishing threat agents. This section will also reveal the involvement that exists
between technology and humans.
Every individual in this world is unique with all individuals being characterised by
different experiences, knowledge, interests, emotions, cognitive abilities, culture and
personality traits which, ultimately, shape their behaviour. Thus, if people are not
currently demonstrating the correct behaviour, it is an extremely challenging task
simply to alter this behaviour. This, in turn, emphasises the important role played by
human factors ‒ an issue which is of key importance to this study. Human factors
play a significant role in information security and, thus, for many years human factors
have been the focus of a great deal of interest in the information security community.
In much of the literature on information security which has been published the writers
consistently reiterate that humans are the weakest link in information security
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Schneier, 2000). Ironically, humans are often both the cause
for security incidents, which are caused by their unacceptable behaviour and lack of
knowledge, as well as functioning as security control measures. Accordingly, security
awareness, training and education are often proposed as a solution to addressing
the problem of human behaviour and also to equip these human beings with the
requisite knowledge to deal with security threats. The next subsection elaborates on
the attributes of human behaviour and knowledge.
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3.4.1 Human Behaviour and Knowledge
Many of the security-related problems in organisations have been linked to employee
behaviour (Thomson, Von Solms, & Louw, 2006) with the behaviour and actions of
employees determining, to a large extent, the effectiveness of information security
practices (Dhillon, 2001, p. 165). The actions and behaviours of employees are
particularly important as almost all information systems rely on the human element
(Berti & Rogers, 2004).
As many as 80% of all major security failures may be the result of poor security
behaviour on the part of employees rather than poor security solutions (Leach,
2003). Studies conducted by Lim, Chang, Maynard, and Ahmad (2009), Lim, Ahmad,
Chang, and Maynard (2010) support the contention that the main threat which
agents pose to information security arises as a result of careless employees who do
not comply with organisational security policies and procedures (Pahnila, Siponen, &
Mahmood., 2007; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). As such, it is essential that
organisations realise that they must not rely on merely implementing technological
controls and organisational policies in order to prevent security threats. This, in turn,
has emphasised the need to understand human factors.
According to Van Niekerk (2005, p. 21), human factors may be classified into the
following two dimensions, namely, human cooperation (behaviour) and knowledge.
To a large extent, human cooperation depends on the attitudes of individuals and,
thus, it is essential to ensure that the attitude of individuals is such that it results in
the desired behaviour (Van Niekerk, 2005). This, in turn, requires that individuals are
in possession of knowledge relating to what they should do and how to perform their
security related functions. This further requires that individuals understand their roles
and responsibilities and that they are adequately trained to perform these roles and
responsibilities (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 3). This aspect will be further explained in
section 3.5.4.
In order to address the issue of human behaviour at an organisational level,
numerous researchers have recommended the establishment of an information
security culture. Information security culture may be defined as “the totality of
patterns of behaviour in an organization that contribute to the protection of
information of all kinds” (Dhillon, 1997). Such a culture may come about if employees
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begin practising information security unconsciously or, in other words, when
practising information security becomes a natural aspect of the daily activities of
every employee (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). However, this would, in turn, require a
change of behaviour so that employees would then demonstrate the correct attitude.
In addition, employees must be trained so that they acquire the relevant knowledge
which is needed to practise information security, for example, security education in
organisational policies and procedures. However, more importantly, it is essential
that the members of senior management demonstrate their support for information
security by being involved in security activities. If employees observe other
colleagues habitually practising security, this will help to influence them to do the
same unconsciously.
The next subsection discusses social engineering. Once social engineering is
understood, the human factor concerns will emerge.
3.4.2 Social Engineering
Social engineering is regarded as an art, method or technique which is used to
manipulate people into performing actions (DeFino et al., 2010). Mann (2008)
defines social engineering as a practice that may be used to manipulate people, by
using deception as the primary method, to influence the decisions and trust of
victims in such a way that they either give out information or perform certain actions.
It is apparent in both these definitions that psychological methods are being used by
social engineers to gain information from their victims.
It is due to the hacker turned security consultant, Kevin Mitnick, that the term ‘social
engineering’ became commercialised. Mitnick was most famous for using social
engineering techniques, instead of hacking, to extract information from unsuspecting
individuals. Mitnick later wrote a controversial book entitled The Art of Deception, in
which he describes, based on his own experiences, how and where he applied these
techniques (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). The book reveals how simple it is to trick people
into divulging information and particularly insiders in an organisation, despite their
technological protection. The book also gives many other real-world accounts of the
ways in which humans beings may fall victim to social engineering attempts.
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Social engineering may be broadly categorised as human-based and computer-
based (DeFino et al., 2010). As pointed out earlier, threat agents may attempt to
exploit vulnerabilities in either the hardware or the software in order to gain
information. However, they may also attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in human
behaviour in order to do the same (Microsoft, 2009). The latter may be considered as
an attack against the human interface of the targeted system (Microsoft, 2009) and is
regarded as the most effective and most convenient method for threat agents. Thus,
social engineering may be considered as a hacking technique against humans rather
than against systems.
Section 2.2 described how organisations have been affected by IT as a result of the
rapid expansion of organisational networks and the Internet. Consequently, many
working individuals are not given the opportunity to communicate directly with others
and vice-versa. Most individuals now sit for long hours in front of their computer
devices, busy with activities involving email, social networking websites or instant
messengers. However, this, in turn, may result in people becoming complacent and
overlooking certain security risks. This then creates an opportunity for the social
engineer to use these same technologies to trick users into either performing certain
actions or disclosing information. The next subsection discusses some of these
social engineering techniques.
3.4.3 Social Engineering Techniques
There are a number of intelligent social engineering techniques that threat agents
use in order to gain personal information from their victims. Some of these
techniques may be combined with technology to enhance their effectiveness (Orgill
et al., 2004). This, in turn, results in another common form of social engineering
which is referred to as phishing. Phishing usually happens through email and
phishers are most interested in obtaining passwords as well as credit card and
account numbers. Phishing will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.
Mitnick and Simon (2002) classify social engineering attacks into the following three
main approaches, namely, direct requests, contrived situations and personal
persuasion. They believe that ‘direct requests’ are the least successful approach
because the threat agents will clearly and directly ask for the information they
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require. However, this may cause the victim to become suspicious. On the other
hand, the ‘contrived situation’ approach is more enhanced in comparison to direct
requests as it involves the threat agent fabricating a story to make the story appear
more convincing. This, in turn, causes less suspicion than the previous approach
because of the creative aspect of the attacker’s story (Mitnick & Simon, 2002).
‘Personal persuasion’ is more complex as the attacker aims to manipulate the
individual into believing that he/she is actually providing the information willingly to
the threat agent. As a result, the victim does not perceive any risk (Mitnick & Simon,
2002). Applications of social engineering techniques which may be used to acquire
personal information or to elicit certain actions from individuals are described below.
3.4.3.1 Pretexting
Pretexting is a hacking technique involving the telephone (DeFino et al., 2010). It
involves the act of creating and using a preconceived scenario to engage a targeted
victim in such a manner that will increase the chances of the victim divulging
information or performing actions that would not usually take place under normal
circumstances or conditions. Today, many sales and other transactions are
conducted over the telephone, primarily because the telephone is so very
convenient. Organisation representatives authenticate the clients to whom they are
speaking by quoting their social security numbers, physical addresses and other
personal details. However, this approach also enables a threat agent to use social
engineering techniques to carry out such transactions.
This technique requires prior research into and information of the targeted victim in
order to establish credibility and legitimacy effectively in the victim’s mind so that the
threat agent gains the victim’s trust. For example, this technique may be used to trick
an organisation into disclosing customer information. The threat agent may pose as
a private investigator in order to obtain telephone records, utility records, banking
records, etc. from the organisation’s employees. This, in turn, enables the threat
agent to target a larger population group than would otherwise have been the case.
Pretexting may also involve impersonating co-workers, police officers, financial
institutions, and suchlike or any individual who is in a position of responsibility,
authority or power. The victim is then deceived by the threat agent as he/she may
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feel obligated to disclose confidential information. In terms of this method, an
authoritative voice, an authoritative tone, quick thinking and physical appearance are
all factors which are considered to increase the effectiveness of the method.
3.4.3.2 Diversion Theft
This technique is usually used against organisations that either transport or deliver
properties or goods. Social engineers persuade the authorities responsible for a
delivery to transport it elsewhere. With the property redirected to a different recipient,
the social engineers/thieves persuade the driver to offload the package near to or
away from the new recipient’s address in the guise that the package is either being
sent out or it is urgently required somewhere else. In this instance, the social
engineering techniques applied by the thieves are both well rehearsed and effective.
This section presented social engineering as the basis for acquiring confidential
information from users without having to resort to technical methods such as
hacking. The section also revealed that social engineers are able to carry out their
attacks in a number of different ways, for example, they may telephone or email
users, pretending to be an official or legitimate entity in order to gain illicit access to
systems. The next subsection aims to discuss those factors that render humans
beings susceptible to social engineering techniques.
3.4.4 What makes Humans Vulnerable to Social Engineering Techniques?
Understanding the human mind is one of the most challenging research areas. It is
not possible to programme humans merely by the push of a button. This section will
discuss some of psychological components that are triggered by social engineers.
Gragg (2002) believes it is essential to understand these psychological aspects as it
will convey why and how humans are falling victim easily to social engineering
techniques. Accordingly, the following paragraph categorises and describes those
psychological triggers which may be used to persuade and influence people.
 Strong affect is introduced when the social engineer makes a statement at
the beginning of the interaction that triggers strong emotions on the part of the
victim. This strong emotion may include, panic, fear and even excitement. For
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example, it may be the promise of a prize worth thousands of dollars or panic
that a bank account is about to be terminated.
 Overloading is used on victims in order to create confusion. The social
engineer will provide the victim with too much information to deal with quickly.
This, in turn, affects the victim’s logical functioning and may produce ‘sensory
overload’. Gragg (2002) further states that, with too much information to
process, people become ‘mentally passive’.
 Reciprocation: According to Gragg (2002), it is common in social interactions
to find that, if someone gives us something or promises us something,
individuals are inclined to return the favour. Reverse social engineering
makes use of the reciprocation trigger with the hacker appearing as a hero
who is ready, willing and able to solve the target’s problems. Thus, even
before the problem is resolved the target feels indebted to the hacker.
 Authority: People are more willing to respond to requests when it stems from
someone who is in a position of authority. For example, a policeman asks a
driver to show the policeman his/her driver’s license. However, it is essential
that the authority figure appear legitimate based on both appearance and
behaviour.
Each of these abovementioned triggers which are used by social engineers aim to
instil trust in their victims. Trust through deception is an important component if
social engineering is to be effective. For example, in the real world, if a well-dressed,
attractive individual approaches one for directions, one would probably be willing to
help this individual. Few people wish to be unhelpful and, when people are placed
under pressure to perform actions, they generally lack the appropriate assertiveness
to refuse (Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, & Ferguson, 2010). Mitnick and Simon
(2002) point out that it is an integral part of human nature to trust others, especially
when there is no apparent reason to be suspicious. However, if a stranger requests
personal information one may become increasingly suspicious. Nevertheless, if the
individual requesting the information were wearing a uniform, one would feel safer in
sharing such information while, if an individual were wearing tattered clothing and
had a scarred face, one would probably try to escape as quickly as possible.
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According to Workman et al., (2008), susceptibility is significantly associated with the
likeability and trustworthiness of individuals. Within an information security context, if
a phishing email or spoofed website appears legitimate, then it would probably not
arouse the victim’s suspicions. On social networking websites such as Facebook this
approach may be made even more effective. The threat agent would have to create
a profile, put up an attractive profile picture (which would most likely not be their
personal picture) and begin randomly sending out friend requests using their false
profile as bait. Once the users have accepted the request, the threat agent may then
establish a relationship of trust with his/her victims.
Deception manipulates the human mind as it focuses specifically on the attributes of
human decision-making known as cognitive biases. A social engineer exploits these
decisions or tendencies of humans by using techniques that exploits either emotions
or cognitive or cultural biases. The effectiveness in using social engineering
techniques, rather than the older, conventional methods, arises from the fact that
that no technical cracking knowledge or hacking experience is required. Social
engineers have realised that it is far easier to obtain personal information through
deception than by spending excessive time, resources and money on hacking into a
system (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). According to a report by Gartner (2005), "Many of
the most damaging security penetrations are, and will continue to be, due to Social
Engineering, not electronic hacking or cracking… Social Engineering is the single
greatest security risk in the decade ahead."
This section revealed that humans may be easily manipulated into trusting entities
based on the appearance of those entities and the use of fabricated stories. This, in
turn, is made possible by social engineering techniques which focus on specific
psychological triggers of the human mind. However, this poses security risks to
organisations and has resulted in the need to change the behaviour of users. The
next section will discuss organisational aspects. The influence of human behaviour
on the organisation will be evident in this next section.
3.5 Organisational Aspects
The previous section described human factors. Humans are involved in using
technology and they are also involved in various activities related to organisations.
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Predictably, human factors are once again going to constitute a security issue that
will have to be addressed in this section. The section focuses on two parties,
namely, the organisation and its employees. Accordingly, this section will discuss the
way in which human factors may be managed by the organisation.
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 23) regards most of the components specified in this
section as managing human resources. Senior management is responsible for the
welfare of the organisation. However, typically, in larger organisations with the sheer
number of employees, it is difficult for management to ensure that employees follow
orders and behave securely (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). This situation is further
exacerbated by the fact that the size of the organisation may result in limited
communication between senior management and employees on the operational
level. Consequently, organisations are forced to communicate their rules and
regulations by establishing of policies. Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) believe that
policies may be perceived as communication documents from management. As
such, the next section will define and discuss organisational policies.
3.5.1 Organisational Policies and Procedures
Whitman and Mattord (2010) define a policy as “the set of organisational guidelines
that describe acceptable and unacceptable behaviour of employees in the
workplace”. One of the reasons for organisational policies is to enable management
to direct appropriate behaviour on the part of both its employees and external parties
involved with the organisation. Procedures, on the other hand, refer to methods
which are put in place by the organisation to enable employees to accomplish the
objectives of the organisation (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 517).
Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) believe that policies are particularly important as
they provide the foundation from which security programmes and security practices
may be derived. Organisations may have in place several different types of policies
including recruitment policies, acceptable usage policies, employment policies and
so forth. It is interesting to note that Barman (2001) believes that organisations may
often have comprehensive employee policies but they do not necessarily have
‘information security’ policies. Furthermore, he states that when organisations do
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have an information security policy, such a policy is often extremely minimal as
compared to the organisation’s their other policies. In this study, policies are related
to information security and the next subsection will discuss this issue.
3.5.2 Information Security Policy
Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 245) define organisational security policies as clear
instructions that provide guidelines for employee behaviour as regards safeguarding
information, while Danchev (2003) states that developing a security policy is the first
measure which is needed to reduce the risk of the unacceptable use of an
organisation’s information resources. According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 7), the
objective of an information security policy is to “provide management direction and
support for information security in accordance with business requirements and
relevant laws and regulations”. However, before this process may begin, it is
essential that senior management demonstrate its commitment to and support for
information security.
Leadership is important in this regard because, if senior management does not
demonstrate its support, then it unlikely that the rest of the staff would demonstrate
the required behaviour (Leach, 2003). However, if management is to demonstrate its
commitment and support, then the organisation’s security policy document must
include a statement of management’s intent, supporting the goals and principles of
information security aligned with the business strategy and objectives (ISO/IEC
27002, 2005, p. 5). It is imperative that employees be educated about it and that they
are aware of organisational policies and procedures and, most importantly, the
information security policy of the organisation. Accordingly, the policy must be
communicated to all the employees of the organisation using a method that is
relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended audience (ISO/IEC 27002,
2005, p. 7).
However, as pointed out by Von Solms and Von Solms (2004), despite the fact that
employees may be informed about the policies, they may not necessarily obey them.
In order to address this issue, Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) recommend that a
group culture be cultivated so that employees will comply with the vision of
management. This may be done by expressing collective values, norms and
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knowledge by defining specific policies and procedures. These policies and
procedures should reflect the underlying assumptions and beliefs of management
(Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). Education will play a role in this regard and will,
thus, be discussed in subsequent chapters.
The information security policy will serve as a centralised document which defines
the organisation’s critical information assets and methods which the policy aims to
protect. ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 7 states that the information security policy may
form part of a general policy document. However, it must also include security
education, training and awareness requirements. Von Solms and Von Solms (2004)
recommend that the information security policy should be “short and sweet” and that
it should address only security principles and technical and business details which
change frequently. According to Johnson (2006), the information security policy
document should not exceed five pages and should include the following
components:
 Letter of commitment or support from management and/or the CEO as
regards the information security of the organisation
 Scope and objectives describing the necessity for such security policies. The
goals, scope and objectives should be outlined
 Clarification of information security aspects and definitions
 Security philosophy and definitions
 Responsibilities of each member of the organisation, particularly executive
management, security professionals and line managers
 Compliance and measurement and the consequences of non-compliance.
3.5.3 Recruitment and Selection of Suitable Employees
Within an organisation, the human resources department is responsible for the
identification and appointment of suitable candidates, either locally or countrywide
(Kirsten, 2001, p. 24). Staff members are selected based on their skills and expertise
regarding the task at hand. If candidates are incompetent or they lack the necessary
skills to perform tasks correctly, they will pose a security risk for the organisation. It is
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thus, essential that candidates possess the abilities and attitudes needed to assist
the organisation in achieving its objectives. However, if the recruitment process is to
be successful, a recruitment policy is needed. Such a policy should be drawn up by
the management of the organisation. From the organisation’s perspective, the policy
will provide objectives and guidelines regarding managing and governing the
recruitment process (Kirsten, 2001, p. 24). According to Kirsten (2001, p. 25), the
recruitment policy should include information on the following:
 Employing suitable candidates. Qualified or experienced staff members to
enable the organisation to achieve its objectives
 Structure of the organisation. Products or services, technology and
production processes determine the type of candidates to be employed
 Encouragement of team work. Conflict may arise in an organisation,
especially if there are diverse cultures, personality differences, communication
barriers and varying leadership styles. It is important that new candidates be
able to adapt and work together in the organisation as a team
 Legal requirements. Government legislations must be adhered to when
appointing candidates and there should be no discrimination based on
gender, race, religion, ethnic-background, sexual preference or health.
As part of this process, it is also important to screen employees prior to employment
because, as Johnson (2006) points out, the greatest source of information security
breaches is the employees within an organisation. Accordingly, the organisation
should screen applicants in order to eliminate individuals with personal
characteristics which do not match the minimum requirements as specified in the job
description (Kirsten, 2001, p. 34). Background verification checks of candidates’
academic qualifications, professional qualifications, character references, identity,
criminal records and past working history should be carried out on all candidates,
including contractors and third party users (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 23).
Screening should be carried out ethically according to existing laws and regulations
and proportional to the business requirements, the classification of the information to
be accessed and the perceived security risks (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 23).
Candidates should be informed beforehand that screening activities will be
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conducted. In addition, screening may also help the organisation to determine
whether a particular candidate may require further training. This, in turn, may help
determine whether specific candidates may be vulnerable to security threats and
also to identify any other security risks which candidates may pose to the
organisation. The latter may be done by adopting methods such as competency
testing, aptitude testing, intelligence testing, interest testing, personality testing,
psychological testing and trainability testing (Kirsten, 2001, p. 38). These tests may
be important because, although candidates may possess the suitable qualifications
for the job description, they may lack other skills or attributes which the organisation
may deem necessary. For example, some employers may indicate that they prefer
employees who are passionate, dedicated and motivated in their work. If the
organisation has carried out the recruitment process correctly, then the organisation
should be able to trust its employees.
3.5.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Employees
It is important that employees are clearly informed about the roles and
responsibilities which an organisation prescribes for them. In other words,
employees must understand what the organisation requires of them and how to carry
out their tasks. On the other hand, the organisation must ensure that the employees’
roles correspond with their abilities and skills. This should have been ascertained in
the recruitment process. According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 23), employees
should be aware that it is their responsibility to protect organisational assets from
unauthorised access, disclosure, modification, destruction or interference while a
knowledge of policies and procedures will enable employees to have an
understanding of what is considered as acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour
with regard to carrying out their tasks in the workplace. Employees understand they
are paid to perform their tasks. Unfortunately, some individuals may be tempted to
abuse the organisation’s time and/or resources by carrying out personal activities
which are unrelated to their roles and responsibilities. As a result, personal activities
during work time are considered unacceptable and may result in disciplinary action
(see section 3.5.7). If employees have completed their tasks according to schedule,
they should not seek alternative activities which are unrelated to work in order to
keep themselves occupied for example, using social networking websites, and
downloading music from websites. Employees should, thus, be made aware that
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their work performance is monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. Furthermore,
employees must be informed that disciplinary action can result from engaging in
activities that is not supported by the organisation.
3.5.5 Induction Programme
Once employees have been appointed to their respective positions, they may need
to go through a formal induction process. Activities in the induction process is driven
by awareness and is designed to welcome employees into the organisation and
involve them by providing them with basic information, including information on the
values and the attitudes expected in the organisation (Kirsten, 2001, p. 51). It is
recommended that an organisation introduce its policies and procedures as part of
the induction process. It is also vital that information on the organisation’s security
policies and expectations be provided before access to information or services is
granted (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26). An induction process represents a form of
education as it typically aims to achieve the following (Kirsten, 2001, p. 52):
 Enable the employee to settle comfortably in his/her new working environment
 Engender a positive attitude to the organisation and/or employer
 Help create realistic employee expectations
 Prevent accidents (e.g. ineffective use of machinery, wasting of materials)
 Ensure that the employee becomes productive as soon as possible
 Promote a culture of continuous training for the future.
Some employees have reported that they enjoy work when it gives them a sense of
meaning and purpose (centreforconfidence.co.uk, online); for example striving for a
goal larger than themselves gives them job satisfaction. Unfortunately, organisations
today often discourage employees from this approach (centreforconfidence.co.uk,
online). The induction process should also, if necessary, aim to change the attitude
of its employees to believe that working may be enjoyable and that working should
not be perceived as a robotic activity which is performed for the sake of earning an
income. This, in turn, will require employees to be motivated and passionate about
their work (see section 3.5.6). Some employees may not be satisfied with their roles
in the workplace despite meeting the requirements for the position and this may
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affect job attitudes. Wipawayangkool (2009) maintains that job attitudes influence the
perceptions of users from their training and the way in which they react to training.
Harrison et al. (2006) determined from their attitude engagement model that job
satisfaction and organisational commitment constitute the underlying dimensions of
job attitude.
3.5.6 Motivating Employees
In general, one often hears about employees who complain that they are not paid
enough in their work, for example an employee whose work involves demanding
physical labour, such as digging up trenches. This employee may have a negative
attitude towards an employee who works in a comfortable office environment while
the physical labourer may also be paid far less for his/her work than the person
working in the office. The labourer may feel that, because they are performing much
harder work which demands physical strength while they are also at risk from
hazards, they should be paid more than the office employee.
On the other hand, the office employees may believe that they are justified in being
paid more than the labourers because they are educated and because they may
possess a formal university qualification and that they are, therefore, being paid to
make important educated decisions. Both parties may argue their cases
convincingly. In addition, the labourer may become demotivated because he
believes he is not being fairly compensated by his employer in relation to his efforts.
As a result, the labourer may purposely start being lazy in his/her work as well as
developing lax habits and a negative attitude towards his employer (i.e. the
organisation). This, in turn, may affect the organisation as far as security and
productivity are concerned. It is, thus, clear that employee motivation may have a
significant impact on the wellbeing of the organisation.
If the organisation does not assign clear roles and responsibilities to employees then
incompetence and a lack of motivation may emerge. Motivating employees usually
takes the form of some reward or compensation for the employee. The latter falls in
the area of compensation management and refers to the system in terms of which
individuals are rewarded with money for their work, performance level and diligence
(Kirsten, 2001, p. 76). This compensation is perceived as a reward and is typically
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used by organisations in order to shape individual and group behaviour (Kirsten,
2001, p. 76).
Compensation motivates employees to be more productive in the organisation while
it also satisfies their needs and expectations. Kirsten (2001, p. 76) points out that
employees will not be prepared to work unless they are assured that they will receive
compensation for their efforts and that they are being treated fairly because they are
being rewarded for their efforts. This, in turn, affects employee attitudes and
behaviour and, ultimately, motivates employees to work towards the goals of the
organisation. It is important that the organisation compensate its employees regularly
on the date specified in the job contract. If employees are not satisfied with their
compensation, they may resort to either strikes or protests. It is, thus, essential that
compensation details be covered in detail in the employment contract.
Incentives are also used by organisations to motivate their employees to produce
results. Incentives refer to rewards and usually take the form of time off, social get-
togethers, salary increases, stationary and equipment, etc. Incentives are also used
to motivate individuals in other domains. For example, the South African athletes
competing in the 2012 London Olympic Games stood to receive R400 000 for every
gold medal they won (Lewis, 2012) while a university may have in place incentives
for academics to the effect that, if they publish research articles in accredited
journals, they are granted money for each publication and may be promoted. In both
these examples, the individuals concerned would be motivated to work harder in
order to realise their goals and, in turn, the organisation concerned would benefit.
Raghu, Jayaraman, and Rao (2004) suggest that employee behaviour is affected by
explicit incentives that both the employees and organisations understand. Team
building exercises may also help motivate employees through building confidence
and trust in their colleagues. This, in turn, may help strengthen existing work
relationships and also create new relationships. These exercises may be held in a
location distant from the organisation itself, such as a holiday resort or a lodge. It is
important that these exercises are fun and, more importantly, that management be
more flexible and forthcoming than usual to their employees during these events. As
a result, any negative attitudes towards the organisation and management and
amongst the employees themselves may diminish.
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Although this paragraph highlighted the fact that organisations should motivate their
employees primarily by means of remuneration, there are other factors which have
an influence in this regard. Kirsten (2001, p. 77) points out these factors may include
legislation, the organisation’s remuneration policy, the worthiness of the employee,
the cost of living and, most importantly, the financial position of the organisation. If
organisations decide on a salary increase, they need certain criteria in order to
determine the worthiness of the candidate. This may be achieved by some form of
performance monitoring. If organisations are in a position where they are not able to
afford salary increases, it is important that they communicate this to their employees
on a regular basis. If employees are not aware of the prevailing situation, they may
make their own assumptions about not receiving any salary increases and, as a
result, they may develop negative attitudes towards the organisation.
Within an information security context, it is important that employees be motivated to
safeguard the organisation’s systems and information. This viewpoint is supported
by Siponen (2000) who points out that, even if employees are educated about
information security, they may not adhere to its procedures as a result of a lack of
motivation. If employees are demotivated, apart from not carrying out their work
tasks efficiently, they may develop a ‘don’t care’ attitude and, as a result, place the
organisation’s information assets at risk. If employees are acknowledged and
rewarded for their hard work and compliance, this may make a significant difference
within the organisation itself and the working environment. Rewarding employees for
desirable behaviour and punishing them for undesirable behaviour are both
considered to be vital factors in influencing employee compliance with information
security (Gonzalez & Sawicka, 2002). Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 245) further add
that organisations should institute a reward programme for those employees who
demonstrate good security practices or for those who report security incidents. The
process for punishing undesirable behaviour is described in section 3.5.7.
Compensation and incentives are strong motivators for productiveness and
adherence to security policies and may also change employee attitudes towards
both their work and their employer.
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3.5.7 Disciplinary Process
Every organisation usually has a formal disciplinary process in place. For example, if
an employee arrives at work under the influence of alcohol, a legal process should
be followed to ensure that the correct action is taken and that the individual is fairly
treated. Mitnick and Simon (2002, p. 245) believe that employees should be advised
of the consequences for failing to comply with security policies and procedures and,
thus, a set of appropriate consequences for violating the policies should be
formulated and communicated to employees. Organisations typically have in place a
disciplinary process to handle such misdemeanours. The disciplinary process should
be described in the organisation’s policy documents. With regard to information
security, employees who have committed a security breach and/or who are
suspected of committing a breach of security should also be subject to such a
disciplinary process (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26). It is essential that employees
understand that, if such policies are either ignored or violated, there will be
consequences. A formal disciplinary process should take into consideration a
number of factors, including, among other things, the nature and gravity of the
security breach and its impact on the business, whether or not this is a first or a
repeat offence, whether or not the transgressor has been properly trained, relevant
legislation and business contracts (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26). Depending on the
nature of the misconduct, the disciplinary process may call for instant removal from
duties, loss of access rights and privileges and, if necessary, immediate eviction
from the premises (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26).
From the perspective of the organisation, an indirect benefit of the disciplinary
process is the fact that knowledge of the consequences may serve as a deterrent to
prevent employees, contractors and third party users from violating organisational
security policies and procedures and from committing any other security breaches.
This, in turn, may help shape the behaviour of employees who will wish to ensure
that they are not affected by any such consequences.
3.5.8 Termination or Change of Employment
Termination of employment may be the result of employee misconduct (see section
3.5.7). The human resources function is usually responsible for this process although
the process may also require the involvement of either a supervisor or a manager of
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the employee concerned (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26) as well as the involvement of
other departments within the organisation, for example, ICT staff withdrawing
network access rights (passwords) from an employee. The latter is important
because, if not done, the employee concerned may continue receiving information in
his/her emails and he/she may then use this information that belongs to the
organisation.
It is essential that the termination process be formalised to include the return of all
previously issued software, corporate documents and equipment. Other
organisational assets, including mobile computing devices, credit cards, access
cards, access rights, manuals, and information stored on electronic media would
also have to be returned. The access rights that should be either removed or
adapted include physical and logical access, keys, identification cards and
information processing facilities. Depending on the level of risk, access rights to
information assets and facilities should be either reduced or relinquished before
employment is terminated (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 28). It is important that the
organisation conduct the termination process correctly and thoroughly. As pointed
out in the Omega example in section 2.3.2, disgruntled employees, contractors or
third party users may deliberately either damage and corrupt information or sabotage
information processing facilities.
It is evident from this section that policies and procedures exert a significant
influence on the way in which people are managed in an organisation. This section
not only emphasised the importance of an information security policy but it also
described other policies which may influence the management of employee
behaviour. It is evident that employees may, knowingly or unknowingly, transgress
policies and, thus, it is essential that they be made aware of the consequences of
such transgressions. This section also further recommended that employees be
rewarded for displaying acceptable behaviour as this may motivate employees and
help sustain such behaviour.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter classified information security controls into three main dimensions,
namely, technological controls, human factors and organisational aspects. Despite
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the fact that organisations make use of all these controls to combat threats,
technological controls are used the most. This is, however, a matter for concern in
view of the fact that human beings constitute the greatest security risk because of
their lack of knowledge and undesirable behaviour. Humans make use of technology
and, thus, if they are unable to use it correctly then the technology may be
considered inadequate. The organisational aspect dimension takes into account
components related to managing the employees of an organisation. In general,
policies and procedures are used to do this. However, in this instance human
behaviour also poses a risk as these policies are often ignored by employees and,
thus, it is essential that organisations ensure that they also put in place other
measures including recruitment, induction programmes.
Motivation plays a key role in ensuring that employees have the correct attitude and
behaviour as regards their work. It is evident that human factors are present in each
of these dimensions and, thus, it is clear that each of these dimensions is linked by
human involvement. Social engineering attacks pose a significant security threat as
they exploit the human factors to the full. This, in turn, heightens the concern that, if
human factors are not managed, a social engineer may target any of these
dimensions as they are each characterised by gaps which are caused by human
factors. Phishing involves the use of the social engineering techniques described
earlier and is the research problem which needs to be addressed in this study. The
next chapter will discuss phishing in great detail. Predictably, human factors will
again emerge as an area of weakness which phishers will exploit.
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CHAPTER 4PHISHING
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4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, information security controls were categorised into three
main areas, namely, technological, human and organisational aspects. These
aspects were all discussed in detail. Phishing is a component of social engineering.
Therefore it was critical to understand the components of social engineering as it
provided insight into the reasons why people fall victim to social engineering
techniques. This will help to understand how to address the problem of phishing. The
chapter begins by describing the most important aspects of both phishing and its
related techniques. The risk which phishing poses to an organisation and its
customers are also examined. The chapter concludes by classifying the anti-phishing
measures found in literature into three areas, namely, human factors, organisational
aspects and technological controls.
4.2 Phishing Explored
Chapter 3 described social engineering and its variations. It emerged from this
discussion that humans tend to trust entities and suchlike easily, based on their
appearance. Furthermore, humans are inclined to be helpful towards others, even
towards strangers. Phishers takes advantage of these human factors by making
effective use of social engineering techniques in order to gain the trust of their
victims as quickly as possible. This section begins by providing a brief history of
phishing and its techniques. This is followed by examples of actual phishing emails.
‘Phishing’ is a term that was introduced in the United States (US) when hackers
began, metaphorically, to ‘fish’ illegally for confidential information from people. They
did this by creating fake emails and websites which functioned as the ‘bait’ while the
victims’ information was the ‘fish’ (phish) caught in the phishers’ net (Sophos, 2005).
The ‘ph’ spelling of phishing originated in the 1970s when the first hackers began
breaking into the US telephone system in order to make free telephone calls, an
activity which they termed ‘phone phreaking’. In this instance, the most notorious
‘phreaker’ was John Draper, famously known as Captain Crunch (DeFino et al.,
2010). John Draper used a toy whistle which was packaged in the Cap’n Crunch
cereal box to emit a tone of precisely 2600 hertz. This frequency allowed him to
make free telephone calls, using the AT&T long lines, from any telephone point in
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the US. The term ‘phishing’ became internationally recognised in 1996, after America
Online (AOL™) and its corresponding customer accounts had been affected by
phishing attacks (Ollman, 2008). Phishing activities began to be more noticeable on
the Internet in late 2003 (Microsoft, 2008 with those people who tricked individuals
into providing their information through using computers becoming known as
‘phishers’.
There are at least two parties involved in every phishing attack, namely, the phisher
who sends an email or an instant message and the victim who receives the email or
message. The most effective phishing attacks have been initiated through email
(Ollmann, 2008). Typically, the phisher sends a phishing email to the victim
containing a fabricated story, warning the victim of a potential threat or danger that is
imminent. For example, the victim may be warned that his/her account may be
compromised as the organisation concerned has been experiencing either fraudulent
activity or a security breach. The victim is required to click on a hyperlink embedded
within the email which directs the user to a spoofed website in order to verify their
personal particulars. In addition, it may be stated in the email that, should the victim
decide to ignore the request, this may result in either their account or their
membership being suspended or terminated. Users often fall for this technique and
obey the request. They then unsuspectingly log-in to the website with their personal
account information (e.g. username, password, credit card number). The victim’s
personal information is then captured by the phisher to be retrieved for illegal
purposes.
These activities are possible because the phisher makes use of social engineering
techniques and, thus, phishing may be considered as a subcomponent of social
engineering. A phisher attempts to steal confidential information from users or
employees by disguising him/herself as a legitimate entity (Kumaraguru et al., 2007).
These entities which are imitated are usually well-known financial or e-commerce
organisations. A few high profile and popular cases of organisations that have fallen
victim to phishing attacks include PayPal, eBay, American Online, ABSA
(Mittner, 2007; Sophos, 2005), Standard Bank (Expertron, 2009, Pickworth, 2009),
Google, Microsoft and the South African Revenue Services (Fin24.com, 2009,
SARS, 2009). Made possible through the Internet, there are no geographical
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boundaries to phishing attacks and, as such, phishing is a problem which is affecting
most of the world. In view of the fact that it is a form of identity theft phishing is
considered as fraud with the phisher intentionally posing as a trustworthy source
which he/she is not. Phishing may also be considered to be a subset of spam as,
firstly, the recipient does not know the sender and, secondly, the recipient did not
request such emails to be delivered to his/her email account. The main objective of
phishing is to obtain the victim’s personal information fraudulently in order to extort
money (Vegter, 2005). Although most of the cases affected by phishing are
financially related, phishing may also include unauthorised access to all types of
other personal and financial data.
Generally speaking, phishing websites (spoofed websites) are discovered and shut
down relatively quickly (Sophos, 2005). However, within the limited time period
available, phishers try desperately to gain the trust of recipients as quickly as
possible. The longer a phishing attack remains active, the more money the victims
and targeted institutions lose and the more money the phisher is able to make
(Aaron, 2010). The strength of phishing lies in its ability to exploit the human
tendency to trust email messages and websites based on their appearance despite
the fact that there is nothing trustworthy in the actual appearance of the spoofed
websites (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor. 2006). Instead of phishers taking advantage
of system vulnerabilities, phishers focus on taking advantage of the way in which
humans interact with computers or their interpretation of messages (Schneier, 2000).
In other words, phishing exposes the human factor the most.
Phishers are aware that users may have technological controls in place, such as
spam filters, anti-virus programs and so on, to detect phishing emails. As a result,
phishers also use technological methods (e.g. HTML based emails, hidden
characters, encoded URLs, and so forth) to avoid detection by the victim and his/her
technological defences. According to Ohaya (2006), in some cases, phishers may
also take advantage of software vulnerabilities, especially vulnerabilities in popular
web browsers. For example, by exploiting the weakness in the web browser, an
entry point may be created to install malicious software (e.g. key logger virus). This,
in turn, will allow the phisher to capture or log all the keys secretly which a user
enters when he/she log-ins to a particular website. As a result, phishers are able to
use these details to log into websites of the victim on other occasions. Such an
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instance would be considered as identity theft. Phishers may even download
specialised programs that are able to change a user’s browser proxy settings, thus
redirecting all Internet requests and responses to pass through spoofed websites
owned by the phishers. Phishers also acquire the email addresses of potential
victims from a variety of sources including websites, social networking websites,
trade journals, professional directories and newspapers (Ohaya, 2006). It emerged
from this section that, in the main, phishers target the human element. The aim of
these phishing techniques is usually to gain the trust of victims so that the victims
provide sensitive information willingly. It is evident that phishers take advantage of
any potential weaknesses in a system. As pointed out in the previous chapter,
technology is characterised by weaknesses in the form of software vulnerabilities i.e.
bugs, as they are developed by humans. In addition, humans may use technology
incorrectly either intentionally or unintentionally. Thus, phishers exploit these
weaknesses from both the technological and the human perspective.
4.2.1 Phishing Variations
The previous section described typical email phishing scams. However; there are
other techniques which phishers use and, besides their predominant use of email
and spoofed websites, in modern times phishing techniques have become
increasingly sophisticated (Kirda & Kruegel, 2006; Sophos, 2005). Phishers are also
making use of a range of modern and popular technologies such as Internet Relay
Chat (IRC), Social Networking websites (e.g. Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and
Friendster) and instant messengers (IMs) in order to lure their victims (Butler, 2007;
Ollmann, 2008). Phishing may also be conducted through viruses, key-loggers or a
Trojan horse (Sophos, 2005) which may be sent through attachments in emails or
downloaded from websites (Drake et al., 2004). Besides these technological
approaches, phishers may also contact their victims directly by using a telephone to
seek personal information. Some phishers may pose as interested employers and
contact and email people who have listed themselves on job search websites. These
examples are described in the following paragraphs. However, all of these variations
are extremely similar as they all make use of social engineering principles.
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4.2.1.1 Spear Phishing
Spear phishing represents a more targeted form of phishing and is not regarded as a
‘general’ phishing scam. As the term ‘spear’ suggests, its differentiation focuses on a
single user or on a department within an organisation. It will appear as if the phisher
is legitimately positioned within the victim’s organisation, usually in a position of trust.
The phisher may request employees to update their username and passwords. For
example, should the phisher have knowledge that the victim is a client at a particular
financial institution, for example, First National Bank™, the phisher would probably
use the institution’s image as a lure (the bait) and include the victim’s name in the
email message in order to enhance the fictional legitimacy of the email. The strength
of spear phishing attacks lies in the timing and context in mimicking an authentic
situation (Jakobsson, Tsow, Shah, Blevis, & Lim, 2007).
4.2.1.2 Whaling
According to Fulks (2010), whaling is difficult to detect as the efforts of phishers in
this regard are more focused in comparison to typical phishing. Similar to spear
phishing, whaling involves the threat targeting specific individuals and creating
messages that appeal to that specific target. In many cases, the person being
‘whaled’ is usually a high profile executive or powerful figure who potentially stands
to lose more financially. Evidently, the term ‘whaling’ describes going after a ‘bigger
fish’ which, fittingly, would be a company executive. Similar to spear phishing, when
a victim is being ‘whaled’, the first contact from the threat may not be the usual
generic ‘Dear user’ or ‘Dear sir/madam’ message but, instead, the message may
include the victim’s name, financial institution, job title. The use of the Internet
enables threats agents to gather considerable information about high ranking
corporate executives with ease and then to use this information to tailor their
messages specifically to those people in order to gain their trust.
4.2.1.3 Wi-phishing
This technique is similar to the spear phishing technique but with the difference that
the phishers target the users of wireless network devices such as cell phones and
PDAs. Wi-phishing tricks users into submitting their personal information via wireless
Internet connection. Internet hot spots at hotels, restaurants, airports, cyber cafés
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and libraries often offer customers wireless Internet access that is convenient to
users, but also provides an excellent opportunity for threat agents to use wi-phishing.
The CEO of Ciron, Nicholas Miller, is credited with coining the term “wi-phishing” and
metaphorically describes it as “somebody walking through Grand Central Station
with papers blowing out of the back of their briefcase all over the place, for anybody
to read. With over 100 million wireless laptops in use today and growing, wi-phishing
is projected to get worse” (Pipline, 2005).
4.2.1.4 IVR/Phone Phishing or Vishing
This technique uses a rogue Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system to recreate
the legitimate sound of an institution’s IVR system. The victim is prompted, usually
by means of a phishing email, to contact the institution in order to verify his/her
personal information. Typically, the system will purposefully continually reject log-ins,
thus ensuring that the victim enter their personal credentials multiple times. More
advanced systems may transfer the victim to the attacker, who poses as a customer
service agent, for the purposes of further questioning. Vishing sometimes uses fake
caller-ID data to create the impression that the calls originate from a trusted
organisation.
4.2.1.5 Mishing
This technique is very similar to phishing although it targets cell phone users. In
today’s world it is common for end-users to perform transactions on their mobile cell
phones, including purchasing goods or services, and mobile banking. Almost all
smart phones are packaged with a mobile web browser and, as a result, these users
are potentially exposed to mishing scams. For example, a typical mishing call or text
message will involve a scammer, posing as an employee from the victim’s bank and
claiming to need the victim’s personal details. Scammers are extremely creative and
they are able to fabricate numerous stories in order to gather personal information.
Mishing may also be delivered in a SMS which lures the user either to click on the
hyperlink or to reply to the message and provide personal information.
4.2.1.6 Baiting
This technique relies on the curiosity or greed of the victim. For example, the threat
may place a malware/virus infected floppy diskette, CD, DVD or a USB flash drive in
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a location where it is intended to be found by the victim. The threat agent entices the
victim by ensuring that the object has a legitimate looking label (e.g. a company logo,
budget report, executive salaries) and then waits for the user to use the device. If the
user does not hand it in, curiosity may result in the victim inserting the device into
his/her computer with the result that malicious software (malware) is automatically
installed on the victim’s computer. This, in turn, enables the threat agent to gain
system access to the user’s infected computer or, at worst, an entire organisations
internal network. Baiting may also occur via email (see section 4.2.3) which lures the
victim to open an attachment. If a recipient takes this bait and his/her computer
becomes infected, the criminals may access the computer device remotely, steal the
personal information stored on it and intercept passwords and online transactions
(Aaron, 2010). The criminals may even log into a victim’s computer device to perform
online banking transactions while posing as the victim by using the victim’s account
details. As a result, it is extremely difficult for the banks to detect this fraudulent
activity while the victim would also struggle to prove the absence of negligence.
4.2.1.7 Pharming
According to Shelly and Vermaat (2011, p. 405), pharming also involves the
perpetrator attempting to obtain personal and financial information. However,
pharming is performed using spoofed websites. Typically, a user types a web
address (URL) but is redirected to a hoax web site that appears to be legitimate. The
hoax website prompts the victim to enter confidential information which is then
captured by the phisher.
It emerged from this subsection that, in the main, phishers make use of technology
to carry out their attacks with effective use being made of the technology in order to
gain the victim’s trust. This enables phishers to exploit human weakness, specifically
their behaviour and trust. In this study, the focus of phishing will be on those attacks
which are carried out through the use of email. The next subsection provides a
systematic description of the way in which email phishing attacks are carried out.
4.2.2 Characteristics of a Phishing Attack
Section 4.2.1 described a number of variations regarding the ways in which phishing
may be carried out. From the description of phishing above, it is clear that phishing
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typically makes use of a variety of social engineering techniques to lure
unsuspectingly victims into providing their personal information. Section 3.4.4
discussed psychological triggers affected by social engineering techniques. These
triggers will be evident in the subsequent sections. Understanding the way in which
these techniques are used will help users to distinguish phishing emails from
legitimate emails. Based on the literature studied, Frauenstein and Von Solms
(2011) classify five factors that must be present if such an attack is to be carried out
successfully:
1. Planning: During this stage, the phisher determines the method (e.g. spear
phishing, whaling) to be used, the intended victim as well as the type of
information to be gained from the victim. Some researchers term this process
the reconnaissance stage. DeFino et al. (2010, p. 35) maintain that Google
search engine may be used as a tool by threat agents to profile and map their
targets. According to Orgill et al. (2004), there are two aspects to social
engineering attacks that are designed to obtain the desired information from
the victim ‒ the physical aspect and the psychological aspect or a combination
of both. The physical aspect is usually decided upon as the environment in
which the victim feels the most secure, relaxed and comfortable. This is often
the workplace, over the telephone, instant messengers, email, text message
and online. Such physical factors provide the victim with a false sense of
security and complacency which assists the social engineer to achieve his/her
objective. Thus, during this phase, the ‘phisher’ will decide which medium
(bait) is best suited to entice the victim into releasing information.
2. Authentic looking email: The phisher usually establishes the first contact
with the victim through email with this process being termed the attack phase.
Thus, in this stage, the appearance and content of the email are critical to the
phisher with a reputable or well-known organisation often being imitated in the
email (Van der Merwe et al., 2005a). This is intended to gain the victim’s trust.
The illusion, based on the appearance of the email (e.g. email address
structure, subject header and content), is made to appear more legitimate by
using institutional logos, terminology, etc. This is often done by the phisher
using URL obfuscation techniques (Ollmann, 2008). Phishers utilise well
known flaws in the common mail server communication protocol (SMTP) and
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are, therefore, able to create emails with fake “Mail From:” headers and
impersonating any organisation they choose (Ollmann, 2008). The email
subject header/line also attracts the victim’s attention for example, Tax
Refund Notification, Important Claim, Warning etc. This technique is used to
enhance the authenticity and urgency of the email in the mind of the victim.
3. Fabricated story: Typically, a fabricated story is used to gain the victim’s
attention with the email usually warning the victim of a supposed problem or
threat which exists for example, customer accounts have been hijacked, a
security breach or to update details. Thus, lured by the fake story, the user is
required to click on a hyperlink which is sometimes disguised as either text or
an image for example, Click here for verification. Alternatively, the phisher
may choose to provide a file attachment which the user must download to
his/her device. This file may either contain a virus or it may contain
information which instructs the user to perform further actions. The tone of the
email is perceived as either friendly or helpful tone, for example thanking you
for your cooperation. In this instance, the phisher makes effective use of
reverse psychology against the victim as, before the victim has reached a
decision as whether or not to respond to the request, the victim may already
feel indebted to the phisher. The strength lies in the psychological aspect,
which preys on human emotions and specifically on the human tendency to
be helpful to others even if they are strangers.
4. Threatening tone and/or consequence: In order to ensure that the victim
responds to the phisher’s demand, the phisher will try to add a threatening
element. For example, the victims are warned that, should they not verify their
particulars, this may lead to the suspension or even termination of their
accounts. Again, reverse psychology is used as victims are afraid to ignore
the request. Ironically, it is typical of ‘human nature’ not to want any further
undesired consequences or complications for example, renewing accounts,
and registration and so on.
5. Spoofed website: This stage involves the final activity which involves the use
and understanding of technology on the part of the victim. The first such
activity was the email. Once the user has clicked on the hyperlink provided in
the email message he/she is redirected to a spoofed-website. The spoofed
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website appears authentic and legitimate as it usually contains institutional
logos. There is almost no difference, in appearance, between the legitimate
(original) website and the spoofed website. As a result, the victim tends to
trust the website and will enter his/her credentials which are then, unbeknown
to the victim, captured by the phisher. The phisher uses this information to
steal money, fraudulently purchase goods on the victim’s account and/or
commit identity theft. Ohaya (2006) maintains that if the website appears
authentic, then users will have confidence in the website as they will not be
able to distinguish between a genuine or a spoofed website. In some cases,
the users’ ignorance plays into the phishers’ hands. Patrick, Briggs, and
Marsh. (2005) maintain that “the importance of visual appeal in the early
stages of interaction with a website is not unexpected given that, in face-face
interaction, people make judgements on the basis of the attractiveness of an
individual”.
Van der Merwe et al. (2005a, 2005b) describe the characteristics of a phishing email
as follows:
 “There is always some kind of company that is imitated, often from the
financial sector
 The email often includes a security breach, warning customers to log-in and
verify or renew their details
 There is always a link that the user needs to follow in order to complete the
process
 The graphics used are often identical to the original website.”
As stated earlier, according to some researchers, the effectiveness of using social
engineering techniques does not depend entirely on the phisher’s possessing much
prior technical knowledge or education regarding hacking information systems and,
instead, a mixture of manipulation, human emotion and technical deceit is used to
trick victims into willingly giving up their personal information (Ollmann, 2008). An
anonymous phisher once posted online that there must be no limit to phisher’s
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creativity. In view of the fact that there is no face-to-face human interaction in a
phishing attack, the appearance of the phishing email and spoofed website is used
to replace this face-to-face interaction.
The next subsection will provide examples of real-world phishing emails. This should
indicate the strength of phishing which stems from the appearance of the email
combined with social engineering techniques.
4.2.3 The Anatomy of Phishing Emails and Email Scams
Section 4.2.2 described the characteristics of a phishing email and how such an
attack is typically carried out. This subsection will illustrate the way in which social
engineering techniques appear in phishing emails. Actual examples of phishing
emails which were directed to the researcher’s personal email account will be
presented and examined. In addition, the psychological triggers, discussed in section
3.4.4, will be highlighted in each example. There are evidently similarities between
email scams and phishing emails and, thus, this section will distinguish between
these similarities by presenting the information in two parts, namely, phishing emails
and email scams.
Phishing Emails
Figure 4.1: Phishing email using a refund to gain the victim’s attention
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The receipt of any email which states that one is about to receive a tax refund is
sufficient to attract anyone’s attention. In this example, the context of this email
would appear as even more trustworthy for South African citizens. However, as one
may see from the description of the link, the email is not directing the user to a
legitimate financial authority, in this instance SARS. The psychological triggers of
strong affect (‘tax refund of R8.582’) and overloading (‘2–3 days to process’) are
used in this example.
Figure 4.2: Phishing email ironically using a phishing warning
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In Figure 4.2, the legitimate institutional logos of Absa Bank are used to make the
email appear more trustworthy. In this example, a reciprocation psychological trigger
is used, as the threat has already warned the victim of phishing risks. As a result, the
victim will be less suspicious and, as such, be led into believing that the threat’s
intention is to be helpful by offering this fabricated security service.
Figure 4.3: Phishing email using an expiration warning to create urgency
In Figure 4.3, a psychological trigger of ‘strong affect’ is used. As the victim does not
want their bank account to be suspended, they will probably obey the request. In this
example, there is a spelling mistake, that is, in the word ‘fruadulent’. Moreover, the
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hyperlink contained in the email is obviously suspect. Users need to identify these
errors as this can help them to recognise such emails for what they are.
Users should be aware that phishers may send emails requesting the user to
download or update their software, and for which purpose they provide a hyperlink.
Figure 4.4 below, which requests users to update their Adobe product software,
demonstrates this particular scam. As Adobe is a popular and reputable software
enterprise, there is a great probability that users will recognise the name.
Accordingly, this might result in users believing in the authenticity of the email. In this
example, the psychological trigger of authority is used.
Figure 4.4: Email scam informing the user of a new version of software
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The benefits mentioned in terms of the software upgrade also to gain the victim’s
attention. In Figure 4.4, it is evident in the status bar (bottom left-hand corner) that
the hyperlink does not redirect to Adobe’s official website but rather to a spoofed
website (http://barrington.myemailrepo...).
There are many phishing examples that could be mentioned. From the real-world
phishing email examples discussed, one can understand why people fall victim to
these techniques. The fabricated story (evident in all the examples) may seem valid
especially when a spear-phishing technique is used. In some cases, the institution’s
logo is used (particularly in Fig. 4.2) to increase its authenticity in the victim’s mind.
Furthermore, other features of the email address structure (domain name) create the
illusion that it originated from a legitimate institution (e.g. ibsupport@absa.co.za.,
customersupports@standardbank.co.za).
Some phishers have sophisticated technical knowledge (i.e. programming
background) and are able to make more use of more sophisticated methods to
deceive their victims. For example, if phishing emails are sent in Hypertext Markup
Language (HTML) format, they can be disguised to appear as plain-text, which
makes it much harder for victims to identify the hidden ‘qualities’ of the emails
dynamic content (Ollmann, 2008). Phishers sometimes purposely change the
characters in the email body to avoid detection by many standard anti-spam filters,
and, thus, fool the recipient into misreading them. For example, the popular
American Online (AOL) website can be spelt by the phisher as: www.aoI.com. In this
example the character ‘L’ was replaced with a capital ‘I’, which could easily be
overlooked. In some phishing cases, there may also be random words hidden in
HTML emails. This can be done by using a white font colour on the white
background of the email, which would not be visible to phishing victims. The purpose
of this activity is to avoid detection by standard anti-spam filters (Ollmann, 2008).
In most of the examples, the URL link is made to appear from a legitimate website
but in fact points to an escape-encoded version of the URL. In Figure 4.1, this was
highlighted with a blue speech bubble. Accordingly, users should be educated so as
to be able to determine whether the website provided in the email corresponds with
the website being imitated. In all of the examples, the victims were not addressed by
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their name and, typically, a generic “Dear Customer” is used. Some legitimate
organisations include hyperlinks in the emails they send out to their clients to, for
example, allow their clients to download financial statements. There are also cases
where users are requested to click on a hyperlink to complete a registration process
on another website. This is to verify that the email address provided by the user is
legitimate. One cannot therefore state that all emails containing hyperlinks are
phishing attempts.
Email Scams
As previously stated, phishing is merely a component or subset of spam. After
obtaining personal information from victims, phishers developed follow-up scams to
transfer stolen monies safely from their accounts out of the country (Orgill et al.,
2004). An increasingly popular method for doing this is by means of fake job scams.
Other spam emails include advertisements or scams offering products, rewards or
prizes that seem too good to be true. As with phishing emails, trickery and deception
are also used. One difference between phishing emails and scams can be seen
below:
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Figure 4.5: Email scam involving a large sum of money won in a lottery
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Figure 4.6: Email scam luring the user to open an attachment provided in the email
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Figure 4.7: Email scam taking advantage of the popularity of social networking websites
The scam illustrated in Figure 4.7 can be quite effective considering the popularity of
Facebook. As there is a high probability that the email recipient is registered on
Facebook, this increases the chances of the victim falling for this particular scam.
The victim is required to open an attachment (a virus) which they think originates
from a Facebook friend. The Facebook branding and logos are used in this scam to
enhance its authenticity.
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Figure 4.8: Email scam originating from a legitimate entity
The scam in Figure 4.8 originated from an actual work colleague. The email address,
name and surname are correct thereby increasing the likelihood that the recipient will
trust the authenticity of the message. In this instance, maybe as a result of software
vulnerability, the victim’s email account was vulnerable to the threat. Consequently,
access was gained to the victim’s email account and requests were sent to the
victim’s contacts, in this instance requesting financial aid.
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In light of the examples cited above, it is obvious why they are so effective. Such
emails attract users and convince them that they have been selected to receive
irresistible offers, which, in most reported cases, usually constitute large financial
rewards. This section pointed out that phishers are able to employ technical
mechanisms to avoid detection by technological controls. Email scams usually
appear in non-risk attachment form, for example, documents or images. However,
some scams require a user to open an attachment or a zip file that may contain a
virus or malware. Email scams can also be directed to cell phone users in text
message form.
Many scams manipulate human emotions; for example, they make an appeal on
behalf of parents who are in desperate need of funding to have their baby’s tumour
removed. Such scams are enhanced by, say, a picture of the baby. Phishing emails
also use some of the scam techniques just discussed and are also considered a
subset of spam. Having described the manner in which phishing is carried out, it is
incumbent to describe the risks that may result from these attacks, as the
combination of phishing and malware, advertised by spam, has become one of the
most deceptive combinations on the Internet (Aaron, 2010). The next section
emphasises the significant danger phishing poses to both consumers and affected
organisations.
4.3 Phishing: A Threat to Users and Organisations
Section 2.3.2 described the dangers that general information security threats pose to
organisations. This section highlights the serious threat phishing poses to
organisations and users.
As section 2.2 revealed, organisations are becoming increasingly dependent on IT to
facilitate the functioning of their business operations (ISACA, 2009). Flowerday and
Von Solms (2005) assert that the majority of organisations today are totally
dependent on their information assets. Using information and communication
technologies (ICTs), these assets are stored, processed and communicated
electronically within information systems. However, this very same technical
environment is ironically what phishers use to gain access to organisational assets.
As a result, ensuring sufficient network security is one of the major concerns for
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organisations and users. To ensure business continuity, information resources have
to be protected, especially since information is considered the lifeblood of most
organisations (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006). The fact that information workers
(Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009) are vulnerable to social engineering techniques
places organisations at risk and, as a result, the literature commonly refers to people
as being the weakest link in the information security chain (Mann, 2008; Russell,
2002), particularly in an organisational context. Since organisations possess
beneficial financial information they are naturally the targets of phishers.
Victims, in the form of organisations and individuals that have fallen prey to phishing,
have been affected by, among other things, large financial losses, damaged
reputations and identity theft (Sophos, 2005). For example, Mi2G, a company that
sells products related to electronic banking, became a victim of a phishing scam in
2003. It subsequently estimated its economic damage as being between $32,2 billion
and $39,4 billion US dollars.
In 2003 alone, Gartner estimated that 57 million American adults received a phishing
email and more than half of the respondents were also identity theft victims (Litan,
2004). In 2005, Gartner estimated total losses to $1 billion (Litan, 2005). One year
later, financial losses reached $2,8 billion (Litan, 2006). These statistics point to the
fact that phishing is on the increase.
In South Africa, approximately three million attacks were launched in the first three
months of 2012 (Alfreds, 2012). Alfreds (2012) further states that users were
targeted by both offline and online malware spread through storage devices (e.g.
removable USB drives, CDs and DVDs). Despite South Africa not having the same
exposure to threats as more developed societies, 37,4% of users were attacked by
local threats (Alfreds, 2012). According to Drake et al. (2004) and Aburrous, Hossain,
Dahal, and Thabtah (2010), security threats may threaten e-commerce because
such threats cause people to lose their trust in online transactions for fear that they
may also become the victims of fraud. Many people believe that the use of online
banking may increase the likelihood of their becoming victims of identity theft, even
though online banking offers more secure identity protection than paper and mail-
based systems (Van Dyke, 2004).
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There are a variety of threats that seek to obtain sensitive information (Janczewski &
Colarik, 2007), which gives organisations even more reason to protect themselves.
According to Sophos (2005), consumers are the main target of phishers.
Nevertheless, the impact of phishing extends beyond the consumer, as
organisations’ public image, consumer confidence and reputations can also be
damaged in the process (Colwill, 2010; Frauenstein & Von Solms, 2010; Sophos,
2005). Organisations have clients, and if their clients suffer losses then such
organisations will also be affected possibly even bringing the functioning of the
organisation to a standstill (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009).
In recent times, the use of social networking websites has become increasingly
popular for phishers as a source of personal information (Bilge, Strufe, Balzarotti, &
Kirda, 2009; Brown, Howe, Ihbe, Prakash, & Borders, 2008; Frauenstein & Von
Solms, 2010; Gibson, 2007; Leavitt, 2005; Ohaya, 2006; Unisys, 2008). This
substantiates the point that threats are constantly seeking to exploit new
weaknesses in humans (Orgill et al., 2004) and, therefore, are seeking to use
modern technology to carry out their attacks. Users of social networking websites
unwittingly share too much of their personal information which phishers conveniently
use. This is mainly due to such websites allowing registered members to share
certain types of information about themselves, for example, birth date, email address
and pictures to develop their online social networking profile (Gross & Acquisti,
2005). The latter inadvertently encourages registered users of these websites not to
understand the importance of making their personal information private. This lack of
good practice cultivates weak information security behaviour (Thomson et al., 2006)
on the part of both the individual and, arguably, the organisation (i.e. the website
itself). Since popular social networking websites (e.g. Facebook, MySpace, and
Twitter) are certainly addictive for some members, employees may spend excessive
amounts of time on these websites during working hours – insecure behaviour which
could potentially place the organisation at risk. Frauenstein and Von Solms (2010)
list these threats and risks as follows:
 puts the reputation of both the employee and the organisation at risk
 may constitute anti-social behaviour
 makes the system vulnerable to viruses, phishing and scams.
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Van der Merwe et al. (2005a) noticed a responsibility shift with regard to security
issues. They state that, previously, security was always the responsibility of the
organisation or service provider. As a result of phishing attacks, however, the
responsibility of security has shifted to the user who engages in an online
transaction. If one analyses this assertion more closely, in light of a real-world
example, one begins to see the validity of this claim. Should an account holder have
money deducted from their bank account without their knowledge, they would
contact the bank. However, financial institutions do not generally accept
responsibility for losses resulting from client negligence. Although institutions usually
have technological protection measures in place, for example, access control by
means of a card, pin, biometric scanner or password, to safeguard accounts from
unauthorised access, the account holder in this instance may not have followed
these procedures correctly. For example, they may have not protected their pin, they
may have fallen victim to a phishing email, they may have not logged out of an online
banking website or computer terminal correctly, or a Trojan virus may have
monitored keystrokes from the user’s keyboard (Sophos, 2005). The only support a
financial organisation can provide, in this regard, is to warn the public at large of the
dangers of phishing. This is usually done through awareness campaigns on
television, websites and mobile alert notifications.
According to Butler (2007), phishers are successful in carrying out their attacks
because consumers are not adequately informed about the risks of disclosing their
personal details online. Similarly, Cobb (2010) argues that the organisation’s clients
are the first and last line of defence against phishing, and any effective solution must
include them. Organisations may not feel that it is their responsibility to educate their
clients about online security, but ensuring that clients are educated to recognise
phishing attacks is a cost-effective strategy that will help to defend the reputation of
the business.
In this section, it was emphasised that phishing attacks pose a significant danger to
both users and organisations and can result in large financial losses. Another reason
for concern is that phishing techniques are evolving with technology, for example
phishers increased interest in using social networking websites to reach their victims.
101
Drake et al. (2004) believe fraudsters will continue to adapt and expand their
methods to reach and defraud their victims. Another matter for concern is that
humans are not demonstrating security-conscious behaviour, which presents
organisations with a serious challenge to protect themselves. In the next section the
literature on developments in combating phishing and some methods for protection
against phishing in terms of human, organisational and technological aspects will be
discussed.
4.4 Developments to Combat Phishing
This section addresses some developments in combating phishing threat agents, as
contained in the literature studied. These developments are categorised into the
main areas of technology, human and organisational aspects.
4.4.1 Technological Controls
The previous chapter established that organisations focus a great deal on applying
technological controls to combat general security threat agents. This is also evident
in phishing protection. There are many advantages and disadvantages to the use of
technology. Some tasks still rely on humans to make correct decisions or
judgements based on their knowledge and/or experience, which is difficult for any
computer to match. For example, in comparison to computers, humans tend to be
better at distinguishing faces in crowds (e.g. friends from strangers) or noticing
suspicious behaviour in humans (Schneier, 2003). However, one cannot ignore that
technology performs a vital role in the functioning and protection of a system against
phishing attacks. The following paragraphs describe some of the technological
controls used to combat phishing.
4.4.1.1 Website Controls
After falling victim to phishing attacks, high profile organisations such as PayPal™
and AOL™ have provided educational information on their websites to educate their
customers on the dangers and identification of phishing emails. Furthermore, AOL™
for example has implemented automatic anti-phishing controls among others on its
website to protect its customers.
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Specialised anti-phishing websites, such as PhishTank, are dedicated to assisting
users to identify spoofed websites by assisting users to verify whether a website is
genuine or not. PhishTank also allows a community of registered users to contribute
suspected phishing websites to PhishTank’s database, which makes a contribution
to the battle against phishing. Other popular websites dedicated to reporting and
educating users on phishing include the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and
SonicWall.
4.4.1.2 Web Browser Security Plug-ins
A great deal of literature is focused on the development of web browser plug-ins to
combat phishing. Garera et al. (2007) studied the structure of URLs evident in
various phishing attacks. Fette et al. (2007), on the other hand, present a method for
detecting phishing emails by using a specialised filter, designed to focus more on
phishing emails than other general purpose spam filters. Their results show that over
96% of phishing emails were correctly identified by the filter and only 0,1% of
legitimate emails were incorrectly classified.
Kirda and Kruegel (2006) developed a free Mozilla Firefox web browser plug-in
called AntiPhish. This plug-in aims to protect inexperienced users against phishing
websites, keep track of the users’ sensitive information and generate warnings if
users type their personal information in a spoofed website. In line with Kirda and
Kruegel’s research, Yue and Wang (2008; 2010) developed a Mozilla Firefox web
browser plug-in known as BogusBiter, which feeds a large number of fake (bogus)
credentials into a suspected phishing website and conceals the victim’s true
credentials amongst the fake credentials. This also enables the genuine website
being threatened posed to identify when a phisher is using stolen credentials.
Yue and Wang (2010) concede that there are indeed a few limitations to
BogusBiter’s effectiveness: phishers may decide to use JavaScript attacks to evade
detection by BogusBiter or they may steal a user’s credential directly using keystroke
monitoring techniques. Phishers may also use non-standard login pages to evade
BogusBiter; for example, they may use irregular HTML login forms, use CAPTCHA
on login pages, or create the entire login webpage in Flash format. This
demonstrates that phishers are constantly seeking new techniques to counter the
technology controls that are in place.
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Krammer (2006) developed a Novel client-side web browser plug-in called Quero,
which implements several techniques to protect the user against visually
indistinguishable address manipulations.
4.4.1.3 Web Browser Warnings
As stated in Chapter 3, many studies have pointed out that web browser plug-in
developments are common and are useful tools in the battle against phishing. One
would assume that web browser security, specifically toolbars and warning alerts, is
sufficient to warn users against entering their details in spoofed websites. However,
Yue and Wang (2008) and Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006) disagree, stating that
studies have demonstrated that neither server-side security indicators nor client-side
toolbars and warnings have proven to be successful. Various authors, including
Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006), Downs et al. (2006), Egelman, Cranor, and
Hong (2008) and Florencio and Herley (2005), express the same opinion. They
substantiate this view by stating that even when users are presented with security
indicators or warnings, they simply ignore them.
Wu et al. (2006) conducted two user studies to test three security toolbars, as well as
other browser security indicators (i.e. browser address and status bars), and found
them to be ineffective in preventing users from falling prey to phishing attacks. These
authors state that the study participants disregarded the toolbar warnings even after
they were asked to pay particular attention to them. They also found that many users
did not understand what a phishing attack is and how sophisticated they can be.
Moreover, they found that users did not constantly check the security indicators of
their web browsers for warnings, as they felt this was not part of their primary goal in
accomplishing their work tasks. This would reveal that users do not understand their
responsibilities relating to security for themselves and the organisation.
Wu et al. (2006) add that when users noticed suspicious activity as evidenced by the
indicators, they did not interpret the warnings correctly. Wu et al. (2006) believe that,
in order to address this challenge, an active interruption such as pop-up warnings
would be more effective than passive warnings displayed in the web browser
toolbars. However, Wu et al. (2006) acknowledge that even pop-up confirmations
may become less effective over time. As there are many pop-up boxes evident in
application software packages and some are part of operating systems, this may
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prove to be true as users may become irritated by these warnings and simply ignore
them as they are too concerned with completing their primary tasks. Wu et al. (2006)
suggest that Internet-based organisations can play a unique role in enabling users to
distinguish their organisation’s website from a spoofed website by following some
standard practices. Wu et al. (2006) elaborate on this, stating that organisations
should use a single domain name that uniquely matches their brand name. In
addition, rather than using IP addresses or multiple domain names for servers, they
should use SSL to encrypt their websites.
This subsection highlighted the fact that technology is most predominant, method for
protecting users and organisations from phishing attacks. To a certain extent, this is
to be expected, considering that, as discussed in Chapter 3, the majority of general
information security threats are controlled using technology. In this subsection, much
research focused on web browser security, specifically identifying phishing URLs,
web browser extension/plug-in development and web browser warnings. Other
technical areas which may be considered but have not been discussed include
network security (i.e. firewalls) and anti-virus software.
As humans are considered the weakest link in any security initiative, it is evident that
most of the technology discussed in this section can be perceived as a way to
reduce human involvement. This is substantiated by Patrick et al. (2005), who state
that “current security systems are often seen as difficult to use, as getting in the
user’s way, or confusing the issue. It is not enough to design systems that are
theoretically secure without taking into account the end users.”
Technology can be used as a tool to help users identify spoofed websites and
phishing emails, but unfortunately, as the literature points out, humans do not know
how to use these tools correctly, do not feel it is their responsibility to use them, and
in general do not understand phishing. The human weakness discussed here is a
double-edged sword, as people not only create the technology but also use it.
Threats expose the flaws in technology that are a result of human error in its
development process. They also expose the danger posed to information systems by
human behaviour as a result of a lack of knowledge in using technology and
technology controls correctly. Therefore, human involvement has not been totally
eliminated from both perspectives. Section 4.4.2 expands on some of the points
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mentioned above, in particular educating users in the identification of phishing
emails.
4.4.2 Human Factors
Section 3.4.2 discussed human behaviour and social engineering techniques in
detail. The following paragraph will discuss the educational developments aimed at
addressing the human element in phishing.
4.4.2.1 Security Awareness, Training and Education
Researchers regard education as a solution to address the human factor in phishing.
In this regard, organisations typically conduct information security training
workshops. Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2007) suggest that in order for anti-
phishing tools to be effective, they should consider how and why people fall victim to
phishing. Their study surveyed 232 computer users to provide more insight into why
users fall victim to phishing emails and why they trust phishing emails. The results of
their study suggest that users may be more vulnerable to phishing attacks as their
awareness of the risks involved are not linked to the perceived vulnerability in
identifying phishing emails. Therefore, users will have to be trained in understanding
the risks of phishing. However, according to Ogren (2009), even if users receive on-
going user education on phishing, it is necessary to test employees and customer
awareness by giving them at least three anti-phishing messages before they depart
for the holidays. Furthermore, an anti-phishing educational campaign should be
created that reaches its audience via email, video snippets and social
communications such as blogs, social networks and websites (Ogren, 2009).
Van der Merwe et al. (2005a, 2005b) compared the nature of phishing attacks with
the guidelines of the security service. Accordingly, they identified five issues related
to the characteristics of a phishing attack that an organisation should be aware of.
These issues are listed below:
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 Education. Users should be educated on prevention techniques and provided
with a strategy for preparing to avoid phishing attacks.
 Preparation. This consists of the process of thinking and stipulating what one
would do in the event of a phishing attack.
 Avoidance. This includes activities that evade the onset of an attack.
 Intervention. This involves activities where the user/organisation involved in
a phishing attack intervenes or steps in to affect the outcome of the attack.
 Treatment. This includes the activities needed to effect recovery after a
phishing attack has been experienced.
As they point out in the guidelines above, Van der Merwe et al. (2005a) recommend
that all users, on both a business and a personal level, be educated to be aware of
the above-mentioned issues.
4.4.2.2 Security Training in Web Browsers
As section 4.4.1.3 shows, researchers support the notion that web browser security
warnings have been proven to be ineffective in phishing prevention. Agarwal, Renfro,
and Bejar (2007) suggest that the solution to this problem is to educate users to
examine existing web browser indicators ‘attentively’ (e.g. URL, SSL indicators and
optional toolbars). Agarwal et al. (2007) maintain that these indicators are restricted
by three issues:
 “Users do not know which indicators are trustworthy;
 Browser indicators can be easily spoofed (e.g. by including them in the page
or painting over them with chrome-less windows);
 Users do not look outside their primary areas of interest.”
Drake et al. (2004) and Ohaya (2006) also point out that users, specifically naïve
users, require more understanding of security indicators in an online environment.
Cobb (2010) adds that “clients should be informed in how to check the security
settings of their web browsers, how to check for the ‘padlock’ icon and certificate
signature on pages, as well as tips such as not sharing passwords, pin or account
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numbers with anyone”. The latter point is also supported by Downs et al. (2007) and
Ohaya (2006). Drake et al. (2004) further suggest that education should aim to
address users’ understanding of the risks rather than merely warning them about the
risks.
Dhamija et al. (2006) conducted a laboratory study in which 22 participants had to
distinguish from twenty websites which were spoofed websites. In this study most of
the participants gave attention to the web browser indicators (e.g. address bar,
status bar), with 23% looking for security indicators only in the website content. The
authors concluded that browser security indicators are frequently misunderstood or
ignored, and that many users do not notice them.
The padlock icon at the bottom of a web browser bar indicates that the website is in
a secure state. However, Jakobbson (2007) states that threat agents may also place
the padlock icon in the content of the page, whether victims intend to establish an
SSL connection or not. He argues that educating consumers on the padlock will not
eliminate the problem and that studies have proven that users are unable to
distinguish a valid certificate from one that is invalid or self-signed and may not even
be able to detect the absence of indicators. This is supported by a recent study by
Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz (2006), which indicated that “while users often detect the
presence of incorrect information, they almost never detect the absence of correct
information”.
4.4.2.3 Training in the Identification of Phishing Emails
Downs et al. (2006) conducted a laboratory study in which they interviewed 20 non-
expert computer users in order to determine their decision-making strategies when
using email. In the interview, participants were required to role play and respond to a
set of legitimate and fraudulent email messages directed to an email inbox. The
study revealed that many participants were unable to distinguish legitimate emails
from phishing emails. The study further revealed that even participants who were
knowledgeable in distinguishing phishing emails were not able to apply this
knowledge to unfamiliar attacks.
The Drake et al. (2004) study explored the tricks used by phishers in emails. These
tricks are classified according to whether they are used in fraudulent emails or in the
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spoofed websites accessed from the hyperlink contained in the email. These
researchers developed a system known as MailFrontier. The MailFrontier index
detected that one out of ten participants who evaluated a phishing email fell victim to
a phishing attack. In common with users who ignored web browser phishing
warnings, users also ignored MailFrontier’s warnings. Drake et al. (2004) add that
most phishing emails use generic greetings such as “Dear Customer” or “Dear
Member”, or the victim’s email address is inserted as a greeting. They insist that by
educating organisations to address their customers by name would allow their
customers to identify these generic emails as fraudulent.
4.4.2.4 Training Conducted through Gameplay and Training Systems
Some researchers have made use of technology to help educate users. To increase
the effectiveness of information security education, some researchers have
incorporated a fun aspect by developing educational games. Gameplay can be
effective in increasing user participation during training. If training is considered fun,
then users may enjoy it and, more importantly, remember what they have learnt.
Some researchers further discuss using a game theory strategy to teach users about
avoiding threats attack (Shing, Shing, Chen, & Lee, 2010). Sheng, Holbrook,
Kumaraguru, Cranor, and Downs (2010) designed an interactive online game known
as Anti-Phishing Phil, which educates users on good habits that help them to avoid
phishing attacks. The game had three objectives, namely, to teach users how to
identify phishing URLs, to identify cues in web browsers and the use of search
engines in finding legitimate websites. Sheng et al. (2007) state that, “after less than
15 minutes of training via the anti-phishing game, study participants improved their
ability to distinguish legitimate and fraudulent websites considerably”. The results of
their study revealed that implementing an educational strategy into interactive games
is an effective method for teaching people how to avoid phishing attacks.
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) designed an embedded email training system known as
PhishGuru. PhishGuru educates people about phishing during their normal use of
email. Users were sent simulated phishing attacks and trained after they became
victims of the attacks. Prior studies tested users immediately after training and
demonstrated that embedded training improved user’s ability to identify phishing
emails and spoofed websites. In Kumaraguru et al.’s (2007) study it was found that
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 “Users learned more effectively when the training materials are sent by email
(non-embedded);
 Users retain and transfer more knowledge after embedded training than after
non-embedded training;
 Users with higher Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) scores in comparison to
lower CRT scores are more likely to click on links in the phishing emails
perhaps due to their curiosity.”
Furthermore, Kumaraguru et al. (2009) investigated the demographic factors that
influence training and their general phishing susceptibility. The results of their study
have revealed that the following:
 “Users trained with PhishGuru retain knowledge even after 28 days;
 Adding a second training message to reinforce the original training decreased
the likelihood of people submitting information to phishing websites;
 Training does not decrease users’ willingness to click on links in legitimate
messages.”
In Kumaraguru et al.’s (2009) study, researchers found no significant difference
between males and females in terms of the tendency to fall for phishing emails both
before and after the training. However, they found that participants in the 18 to 25
age group are more vulnerable to phishing attacks in comparison to older
participants.
This subsection revealed that education is necessary to help users identify phishing
emails and spoofed websites. It is evident that much research focuses on improving
user education on the technical aspects of the web browser. The literature also
describes a variety of techniques to enhance user education, with some studies
using technological tools such as email systems and gameplay to educate people on
phishing. The next subsection discusses aspects related to the organisation in the
context of information security.
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4.4.3 Organisational Aspects
Section 3.5 discussed in great length the organisational aspects related to protecting
organisations against general security threats. These aspects include organisations
paying attention to processes for managing employee behaviour in this regard. As
the strategic responsibility for an organisation lies with top-level management, that is,
the CEO, and because information is an organisational asset, it is the board of
directors’ responsibility to ensure that the assets are protected as these will
ultimately assure success (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006). Many organisations are
aware of the importance information security and have, thus, adopted standards and
best practices such as ISO/IEC 27002, King III, the NIST frameworks and COBIT 4.1
(Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). These standards and best practices encapsulate
various methods and guidelines for helping to keep information secure. Although
these best practices provide guidelines for managing general information security
threats, they unfortunately neglect to include phishing. Accordingly, no preventative
measures for dealing phishing are referred to at any point in these standards and
best practices.
This section established that humans exert a major influence in terms of their use of
technological controls in organisations to combat phishing threats. Even if certain
technological controls are in place, if they are not understood and used
appropriately, both the technology and the humans using it can become vulnerable
to phishing threats. There is a paucity of literature describing standards and best
practices that specifically address phishing attacks, even though such standards
should as a matter of course be in place to govern the use of technology and human
involvement in organisational processes. Organisations can implement security
policies and procedures with regard to managing phishing attacks. Nevertheless,
such policies can be, unintentionally or intentionally, ignored and neglected. The
common element in all the processes is that all the dimensions that have been
mentioned involve humans.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter described phishing and the techniques it employs. The systematic steps
phishers use to lure their victims were also described. In section 4.3, phishing was
described as a threat to both users and organisations. However, most of the
literature studied does not address phishing in terms of protecting organisations, but
rather in terms of protecting users on a personal level. For example, general user
education on the secure use of personal email at home or in the workplace is
addressed, but the effects of phishing on the organisation are generally ignored
despite the fact that its demise would affect both its clients and its employees.The
literature does, however, highlight a number of areas exploited by phishers, which,
coincidentally, are also the controls that assist organisations to safeguard
themselves against phishers. These areas were categorised as human,
organisational and technological dimensions. Of these, two areas that receive the
most attention are technological controls and human factors, with the organisational
dimensions, specifically with regard to phishing, being neglected. Humans still
cannot conclusively identify phishing emails and spoofed websites despite the
technological tools available to assist in this regard. The literature revealed that even
when users are trained, they still fall victim to phishing. As such, human factors are
said to pose the greatest risk to organisations. This is not coincidental, as these were
referred to earlier as being the greatest risk to general information security. To
address these human factors, much research has been placed on security
awareness, training and education, policies and procedures and, finally, the
implementation of technological controls. Nonetheless, it would seem that these
three dimensions have not been satisfactory harmonised or aligned. For example,
organisations either apply technological controls or they educate their staff on how to
use these technological controls, they seldom do both. As a result, an opportunity
(i.e. gap) is created for phishing to proliferate and subsequently to compromise the
other dimensions.
The next chapter introduces the concept of an integrated human, organisational and
technological (HOT) approach to address phishing holistically, instead of using a
single-layer defence model as is currently the case. The chapter also elaborates on
the gap between the dimensions which phishers aim to exploit.
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CHAPTER 5INTRODUCING AN INTEGRATEDAPPROACH TO PHISHING MITIGATION
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5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the effectiveness of phishing attacks and the techniques that
are used were described in detail. Furthermore, the three dimensions identified when
addressing such attacks, namely, technological controls, organisational aspects and
human factors, were examined. It would seem that these three dimensions act in a
synchronised manner both as barriers against phishing and as areas for phishers to
exploit. Moreover, each of these dimensions has weaknesses that expose the
organisation to phishing attacks, and therefore also affect the other related
dimensions. To reduce this security gap, a holistic approach is required whereby all
dimensions are integrated to form a stronger barrier of defence. This approach
requires management, particularly in strengthening the links, or relationships,
between each of the dimensions. The achievement of a managed approach is one of
the core objectives for this study, as this could eventually result in a holistic anti-
phishing framework. Accordingly, an examination of existing theories related to
information systems research, might assist in understanding how these relationships
can be integrated and managed.
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the concept of an integrated HOT
approach in order to address phishing holistically, instead of using a single-layer
defence model. In doing so, three important links between the HOT dimensions will
be established. Finally, theories will be examined in order to guide an understanding
of the way the relationships between each of the dimensions can be managed more
effectively.
5.2 Importance of Using an Integrated Approach to Help Improve
Information Security
The previous chapters categorised areas of information security and phishing into
three dimensions, namely, Human factors, Organisational aspects and Technology
controls (HOT). This section provides a brief literature background substantiating the
notion that, in order to improve information security, an integrated approach is
required. This preoccupation with an integrated approach stems from the concern
that general information security practices are usually applied using a single-layer
approach (e.g. applying only technical controls), as described in previous chapters.
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The aim of using an integrated approach is to increase the level of protection against
phishing attacks. Accordingly, an integrated approach should consider the three
above-mentioned dimensions.
The HOT concept is not new and its application has not been restricted to the IT
discipline. According to Berglund and Karltun (2007), the concept of HOT was
developed during the 1980s in the nuclear power industry in order to improve safety.
Initially, safety in this industry was addressed through technical advances, which
reduced the number of near-accident incidents caused as a result of technical
failures. However, it later became evident that the majority of reported accidents
were caused by humans rather than the technology. After a period during which the
focus fell on the field of potential ‘human error’, safety was further improved. At that
time it became apparent that it was also necessary to consider organisational
aspects such as policies and procedures. Subsequently, this led to the realisation
that all three HOT dimensions in the system needed to be considered in order to
improve safety comprehensively (Eklund, 2003).
Coincidentally, in an information security context, the literature also points out that
technological controls are used mainly to resist general information security threats
(Beznosov & Beznosova, 2007). According to ISACA (2009), this is because some
regard information security solely as a technical discipline. Beznosov and Beznosova
(2007) support this by stating that “public research related to computer security has
been overwhelmingly focused on technological aspects, leaving human and social
dimensions mostly uncharted”. As a result, organisations are dedicating large
amounts of money to technical solutions, while neglecting the other dimensions in
the organisation that may be exploited by security threat agents.
Chapter 3 discussed various applications of technical solutions in detail. However,
the literature also recognises that technology is not the only way to manage general
information security related risks (Gonzalez & Sawicka, 2002; ISACA, 2009; Parsons
et al., 2010). Subsequently, human factors became another important focus of
information security research (Parsons et al., 2010). Furthermore, to understand why
users behave and react in certain ways when presented with difficult situations,
human psychology (Jakobsson, 2007; Schneier, 2008; West, 2008), human-
computer interaction, user security awareness (Dodge Jr., Carver, & Ferguson,
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2007; Thomson & Von Solms, 1998), attitudes and behaviour (Downs et al., 2007;
Stephanou & Dagada, 2008), and organisational culture (Cabrera, Cabrera, &
Barajas, 2001; Helokunnas & Iivonen, 2003; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Thomson et
al., 2006) are all distinct areas of interest in the area of human factors.
In the literature studied, the main developmental areas of technological controls,
human factors and organisational aspects are often treated as separate entities. This
subsequently exposes a possible gap in protection for threat agents to target.
Cabrera et al. (2001) emphasise that technology and people are only two of the
several subsystems that function within the organisation. They suggest that in order
to understand the interconnections between technology and people, a broader scope
which describes the relationships between the two and other important subsystems
needs to be employed.
Besides technology, Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov (2008) see a need to
understand the impact of human and organisational factors. They state that few
researchers have provided a comprehensive integrated overview of the challenges
faced by security practitioners. Furthermore, they add that “a better understanding of
how different human, organisational and technological elements interplay could
explain how different factors lead to security breaches and vulnerabilities within an
organisation”. As such, their study involved the development of a framework to assist
organisations in identifying their limitations with regard to implementing security
standards.
Human factors and organisational aspects have also been found to be important
areas in the effectiveness of other critical systems, such as safety and accident
mitigation (Rasmussen, 1994). Similarly, Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) suggest that
a socio-technical approach needs to be adopted that addresses both the human and
organisational aspects. Besnosov and Beznosova (2007) recommend that future
research should focus on examining the relationship between organisational
processes and behaviour in the effectiveness of security defences. They elaborate
further, saying that one could study decision-making processes and operational
routines within organisations to improve understanding of the way they influence the
security position of the organisation. The current study discusses a holistic approach
to addressing phishing threat agents in an organisation; the following paragraph
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describes how the elements of an information system are closely related and
dependent on each other.
The five main elements of an information system are people, procedures, data,
hardware and software (Shelly & Vermaat, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 15;
O'Leary & O'Leary, 2010). Fundamental to an information system is the people
element, which has a major influence on all the other parts of the system. People are
considered to be the most important organisational resource as they have both a
direct and an indirect involvement with all the other parts of the system (Patterson,
West, Lawthom, & Nickell, 1998). At the same time, it is significant that people are
regarded as the weakest link in any information security context (Deloitte, 2009;
Ernst & Young, 2010; Nelson, 2011), as people use hardware and software for their
daily tasks. Moreover, it is people (normally management) who develop the
organisational policies and guidelines that define acceptable and unacceptable
employee behaviour in the workplace.
Hardware and software can be viewed as technological components of the
technological controls dimension, while policies and procedures can be
considered to be part of the organisational aspect and people fall under the
category of the human factors dimension. Finally, another important component
and asset of the organisation, as established in section 2.2, is data or information.
Each of these five components of an information system has its own inherent
strengths and weaknesses. Each has its own procedures and security requirements
which can be followed or neglected, intentionally or unintentionally, by the people
who use them (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 15). It is humans (the users) who have
to ensure that all the previously mentioned aspects are operating correctly. If the
organisations’ policies and procedures are obeyed and understood correctly, it will
help to ensure that, ultimately, all elements work in synergy with one another and the
system performs securely, productively and accurately. This will help ensure that the
organisation’s information is protected from unauthorised access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification or destruction. However, should one of the elements be
compromised, this may result in the organisation’s data being put at risk and/or
damaged.
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For example, in an information security context, the software element is not a
sufficient defence on its own if it is not regularly updated, maintained or used
correctly by the people using it. Software can also be affected by viruses or contain
bugs caused by programmer coding errors.
Procedures are the methods, rules or guidelines that are developed to direct people
in accomplishing organisational objectives. Procedures can help coordinate the
information system elements and, if defined properly, can together with suitable
technological controls reduce the threat of a breach in an information system,
regardless of the method of attack.
In an organisation, people make up the staff, end-users, managers and decision
makers among others who are involved in the information system to make it more
productive. Figure 5.1 below presents the Business Model for Information Security
(ISACA, 2009), which features similar core elements to the ones identified here, that
is, people, organisation and technology (POT) and describes the interdependencies
between these elements.
Figure 5.1: Business Model for information security (extracted from ISACA, 2009)
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This model can be used to predict the way in which technology, process,
organisation or human resource is affected by culture, human factors or other
dynamic interconnections. This existing model is further evidence for the
relationships between dimensions. Werlinger et al. (2008) explicitly highlight the HOT
dimensions as an approach to addressing information security and specifically focus
on the need to manage the interconnections between each dimension.
Werlinger et al. (2008) further define the organisational challenges each of the
dimensions face. They identify the attributes of each of the dimensions, as described
in Table 5.1 below:
HUMAN ASPECTS
ORGANISATIONAL
ASPECTS
TECHNOLOGICAL
ASPECTS
 Related to the
cognition of
individuals
 Culture
 Interaction with
other people
 Structure
 Size
 Managerial
decisions of IT
security
 Applications and
protocols
Table 5.1: HOT attributes (adapted from Werlinger et al., 2008)
Table 5.2 lists the challenges identified by Werlinger et al. (2008) in the HOT aspects
with regard to implementing security controls. This suggests that there are difficulties
inherent in the use or implementation of technological controls by humans. In Figure
5.2, Werlinger et al. (2008) illustrate the HOT challenges and the interplay of the
corresponding relationships in an organisation. In Figure 5.2, the two-sided arrows
indicate the association between the HOT factors, while single-sided arrows indicate
that one factor affects the other factor, but not vice versa. This figure illustrates that
there are many links between the factors and the dimensions that may be
overlooked.
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Table 5.2: HOT challenges in the implementation of security controls (adapted from
Werlinger et al., 2008)
ASPECT CHALLENGES
HUMAN
 Lack of training or experience
 Culture within the organisation
 Communication of security issues
ORGANISATIONAL
 Risk estimation
 Open environments and academic
freedom
 Lack of budget
 Security as low priority
 Tight schedules
 Business relationships with other
organisations
 Distribution of IT responsibilities
 Access control to sensitive data
 Size of the organisation
 Top management support
TECHNOLOGICAL
 Complexity of systems
 Software vulnerabilities
 Mobility and distributed access
In Figure 5.2, Werlinger et al. (2008) discuss the interplay between the various IT
challenges. Although they consider human and organisational factors in the
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development of security processes and technologies, they do not explain how these
factors can be managed more effectively.
Werlinger et al. (2008) therefore acknowledge that more research is necessary to
understand the interplay between security challenges, as these interactions affect
the organisation’s security levels and the extent to which they can be improved.
Figure 5.2: A holistic view of the challenges within the HOT factors and their
interrelationships (extracted from Werlinger et al., 2008)
In their research, Cabrera et al. (2001) reveal that an integrative model will help both
administrators and technology designers to understand and manage the
interconnections between technology and the other human and organisational
aspects of their business. Furthermore, they state that it is important to pay special
attention to the factors that determine the behaviour of people in a particular
organisation. Moreover, they maintain that organisational culture needs to be
understood as it will describe factors that influence human behaviour. This would
seem to underline the need to explore the factors that influence these relationships.
This section provided supporting evidence from the literature studied to describe an
integrated approach that can be used to strengthen information security practice.
However, this approach requires more understanding particularly in the integration
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aspect. In this study, the ‘integrated approach’ consists of merging three main areas,
namely, human factors, organisational aspects and technological controls. This
approach will contribute to the creation of a HOT framework focusing on the
prevention of phishing attacks.
To accomplish this integration, the main areas require more understanding,
particularly in the way they influence relationships and in how they can be managed.
This stems from the concern that an isolated single-layer defence approach is
insufficient to mitigate phishing attacks comprehensively. More importantly, since
each dimension has its own inherent weaknesses, even when a dimension is
coupled with another dimension (e.g. H+T), the gap for phishers to exploit is not
eliminated. As pointed out by Werlinger et al. (2008), these gaps become more
apparent if dimensions are interrelated because of these very relationships. These
interrelationships between dimensions have been demonstrated by relating
information system elements in the context of the HOT dimensions.
The literature describes a need to suitably align the interdependencies or
relationships that exist between HOT dimensions. As a result, some sources discuss
adopting an approach whereby all HOT elements are included and, therefore, some
studies have already partly integrated some of the dimensions. However, it would
also seem from the literature studied that there are challenges with this integrated
approach. Firstly, there needs to be an understanding of how to integrate these
dimensions, as failure to achieve this could result in one relationship being
compromised as result of it being loosely coupled and may have an undesired effect
on other dimensions. Consequently, this could expose a gap in which phishing
attacks could proliferate. To reduce this gap, the relationships that influence these
dimensions need to be understood and addressed in more detail. The next section
aims to achieve this. By describing problem-based scenarios, the following
paragraphs shed more light on why victims fall prey to phishing attacks, putting into
context the HOT dimensions and their role in the process. The section also
establishes the main relationships between dimensions. The scenarios help to
explain why ‘loosely coupled’ relationships are referred to as a ‘gap’.
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5.3 A Need to Bridge the Phishing Gap
This section aims to further explore the loosely coupled link between HOT
dimensions by using practical scenarios. These scenarios point out, in a phishing
context, that there are relationships that exist between HOT dimensions. At the same
time, this section also points out the gaps between each of these relationships.
Understanding which relationships depend on one another will help establish which
of the main HOT relationships require strengthening.
Scenario A: John receives an email from his banking institution. The email
warns John that the bank’s customers may be subject to fraudulent activities.
Therefore, he is requested to verify his banking details to validate his account.
The email provides a hyperlink which will direct him to the bank’s website in
order to complete this verification process.
In this scenario, John will have to know how to distinguish email scams or phishing
emails from legitimate emails. Accordingly, this knowledge will determine his actions
and behaviour in reaction to the email. In this scenario, the technological controls
had failed, as the phishing email reached John, consequently exposing the human
factor dimension, and making John vulnerable. Alternatively, if John had not received
the phishing email, then the technological controls might have performed their role
adequately by preventing the email from reaching him. In this case, the phishers
used social engineering techniques combined with technological tools with the
intention of tricking John into submitting confidential information (see section 4.2.2).
However, in this scenario, John could make effective use of technological tools such
as an anti-virus program and/or features of the email client. If he can correctly
identify the phishing email, then he can use the email client function to mark the
email as spam, possibly preventing such emails from reaching him again in the
future. Section 5.5.1 describes further activities that John can engage using
technology. In these instances, only a single-layer defence is present, that is, either
technological controls or human factors. Therefore, it can be established that in
Scenario A human (H) and technological (T) dimensions are linked (H, T) and
require further strengthening.
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Scenario B: John manages to find time during working hours to communicate
with his friends on his office computer terminal using social networking
websites and other applications. From his computer terminal, he also manages
to download software, games, movies, wallpapers and music, as he does not
have an Internet connection at home.
In Scenario B, it would seem that John disregards any security risks he might pose
to the organisation as he accesses social networking websites. Section 4.3 revealed
that social networking websites have become a breeding ground for phishing
attacks, as well as other information security threats. Should confidential information
related to the organisation or its employees be leaked to phishers, this may put the
organisation’s reputation and its information at risk. John is abusing organisational
resources by using the organisation’s Internet service for his personal interests. He
is also abusing organisational time, as he downloads files and is active on social
networking websites instead of carrying out his work-related tasks. John is being
paid to perform his duties at work and not for any personal activities. Some of his
activities, such as downloading games, could potentially expose the organisation to
viruses or Trojans, which may originate from phishers, consequently putting the
organisation’s information at risk. Excessive downloading may also affect the
organisation’s network connection speed or data capacity download limit. John
should be made aware of the risks involved in falling victim to phishing emails.
However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, phishers make use of a variety of modern and
sophisticated technologies and techniques to trick their victims and John may not be
aware that phishing is not limited to the use of emails. Through social networking
websites, John may have clicked on hyperlinks, supposedly sent from his online
friends, thereby downloading a virus or having his account hijacked. Consequently,
he may not perceive any risk until an accident occurs, which is not ideal. Accidents
themselves are not a viable policy tool for the improvement of information security.
Organisations should not merely react spontaneously to security events as they
occur, but should rather be proactive in their approach. This is supported by
Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002), who state that “it is desirable that compliance with
security measures is ‘brought back’ to a safe level long before the system enters the
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accident zone, preferably before it enters the extinction of conditioned behaviour
zone”.
Background activities related to Scenario B could be organisational policies and
procedures that strictly manage the use of technology by employees; for example,
an Internet usage policy. On a user level (the human factor), John should be familiar
with organisational policies and should adhere to them. Policies and procedures can
also help ensure that he understands what encompasses acceptable and
unacceptable behaviour in the workplace. However, even when aware of security
policies, employees may choose not to adhere to them either because they have
malicious intent or because they are inconvenient (Herath & Rao, 2009). Therefore,
John should be aware of the risks that security threats pose to him personally, as
well as technically knowledgeable about using websites, hyperlinks, email clients,
software and so on. Even if John understands the risks of phishing emails, he may
still fall victim to links on or originating from social networking websites.
In Scenario B, it is evident that there is a clear gap between John’s needs and what
the organisation expects and requires from John. In this instance, the main links that
can be compromised by John’s actions are the human (H) and organisational (O)
dimensions. Section 5.5.2 discusses this link in more detail.
Scenario C: The organisation has very slow Internet connection and
sometimes no Internet at all. As a result, staff often blame the organisation for
not completing tasks on time. Moreover, the computer hardware and software
are outdated and the organisation has no clearly defined policies or
procedures describing the acceptable use of software or placing any
restrictions on its use. In addition, individuals do not require authorisation to
enter the work premises. Although staff training workshops are offered staff
do not participate and generally absent themselves from such training.
In Scenario C, it is evident, that, from a technological perspective, the organisation is
not providing a suitable service. It should ensure that technical staff apply
technological controls such as network firewalls and anti-virus programs, and ensure
that they updated regularly and managed correctly. The organisation could restrict
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users (employees) from accessing social networking websites from their
workstations during work time or even permanently. This could be achieved by
implementing technological controls such as firewalls or authentication measures.
The organisation is not implementing good practice in that it does not use technology
to carry out business functions correctly, accurately and efficiently and in a timely
fashion. As a result, opportunities may be created for phishers to expose any
weaknesses inherent in the systems. Weak policies can allow for employees to bring
in their own technology from home, opening up new opportunities for phishers and
other threats. As a result of outdated hardware and software, viruses (perhaps
originating from phishers) can penetrate the organisation’s weakened information
system and compromise its information and data. Moreover, since this organisation
has no access control measures in place, any unauthorised person may enter the
premises posing as an employee or customer. This imposter could be a social
engineer (i.e. phisher) intent on analysing any physical, technical and behavioural
weaknesses in the system. Consequently this information could be used to plot a
phishing attack on the organisation. From this scenario it is evident that there is a
gap between the organisational (O) and technological (T) dimensions.
In all three of the scenarios described above, it is evident that a loosely coupled
approach has affected the other dimensions involved, as the dimensions were not
tightly linked to another. As such, these dimensions were treated as isolated single
entities, thus forming only a single-layer defence. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. In
all three scenarios the human element was targeted most frequently, even though
other controls played a role. Consequently, if one of the dimensions is weakened,
phishing attacks may proliferate, thus compromising the other dimensions
(Frauenstein & Von Solms, 2011). Unfortunately, users may therefore be of the view
that, since phishing penetrates technological defences, technology requires the most
improvement. However, phishers most frequently exploit human behaviour which is
made easier by a lack of knowledge in using technology correctly. Furthermore,
humans lack of compliance with organisational policies and procedures favours
phishers. In order, therefore, to be adequately protected against phishing attacks,
particularly in an organisational context, a framework a required consisting of all the
HOT dimensions (Frauenstein & Von Solms, 2009).
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Figure 5.3: HOT dimensions targeted by phishers (adapted from Frauenstein & Von Solms,
2011)
This section revealed that there are indeed relationships that exist between each of
the dimensions. However, these relationships are loosely coupled as a result of gaps
in their protection. There is a need to close the gap between each dimension. If this
is not done, any of the three HOT dimensions may be subsequently compromised to
the detriment of the organisation. In the literature examined no approach could be
found that describes ways to further integrate and improve the relationships between
the HOT dimensions. In the next section, the introduction of the dominant
relationships between each of the dimensions will be further examined. This is
significant for determining how these relationships can be managed to form a tighter
bond, thus reducing potential gaps in protection.
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5.4 Relationships Established Between HOT Dimensions
Using scenarios in the context of phishing, section 5.3 demonstrated that there are
indeed relationships between the HOT dimensions in an organisational environment.
It also pointed out that these dimensions often depend on one another to achieve a
function or process correctly. As can be seen in the above scenarios, the human (H),
organisational (O) and technological (T) dimensions are loosely coupled to each
other. This loosely-coupled approach provides the least amount of defence as it
predominantly offers a single-layer defence. As mentioned before, the literature
highlights cases where a dimension is paired with another dimension with the aim of
forming a stronger layer of defence, for example (H+T). The aim of this study is to
move towards a holistic framework which integrates all three elements of HOT. To
accomplish this, important links or bonds need to be established between the
following pairs of dimensions:
 Human and Technology (H,T);
 Human and Organisation (H,O);
 Organisation and Technology (O,T).
To identify the most suitable practices for binding these individual dimensions to one
another, various theories and best practices will be studied. Hevner et al. (2004)
support this approach, stating that the behavioural sciences approach this objective
“through justifying theories explaining or predicting phenomena that occur”. Using a
design science approach would require the construction of innovative artefacts
aimed at changing the phenomena that occur (Hevner et al., 2004). This process
constitutes Hevner’s second guideline, namely, problem relevance. In this regard,
the phenomena are the loosely coupled links between the dimensions.
Understanding theories and best practices can help strengthen the links between
each of the dimensions in order to close the gap. The artefact is the anti-phishing
model that results and which is revealed in the next chapter.
In section 5.3, three scenarios were used to describe the relationships between the
dimensions and the consequences that could result should some of the relationships
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be compromised. It is important that these relationships are strengthened to form a
‘tighter’ bond between each of the dimensions. In the next section theories and best
practices are described that will assist in strengthening this ‘binding’ process.
5.5 Linking Dimensions towards a Holistic Framework
The previous section established and described the three main links that exist
between the HOT dimensions. However, these links are still not tightly bound thus
exposing a gap for phishers to exploit. As such, more understanding is necessary on
how the links can be managed more appropriately. This section aims to achieve this
by describing theories and best practices in conjunction with those links. An
understanding of these theories and best practices will help point out specific areas
that influence the respective dimensions, which will contribute to the establishment of
an anti-phishing framework. The next subsection begins by introducing the popular
Technology Acceptance Model, a theory that describes factors that influence the
relationship between humans and technology.
5.5.1 The Technology Acceptance Model
Section 3.3 pointed out that technology has a useful role to play as it can be used in
controlling and eradicating information security threats. It was also pointed out that
organisations generally apply technological controls to combat general information
security threats. However, one of the challenges in this regard is that technology
must be accepted and understood in order to be used correctly by humans. For
example, employees in an organisation are expected to be able to use Microsoft
Office software applications correctly to create professional reports and
presentations. If employees cannot use such basic application software technologies
correctly, this would suggest that they cannot perform the duties expected of them.
Security technologies can be even more challenging. In a study conducted by
Furnell, Jusoh, and Katsabas (2006), the problems that end-users face when
attempting to understand the security functions of common software applications
were pointed out. In the case of specialised software, this may have even greater
undesirable consequence. Specialised software comprises programs more narrowly
focused on specific disciplines and occupations. For example, an automotive
designer is expected to be able to design vehicles using specialised computer aided
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design (CAD) software. If the automotive designer believes that merely using
traditional tools to accomplish his tasks, such as paper, geometry tools and a pencil
would suffice, potential faults may occur in his/her vehicle design that might perhaps
have been overcome with the aid of technology. In the engineering fraternity it is
accepted that using such software is common, advantageous and necessary, as it
can help to reveal errors before a project is approved for manufacturing or
development. Although it may be challenging to use the software at first, if the
engineer undergoes proper training, he/she should be able to use it effectively. As a
result, software developers place much emphasis on graphical user interface (GUI)
design so that users are able to work with computer programs easily, productively
and enjoyably (Galitz, 2007, p. 2). All of the examples mentioned relate to the human
use of technology and the fact that technology is developed with the intention for
being useful for humans. The next paragraph attempts to further explore this area.
Section 2.3.2 pointed out the dark side of technology, namely, use of technology by
threat agents in order to commit crimes. However, there are many people who are
not considered as a typical security threat agent to organisations. Such people
misuse technology for unlawful activities. For example, cell phones are mainly used
to communicate with others through voice and text messages. However, with the
rapid development of the capabilities of such devices, they are often used unlawful
purposes such as the pirate downloading of music, and games and so forth at no
cost. Furthermore, involvement in pornographic activities, and sex chat (sexting).
Using these devices, threat agents may also try to lure teenage girls into engaging in
adult activity. In such instances, features of technology are exploited for the wrong
reasons. In all these cases, it is human behaviour, and not technology, that needs to
be addressed.
Many IT professionals consider that the key to the success of information security
lies in the way humans use computers and technology. This brought to light the
broad developmental area of human-computer interaction. Section 4.2 pointed out
that phishers take advantage of aspects of human behaviour, specifically the way
humans interact with computers (Schneier, 2000). Since it is apparent that humans
are often unable to use technology optimally, developers are generally automating
technology. Cranor (2008) substantiates this by stating that humans often fail in their
security roles and therefore, to reduce human involvement where possible, it is
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necessary for systems to be as automated as possible. For example, operating
systems or anti-virus programs are usually set by default to be updated automatically
from the Internet instead of requiring the manual involvement of the user (Ai Cheo
Yeo et al., 2009). One of the factors that may cause humans not to use technology
correctly is because it is technically complex; this one of the technological factors
pointed out by Werlinger et al. (2008) in section 5.2.
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is an information systems theory
representing individuals’ acceptance and usage of technology (Davis, 1989). For this
reason, the TAM serves as a suitable model to understand the way in which the link
between the human and technology dimensions can be further strengthened.
According to Swanson (1988), one of the most challenging issues in information
systems (IS) research is to understand why people accept or reject computers. If this
can be understood, one would be able to predict, explain and increase user
acceptance of technology (Davis, 1989). The TAM is an extension of Ajzen and
Fishbein’s (1980) study entitled “Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)” and is used as a
theoretical basis for specifying the causal linkages between two key beliefs.
Accordingly, the TAM suggests that when users are presented with a new
technology, a number of factors influence their decision about how and when they
will use that technology. As discussed by Davis (1989), these two factors are
 perceived ease of use (PEOU)
 perceived usefulness (PU).
These two factors are regarded as important determinants of computer usage.
Users’ negative attitudes towards the use of technology may influence its perceived
usefulness. To elaborate, users may feel technology is inadequate or that it always
fails (breaks down) or is faulty. People who fear or do not like advanced technology
and complex devices are said to have technophobia. A number of reasons may have
contributed to this perception. For example, it may be caused by a lack of knowledge
about technology and its potential benefits in that they may have experienced their
computer starting up slowly or their anti-virus program not performing adequately in
removing all the viruses on their system. There may be many other factors, other
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than the technology itself, responsible for these challenges. As a result, users start
developing negative attitudes and behaviour towards technology. Unfortunately, this
is a result of users lacking knowledge about computer systems. For example,
although humans tend to blame most computer-related problems on viruses, if they
had knowledge of some of the technical and software related issues they might find
that it is in fact a hardware related problem and not a virus.
According to Lee, Kozar, and Larsen (2003), TAM is a robust theory as it has been
applied to many different software application technologies such as spreadsheets,
graphics, word processors, email, v-mail, WWW, and hospital information systems.
Adams, Nelson, and Todd (1992) found that, after examining the application of TAM
to these technologies, it in general maintained its consistency and validity in
explaining users’ information systems acceptance behaviour. The TAM has also
been applied to various situations (e.g. time and culture), with different control
factors (e.g. gender, organisational type and size) and different subjects (e.g.
undergraduate students, MBAs, and knowledge workers). This is an important issue,
as phishers target different types of user under different conditions.
Since technology is one of the main dimensions in an anti-phishing framework, this
theory will be used to understand the reasons why humans are susceptible to
phishing attacks when they have technological controls at their disposal. Technology
is frequently used by phishers as a tool to carry out their attacks. In response, users
(the victims) should also be able to use technology as a tool to protect themselves
against such attacks. However, the TAM’s two factors of perceived ease of use
(PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PU) of using technology can be used explain in
more detail why humans find it difficult to identify the structure of spoofed websites
and phishing emails. They may also help to explain why users ignore or pay little
attention to technological warnings that appear on web browsers and suchlike.
Consequently, education on and awareness of the use of technology and an
understanding of its perceived benefits can help address the factors that influence
perceived usefulness and ease of use.
According to Ai Cheo Yeo et al. (2009), substantive research highlights a strong
relationship between attitude and behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Accordingly, a
change in attitude is likely to result in a modification of behaviour (Thomson & Von
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Solms, 1998). The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) predicts that personal attitudes
and societal norms are the two factors that guide behavioural intent. In this regard,
attitude captures summary evaluations, such as good–bad, easy–difficult, harmful–
beneficial, of a particular behaviour (Ajzen, 2001). For example, an organisation can
have policies in place which restrict employees from visiting certain websites. This
may make the employee develop a negative attitude to this, thus the employee may
try to bypass this restriction as he/she feels it is a benefit for them to visit any
website they wish.
Fogg (2002, as cited in Ai Cheo Yeo et al., 2009), states that, in recent years,
research has been focused on using technology to intentionally persuade users to
change their attitudes and behaviour in a predetermined way. To accomplish this,
technologies such as computer systems, devices and software applications were
used. According to Fogg (2002), this application of technology is defined as
persuasive technology and is regarded as a major strategy for influencing people.
Indeed, it has been applied in many disciplines such as marketing, health,
environmental conservation and safety.
Using Scenario A in section 5.3 as an example, the involvement between the two
dimensions of human (H) and technology (T) can be further described. In Scenario
A, John represents the human (H) dimension and the use of technological controls
(e.g. email client) represents the technological (T) dimension. There is no harm in
John receiving a phishing email; the harm lies in his subsequent actions which may
follow from his decision making. Accordingly, in the context of Scenario A, there are
a number of actions or activities involving the use of technology that John could
perform after receiving a phishing email.
 Use the email client functions: Open, Reply, Delete the phishing email, Mark
the phishing email as junk or spam, Block from receiving further phishing
emails from the source.
 Choose to ignore the phishing email.
 Click the hyperlink provided in the phishing email.
 Enter and submit personal particulars on the spoofed website.
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 Download, run and save the attachment (if it is provided in the phishing email)
to the local computer system or network drive.
 Scan the attachment (if it exists) using an anti-virus program.
 Report the phishing incident to other staff members (using email,
organisational website, intranet, notice boards or directly).
In Scenario A, a number of technologies (mostly software) can be used. These
technologies include the web browser, email client, anti-virus program and network
firewalls. Other areas affected by the use of these technologies may require
knowledge of websites, file management and so on. Firstly, it is important that John
correctly identifies the email as a phishing email. Section 5.3 pointed out that a
determining factor in John’s choices mentioned above would be his knowledge and
understanding of technology. John will also have to have knowledge on identifying
phishing threats in order to make use of technology when needed. If John has a
negative attitude towards technology and does not perceive any risk in visiting any
website he wishes, this may pose a risk to both himself and the organisation. He
may not perceive any risk in using an outdated anti-virus program. He may not take
any of his computer system and web browser alerts and warnings seriously.
Preferably, John should find the technology easy to use and useful for its intended
purpose. If John finds technology useful, he would probably use the email client
functions correctly (as described above) and mark phishing email as spam mail so
that he no longer receives such emails from the source. Having these above-
mentioned controls automated, does not guarantee that John will not in future fall
victim to a phishing. However, in general if users do not accept technology, they may
settle for alternatives to perform their tasks. These alternatives could result in the
user performing inefficiently and consequently place the organisation at risk.
Ohaya (2006) points out in his study that most IT professionals continue to ask:
“Why are many employees or users still susceptible to phishing?” Nevertheless,
Ohaya (2006) feels that there are many reasons and lists the following as
contributing factors:
 “lack of knowledge in computer systems;
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 lack of security and security indicators;
 lack of attention to security indicators;
 lack of attention to the absence of security indicators;
 sophistication of spoofed websites.”
These factors described by Ohaya reveal the gap between humans and technology.
Ohaya (2006) explains that “many users do not have the underlying knowledge of
how operating systems, emails and websites work. Many non-technical employees
do not know what a domain name means and cannot tell the difference between a
genuine website from a spoofed-website.” Ohaya elaborates on the previous point
with the following example, “[m]any users may think http://www.paypai.com is the
same as http://www.paypal.com”. Furthermore, the average employee does not
know that a closed padlock icon displayed in the browser indicates that the web
page is using Secured Socket Layer (SSL), which is a certificate verification process.
Ohaya (2006) feels that to understand such topics employees should be part of the
IT department or in the certificate verification business.
Another example added by Ohaya is that “technology-smart” phishers may use an
image of a legitimate hyperlink but the image itself serves as a link to a spoofed site.
This fools users in that they do not know that images can also contain links to
websites. The result is that it is difficult for employees to keep up with the rapid
technological advancements that phishers utilise in their attacks. In some cases,
users ignore phishing warning messages from anti-phishing tools (Dhamija et al.,
2006; Egelman et al., 2008; Florencio & Herley, 2005; Wu et al., 2006). This can be
attributed to the fact that employees are too focused on their primary tasks to pay
much attention to security indicators or the absence thereof.
Some phishers are very knowledgeable about web development and are able to
develop websites that are almost perfect replicas of genuine websites (Jakobsson,
2007). This strongly suggests that individuals need to be educated, trained and
made aware of phishing techniques and to be suspicious of well-designed spoofed
websites. It also indicates that there are vulnerabilities in the way humans make use
of technology. Accordingly, education is also necessary to train users of technology
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to use it correctly. To strengthen the relationship between the human (H) and the
technology (T) dimensions, education will have to ensure that employee behaviour is
changed, as it will affect the actions mentioned above. Once education has
successfully accomplished this change, the results will satisfy the TAM’s objectives
of
 technology (e.g. software) is useful
 technological controls are easy to use.
The literature studied has demonstrated that with any current or future technology
development, key factors are necessary for making technology useful and easy for
consumers to use. To successfully bridge the gap between humans and technology,
it is imperative that users are educated about using technology correctly and seeing
its usefulness.
As pointed out earlier in this context, it is necessary to understand why technology is
not used by humans to mitigate phishing attacks, as the latter is a significant
challenge. According to Adams et al. (1992), a subtle problem in examining the
determinants of technology use is the notion of "captive use”. They add that “[e]ven
when usage is not strictly required as part of a job there may be no alternative but to
use that system to effectively complete the job. Thus, the user's attitude might be, ‘I
don't like it but there's no alternative’”. The latter statement can be linked to agency
theory, which is described in the next paragraph.
The following paragraph describes agency theory, which will help explain the factors
that influence the relationship between the human (H) and the organisational (O)
dimensions.
5.5.2 Agency Theory
According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory is an important, yet controversial,
theory because many authors have different interpretations of it. Eisenhardt (1989)
states that scholars have applied agency theory in various disciplines, such as
finance, economics, accounting, sociology, political science and marketing. Agency
theory discusses the agency problem that arises when cooperating parties have
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different goals and division of labour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). This
relationship is metaphorically described as a contract between two parties, namely,
the principal who delegates work to the agent who performs that work (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). In this study, the research problem is addressed in an
organisational context; as such, the principal is seen as the organisation and the
agent is the user or employee. Agency theory is regarded here as being an
appropriate theory to understand the significant role between human (employee) and
organisational (management) dimensions.
The problem domain in agency theory is the relationship between the principal and
the agent, who both have differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation,
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle blowing, vertical integration,
transfer pricing). According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory is concerned with
resolving two problems:
 The conflicting desires or goals of the principal and agent
 The verification of the agent’s activities, which is too difficult or expensive for
the principal.
Conflict arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk.
These differing goals may explain why the agent (i.e. employees) disobeys or
neglects organisational policies and procedures. The fact that organisations have
policies and procedures in place means that there are no written disparities in what
the employee should and should not do. However, even if an organisation has such
policies and procedures in place, it should not necessarily be taken for granted that
employees comply with and support them. Herath and Rao (2009) state that
employee negligence and non-compliance with policies cost organisations millions of
dollars every year. Accordingly, section 3.5.1 discussed the differences between
policies and procedures and the related challenges.
To address the problems pointed out above, the principal aims to motivate the agent
using incentives that recognise the agent’s effort, as well as the environmental
factors that have an effect on the outcomes (Herath & Rao, 2009). Bamberg and
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Spremann (1987) illustrate this with an example: “the principal is assisted by the
agent and the agent is deciding on level and kind of his effort. The principal is thus
ready to pay some kind of reward to the agent in return for a certain decision, action
or effort.”
As part of their research project, Schlienger and Teufel (2003) administered
questionnaires at Orange Switzerland to determine whether employees knew and
supported their organisation’s security policy. The results of their evaluation indicate
that the security policy is known in general, but not supported by the employees or
by management. According to Schlienger and Teufel (2003), this also indicates that
the employees need extra security training and education.
For users to behave appropriately in the organisation they first need to be made
aware of and given reasons why security policies and procedures are needed.
Furthermore, they need to know and understand how to implement the procedures
supporting such policies (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). If this is not accomplished,
users will put organisations’ information at risk. Organisational policies can ensure
that employees cannot plead ignorance to the rules, as many insider problems stem
from ignorance rather than malicious motivation (Cobb, 2010). However, in their
study Schlienger and Teufel (2003) describe that even where employees know of
security policies, they may still wilfully ignore such policies because they do not
understand why they are needed. Educating employees on why such policies are in
place not only increases understanding, but also increases motivation (Siponen,
2000). In terms of such policies, it is also important that employees understand their
roles and responsibilities within the organisation. This is supported by ISO/IEC
27002 (2005, p. 23), which states that the organisation must ensure that its
employees, contractors and third party users understand their roles and
responsibilities in order to reduce the risks to the organisation.
Understanding why humans behave in a certain way in certain situations, or do not
perform their duties according to the organisation’s procedures, requires a
fundamental understanding of human behaviour. Establishing an organisational
security culture is another element that cannot be ignored as it has great significance
in agency theory. Organisational culture has two core elements, namely, basic
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assumptions and beliefs (Schein, 1985). The organisational culture is consequently
expressed in terms of the collective values, norms and knowledge of organisations
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In turn, those collective norms and values impact on the
behaviour of the organisation’s employees. If employees do not take the severity of
risks posed by phishers seriously, they will affect other members of a particular
organisation and thus put the organisation at risk. An information security culture,
like an organisational culture, cannot be created once and then be used repeatedly
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). To ensure that the organisational culture and the
information security culture are aligned, culture has to be created and maintained or
changed on an ongoing basis.
Herath and Rao (2009) point out that in the context of information security it is
challenging to observe end-user behaviour. Similarly, Bamberg and Spremann
(1987) add that “the principal cannot observe the agent's actions in full detail”. Even
when the principal is able to observe the agent’s activities, it does not guarantee that
the agent has done what is required of him/her in the interim to accomplish that
outcome. This poses a problem – if the organisation does not fully observe its
employees activities it may result in phishing threats entering the organisation
through its employees. The information provided in this paragraph reveals that,
generally, organisations may not completely trust their employees and therefore their
employees have be monitored and supervised to ensure that the requirements of the
organisation are met. This may create further conflict on the part of employees.
Using Scenario B in section 5.3 and considering all the variables that have an
influence on agency theory to strengthen the relationship between the human (H)
and the organisational (O) dimensions, the following factors should be taken into
consideration. The next two paragraphs categorise principal and agent factors.
PRINCIPAL FACTORS
 Organisations should screen prospective employees carefully before
employing them, preferably using trained employees for the task. This will
allow organisations to trust and have confidence in their employees.
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 Organisations should motivate employees. Organisations can introduce team-
building workshops to encourage staff to work in teams. Furthermore,
organisations can offer incentives to their staff.
 Organisations should have clear policies and should negotiate and draft
related procedures. Government regulations and laws need to be understood
by all parties concerned.
 Organisations can facilitate or organise information security training and anti-
phishing campaigns. This can help to educate employees on the dangers of
modern-day information security threats (specifically social engineering
techniques and phishing).
 Organisations should educate their employees so as to understand their roles
and responsibilities in information security (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004a).
More importantly, policies and procedures must be understood and followed.
 Organisations should have internal communication. There are two main
forms: interpersonal and communication using media (Schlienger & Teufel,
2003).
 Organisations should perform monitoring and/or evaluation of its employees
to determine whether they a performing according to organisational
requirements and expectations.
 Organisations should ensure that employees can improve and further develop
their career paths in the organisation. Further training and certification of such
training can develop interests and skills.
 Organisations can reward staff if they go the ‘extra mile’ to meet the
organisational targets set by their objectives. Rewards could include perks,
incentives, verbal recognition, promotions and responsibilities. This will
motivate employees.
AGENT FACTORS
 Employees should have knowledge of where to access organisational policies
and procedures (e.g. intranet, organisation website, documentation).
 Employees should be made aware of organisational policies and procedures
upon appointment through proper educational and awareness campaigns.
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 Employees should understand their roles and responsibilities (i.e. daily tasks)
and what is expected of them in the workplace.
 Employees should be cognisant of the organisation’s mission, strategies,
goals and objectives.
 Employees should understand that they are paid to perform a task or service
to the organisation.
 Employees should be made aware of the severity of risks the organisation
could face from security threats should policies be disregarded or neglected
by them.
 Employees should understand the risk of noncompliance with organisational
policies and procedures. Penalties or further disciplinary action may be taken
against the employee.
 Employees should report all security-related incidents, for example to
managers.
Addressing these factors requires both parties to understand their roles and
responsibilities. In this regard, education is required to help change the behaviour of
employees. Employees should have the best interests of the organisation at heart
and should understand their role in protecting the organisation and not divert the
responsibility to somebody else. If this could be achieved, this would satisfy the
agency theory problems highlighted earlier, thus closing the gap between the human
(H) and the organisational (O) dimensions. As such, this would also influence the
agency problem alluded to earlier as follows:
 Principal’s and agent’s desires or goals do not conflict with each other
 Principal can verify what the agent is actually doing in the workplace.
The human-organisation (HO) link is an important hub from which other important
processes between human-technology (HT) and organisation-technology (OT) flow.
It would seem that there are some overlaps originating from the HO link that affects
other relationships. For example, Posthumus (2009, p. 110) describes in his thesis
that there is a close link between IT governance and agency theory relationships.
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These overlaps can be explained and strengthened by education and will be
discussed in the following chapter.
This subsection described the relationship between the employees as the agent and
the agent’s organisation (principal). It demonstrated that the relationship between
these two parties is in conflict (based on differing goals), hence the term ‘agency
problem’. Agency theory has described many factors which influence the different
objectives between these two parties. Most of these factors point out that employee
behaviour needs changing, as employees do not comply with organisational policies
and procedures. One of the factors that may have caused this relates to the limited
knowledge of why such policies are needed. It is therefore important for the
organisation to make its employees aware of this. This section further described
factors that help to understand how to reduce the conflicting needs between
employees and the organisation. An understanding of these factors pointed to the
fact that an educational approach is necessary to solving these conflicting needs.
Accordingly, education will help form a tighter bond between the human (H) and the
organisational (O) dimensions. The following chapter will discuss further how
education can be used to achieve this.
By examining an internationally recognised framework, the following paragraph
attempts to understand factors that influence organisational (O) practice in terms of
technology (T).
5.5.3 COBIT 4.1
Linking IT to business is not a new concept; it has previously been recognised as
business-IT alignment. This alignment refers to “applying IT in an appropriate and
timely way, in harmony with the business strategies, goals and needs” (Luftman,
2004). IT alignment specifically attempts to address the way the organisation should
or could be harmonised with IT. For this reason, COBIT 4.1 serves as a suitable best
practice to understand how the bonds between the organisational (O) and
technology (T) dimensions can be strengthened. COBIT 4.1 (2007) is an
organisational best practice and stands for Control Objectives for Information and
related Technology. It is a framework and supporting tool set that allow managers to
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bridge the gap between control requirements, technical issues and business risks,
and communicate that level of control to stakeholders. COBIT 4.1 enables the
development of clear policies and best practices for IT control throughout
enterprises.
COBIT’s objective is the following: "Specifying the decision rights and accountability
framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT." It has been frequently
pointed out in this study, human behaviour is a concern. COBIT is kept up to date
and harmonised with other standards and guidelines that help in understanding and
managing the risks and benefits associated with IT. The process structure of COBIT
and its high-level, business-oriented approach provide an end-to-end view of IT and
the decisions to be made about IT. Furthermore, COBIT provides good practices
across a domain and process framework, and presents activities in a manageable
and logical structure (COBIT 4.1, 2007, p. 4). IT governance implies a system in
which all stakeholders, including the board, executive management, customers and
staff, have clear accountability for their respective responsibilities in the decision-
making processes affecting IT. These stakeholders form part of the organisational
dimension.
The COBIT 4.1 framework covers five specific IT governance domains, namely,
strategic alignment, value delivery, risk management, resource management and
performance management. These domains are described in further detail in Figure
5.4 below.
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Figure 5.4: COBIT IT governance domains and their descriptions (adapted from COBIT 4.1,
2007)
Agency theory focuses specifically on organisational aspects (O) and the
organisation’s employees (H). COBIT, on the other hand, focuses on the
organisation (O) and its use of IT (T). Extracted from COBIT 4.1, the benefits of
implementing COBIT as an IT governance framework include the following:
 “Better alignment, based on a business focus;
 A view, understandable to management, of what IT does;
 Clear ownership and responsibilities, based on process orientation;
 General acceptability with third parties and regulators;
 Shared understanding amongst all stakeholders, based on a common
language;
 Fulfilment of the COSO requirements for the IT control environment.”
COBIT 4.1 can be used to prevent some of the challenges described in Scenario C.
Elements of the COBIT 4.1 domains were selected specifically to deal with phishing
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threats. The Delivery and Support domain of COBIT is concerned with the actual
delivery of required services, which include service delivery, management of security
and continuity, service support for users, and management of data and the
operational facilities. This is important to ensure that phishing threats do not pose a
risk to the organisation. The following box presents the controls extracted from
COBIT’s Delivery and Support domain of ‘Ensure Systems Security’ that are
considered applicable in addressing the organisational and technological
dimension specific to this study:
Delivery & Support 5: Ensure Systems Security
 DS5.1 Management of IT Security
 DS5.2 IT Security Plan
 DS5.3 Identity Management
 DS5.4 User Account Management
 DS5.5 Security Testing, Surveillance and Monitoring
 DS5.6 Security Incident Definition
 DS5.7 Protection of security technology
 DS5.9 Malicious Software Prevention, Detection and Correction
 DS5.10 Network Security
 DS5.11 Exchange of Sensitive Data
According to COBIT 4.1, ensuring systems security (DS5) would satisfy the
requirements for IT by maintaining the integrity of information, processing
infrastructure and minimising the impact of security vulnerabilities and incidents. This
is applicable not only to phishing threats but also any security threat.
Within the COBIT 4.1 guideline of monitor and evaluate, monitoring and evaluate
internal controls (ME2) and ensure regulatory compliance (ME3) were also
selected as components that can improve the OT linkage. This monitoring and
evaluating the effectiveness of controls is an important process given the ever-
changing nature of technological controls and phishing attacks. As a result, controls
may have to be improved accordingly.
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This subsection points out that the responsibility shift in information security does not
lie solely in the hands of users or employees. Management also has a vital role to
play in ensuring that the organisational IT infrastructure provides a safe, reliable and
secure environment in which its employees can perform their duties. As such, top-
level management must support information security and ensure that employees are
trained to exercise their information security responsibilities. If not, this will potentially
create an opportunity for phishers to target weak IT infrastructure either by exploiting
technological vulnerabilities, or through employee behaviour. This will consequently
expose the organisation’s vital information.
This section examined theories and best practices that are relevant to the main
relationships that influence each of the dimensions. Theories and best practices
provided guidance for understanding the variables that reveal gaps between each of
the dimensions. As such, the section provided guidance on understanding which
components within these links were in need of improvement. Figure 5.5 below brings
the theories, best practices and their relationships with the dimensions into
perspective.
Figure 5.5: HOT linkages supported by theories and best practices
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It is evident that in all three linkages (HT, HO, and OT), the attitudes and behaviour
of users influence the functioning of these linkages. This is to be expected given that
each link includes human involvement. Accordingly, education plays an essential
role in ensuring that these linkages form a stronger bond with their respective
dimension. From the understanding of the theories and best practices that has been
created here, a number of gaps are highlighted between each of the links. Humans
need to be properly educated to change their attitudes to technology and to see that
it is easy to use and useful for its purpose. Moreover, humans need to be educated
on security threats and their related risks. They also need to be educated in terms of
carrying their roles and responsibilities safely in organisations; this is made possible
by organisational policies and procedures. Finally, the organisation should ensure
that its IT infrastructure and its associated processes are defined and managed
correctly. Education will help facilitate communication between all three of the
dimensions, and accordingly can be perceived as the catalyst that ignites the
linkages between the dimensions. The relationships or linkages can be seen as the
metaphoric glue that binds all dimensions together, thus forming a stronger layer of
defence against phishing attacks.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the concept of integrating human, organisational and
technology (HOT) dimensions to help mitigate phishing attacks. It also established
that there is currently no literature that can assist in describing how to integrate HOT
aspects effectively. It is evident that a gap exists between the relationships and their
respective dimensions, which created an opportunity to investigate ways in which
this relationship can be further strengthened. Thus, the TAM, agency theory and
COBIT 4.1 were used as suitable theories and best practices to help understand the
components that influence each of the established links. Having understood the
theories and their related components, it became evident that this gap was caused
by human attitudes and behaviour in terms of the use of technology, security
responsibility and compliance with policies and procedures. It emerged that
education plays a vital role in strengthening this process and it can be seen as a
catalyst for further bonding the relationships between the dimensions. This will allow
for better communication between the linkages and their respective dimensions. As a
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result, the current loosely coupled approach will form a tighter bond, subsequently
closing the gaps that phishers try to exploit. The following chapter describes certain
educational principles and develops an educational programme that can be used to
strengthen the links between the dimensions.
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CHAPTER 6A HOLISTIC ORGANISATIONAL ANTI-PHISHING FRAMEWORK
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6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, an approach to integrating human, organisational and
technological (HOT) dimensions to address phishing threats was discussed. This
approach was supported by the literature, which either encourages its use or
integrates aspects relating to these dimensions. Three main linkages were
established between the HOT dimensions. These linkages are, namely, human and
technology (HT), human and organisation (HO) and, finally, organisation and
technology (OT). Various theories and best practices were examined to determine
the variables that influence each of these linkages. This achieved a number of
objectives: firstly, to establish the gaps evident within each of these dimensions; and
secondly, to provide guidance in identifying components that can be used to
strengthen each of these linkages. It emerged that education is inevitably the
solution when attempting to strengthen each of the linkages, as these dimensions all
have some form of human involvement. Education in each of these linkages will
result in a more cohesive bond between each of the dimensions, consequently
resulting in a holistic anti-phishing framework.
The previous chapter identified the factors that are required to strengthen the
linkages between the dimensions. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the
educational components needed in each linkage to address such factors. The next
section begins by discussing the need for security awareness, training and
education. Human behaviour and some methods for changing it are briefly
examined. Section 6.5 describes the educational components needed to address
each of the respective linkages with the aim of safeguarding against phishing
attacks. In section 6.6, the framework is evaluated by three organisations using an
interview technique and the interview findings are discussed in section 6.7.
6.2 The Need for Security Awareness, Training and Education
Chapter 3 discussed the fact that human factors pose security risks to organisations.
As mentioned, many of the problems experienced in the protection of information
can be directly attributed to the involvement of humans in the process (Van Niekerk
& Von Solms, 2008). Payne (2003) states that statistics have proven that the
majority of security breaches affecting organisations are caused by insiders (i.e.
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employees), as opposed to external threats such as hackers. A popular
misconception is that these insider breaches are caused by disgruntled employees.
Instead, Payne (2003) points out that individuals cause these breaches for the
following reasons:
 Users are not aware of security threats.
 Users incorrectly rely on someone else to deal with security threats, for
example IT personnel.
 Users are not adequately skilled in addressing threats.
 Users feel that they have more important things to do, for example their work
tasks.
In the above list, the acts are not committed intentionally by insiders. However,
phishers will exploit these opportunities without hesitation. Therefore, user education
emerges as the solution to address these concerns. However, as pointed out by
Payne (2003), this becomes more complicated when
 users do not acknowledge that it is their personal responsibility to ensure
security
 users consider security too technically complex for them to understand
 top-level and middle management fail to comprehend the importance of
information security and the threat that the related risks poses to the
organisation
 security budgets and staff are not utilised correctly.
From the factors described above, a number of concerns emerge. Humans have a
negative attitude towards accepting personal responsibility for ensuring information
security. Furthermore, they are not adequately educated to deal with security threats.
Consequently, they develop attitudes from the preconceived ideas that security is a
technical concern and is thus the responsibility of technical staff, which then
influences their behaviour. This is one of the reasons why in this study and in many
others humans are referred to as the weakest link (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). To
address this concern, some organisations implement security awareness training
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and education programmes aimed at changing employee behaviour. It has been
proven that motivated and educated users are the best defence against any
unwanted security threat (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). Unfortunately, information
security education is often neglected as a top priority by organisations in favour of
the implementation of technological controls (Nosworthy, 2000). This is concerning,
considering that one internationally accepted code of practice, namely, ISO/IEC
27002 (2005), emphasises the importance of information security education. NIST
800-16 (1998) emphasises that organisations cannot protect the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information without ensuring that employees understand
their roles and responsibilities. Accordingly, the effectiveness of information security
is becoming more dependent on the vigilance of its users. As such, it is important for
every employee in the organisation who works on a computer to be educated about
information security (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 25).
This section emphasised that human behaviour is a security risk to organisations. In
this study, humans have either a direct or an indirect involvement with each of the
processes in the HOT linkages. Thus, it is imperative that this behaviour is
addressed through security awareness, training and education. This section also
revealed that organisations do not treat information security as a high priority. The
organisation, particularly management itself, should also receive education, as it
must support information security and be made aware of the risks. The greatest
influences stemming from human factors are the attitudes, behaviour, motivation,
commitment, habits and norms of people. Unfortunately, very little is known about
why users choose to engage in unsafe security behaviour (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).
In this study, the human factor attributes that will receive the most attention are
attitudes and behaviour. Therefore, the educational principles affecting attitudes and
behaviour also need to be understood before an educational programme can be
implemented. The following section aims to clarify and support this.
6.3 Human Behaviour and How It Can Be Changed
Earlier chapters pointed out that if human behaviour could be better understood, one
could suitably address why humans fall victim to phishing emails (Beznosov &
Beznosova, 2007; Downs et al., 2007). According to Lacey (2009, p. 252), changing
behaviour is much harder than changing attitudes. The literature supports the view
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that to improve human behaviour in information security requires security
awareness, training and education. However, what if the education programme itself
needs improving? Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004a) point out that user education
programmes do not focus enough attention on behavioural theories. Furthermore,
they state that many educational programmes directed at users have been created
by security professionals who do not necessarily have a background in education. As
such, in their study Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2008) further deliberated on how
the educational approach could be improved. They firmly believe that applying
pedagogical principles, such as Bloom’s taxonomy, can assist trainers in correctly
measuring the needs and requirements of their target audience. In this regard, the
concerning factor is that educational programmes are not designed properly.
On the other hand, Leach (2003) states that three key factors are necessary to
improve user behaviour in information security. These factors are the following:
 The behaviour demonstrated by senior management and colleagues
 The user’s security common sense and decision-making skills
 The strength of the user’s psychological contract with the company.
The human factors described above have a great influence on the organisation itself.
Furthermore, Lacey (2009) points out the social factors that also influence behaviour.
To elaborate, Lacey (2009) uses the example of the way group norms can influence
user password behaviour. When users share their passwords with their colleagues, it
can be considered as a sign of trust, while refusing to share a password could be
seen as a sign of mistrust. Lacey (2009, p. 253) further reveals the following ten
factors that most influence people’s attitudes and behaviour:
 “Stories that they read, and games that they play;
 Their perceived organisational role;
 The influence and authority of their management;
 Accepted corporate rules and procedures;
 The nature of the local office or cyberspace environment;
 The actions of their immediate colleagues;
 The cues and controls in the systems they use;
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 The personal consequences of their actions;
 Things that are personal, immediate and certain;
 Their most recent experiences.”
Thomson and Von Solms (1998) believe that, in order to change the ideas and
behaviour of users in an organisation, the organisation would have to undertake an
information security awareness programme that has aims to change the information
security culture of its audience. They further suggest that the security awareness
programme should apply different psychological principles in order to change the
user behaviour (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). They focus on three methods which
aim to affect user’s behaviour. These methods are the following:
 “Directly changing their behaviour (ignoring attitudes and knowledge);
 Using a change in behaviour to influence a person’s attitude;
 Changing a person’s attitude through persuasion.”
To make the above-mentioned methods possible, the practice of information security
has to be incorporated into the daily activities of employees. Thomson and Von
Solms (1998) recommend that this should affect human behaviour to the extent that
it becomes second nature or subconscious to users. Thomson et al. (2006) call this
“unconscious competent”; this is a term used to describe the state where people
start to perform tasks automatically without needing to think consciously about them.
Thomson and Von Solms (1998) discuss a variety of techniques that can be applied
to accomplish the above-mentioned goals. To change the behaviour of users
directly, Thomson and Von Solms (1998) recommend using the technique of operant
learning. This refers to a situation where there is a relationship between a response
and its consequence. They elaborate that if a person’s behaviour is correct, then
they are praised, and if their behaviour is incorrect they are reprimanded (Haber &
Runyon, 1986, p. 73). In explaining how this technique can be applied, Thomson and
Von Solms (1998) describe that in security awareness, training and education
programmes, employees can be rewarded with small tokens for showing the desired
behaviour. They add that these tokens should not be of any great monetary value,
but rather the goal should be that they are earned. Thomson and Von Solms (1998)
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also recommend that when employees are awarded these tokens, it should be
clearly visible to the other employees so that they can be motivated to also earn
such tokens. Motivation is a key concept when teaching learners about information
security and it is often not taken seriously enough (Siponen, 2000). If employees
identify the benefits of receiving security awareness training and education, they will
be more willing to participate. The use of incentives is one of the factors considered
by agency theory and is therefore recommended in this study.
This section highlighted the fact that educational programmes need to be understood
in more detail before they are implemented. Accordingly, it is recommended that
trainers have knowledge of effective educational principles before implementing
educational programmes (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2008). It then further pointed
out that user behaviour is also influenced by the behaviour demonstrated by
management. This indicates that management also requires a change of behaviour
as its influence has an effect on the entire organisation. If the educational
programme does not consider behavioural aspects, it may not be effective enough in
changing human attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, the section further explored
the psychological methods suggested by Thomson and Von Solms (1998), which
were used to change employee behaviour. In this study, these attitudes and
behaviours are primarily focused on three main areas, using technology correctly,
following organisational policies and procedures, and management’s support of
information security. As pointed out in section 3.4.1, Van Niekerk (2005) states that
information security depends on both human knowledge and human cooperation.
According to Nosworthy (2000) a change in user’s attitude automatically leads to a
change in their behaviour (Nosworthy, 2000). In this regard, the human–organisation
linkage will have the greatest influence in achieving this result. Changing an
employee’s attitude is important if the employee is expected to treat phishing threats
seriously in an organisation. This can only be made possible through an information
security educational programme that covers all content related to each of the
linkages.
The next section will discuss security awareness, training and education
programmes and their attributes. These programmes are used to deliver educational
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content to members of organisations with the aim of educating them on each of the
linkages. These educational programmes aim to change user attitudes and
behaviour in terms of security in the organisation.
6.4 Information Security Awareness, Training and Education
Programmes
Chapter 3 categorised and described various controls that organisations commonly
apply to protect themselves against general information security threats. The
literature points out that technological controls alone are inadequate to protect
against security threats, especially phishing. This is largely due to the human
behavioural aspects that affect technology use. Furthermore, organisational policies
and procedures are another control measure that is affected by human attitudes and
behaviour. As a result, a security awareness, training and education programme is
one method that can be used to address the human aspect. Security awareness,
training and education can help change users’ mindsets and behaviour towards
information security thereby making them a more effective security defence in an
organisation (Johnson, 2006). In doing so, the number of security incidents can be
reduced (Hight, 2005).
NIST 800-16 (1998) describes the process of information security education as a
continuum. This continuum is fairly widely accepted and consists of awareness,
training and education (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Van Niekerk & Von Solms,
2004b). This continuum is necessary for the successful implementation of any
information security programme (NIST 800-50, 2003). Learning in the continuum
begins with awareness, develops into training, and finally evolves into education
(NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14). Furthermore, the role each individual plays in an
organisation determines and defines the IT security learning needed by that
individual (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14). According to NIST 800-16 (1998), the purpose
of information security awareness, training and education is to enhance security by
 improving awareness of the need to protect system resources
 developing skills and knowledge so computer users can perform their jobs
more securely
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 building in-depth knowledge, as needed, to design, implement or operate
security programmes for organisations and systems.
The literature often conflates the terms ‘security education’, ‘training’ and
‘awareness’ into a single meaning. As a result, it is difficult to delineate the
differences between them. However, some literature clarifies each of these areas.
Accordingly, the following subsections aim to categorise and discuss these three
levels of learning in more detail. They also attempt to point out how organisations
deliver educational content to all their employees on each of these levels. The next
subsection begins with the awareness level.
6.4.1 Awareness
NIST 800-16 (1998) states that awareness programmes are not training
programmes. Accordingly, they are less formal and a presentation or briefing is often
used to deliver content. Awareness programmes are an effective way of conveying
education and the objective of such programmes is to make people pay attention to
certain information (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 15). Awareness programmes are made
effective when media such as television advertisements and documentaries are
used. Similarly, security awareness campaigns in organisations often make use of
tools such as posters, websites, videos and promotional slogans.
According to Weippl and Klemen (2005), awareness is a much underappreciated
step toward protecting IT systems. This is astounding, considering that it is regarded
as the most cost-effective information security control an organisation can implement
(Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2002). According to Siponen (2000), security awareness
is “a state where users in an organisation are aware, ideally committed to, of their
security mission”. NIST 800-16 (1998, p. 5) considers awareness programmes as a
prerequisite for information security training. Such programmes are usually short
term, specific and immediate (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 15). Furthermore, NIST 800-16
(1998) states that awareness programmes should be motivational, ongoing and
creative, thus enhancing the learner’s attention so that learning will be incorporated
into conscious decision making.
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Awareness programmes are required for all employees and comprise a learning
process focused on allowing individuals to recognise security concerns and to
respond accordingly (NIST 800-16, 1998). Awareness programmes are intended to
educate users on information security issues and also to continually remind users of
the issues and any new pertinent issues involved (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). In
this study, the latter point is important especially as phishers constantly seek new
technologies and techniques to lure their victims, for example social networking sites
and mobile phones. Such programmes should instil a sense of responsibility and
purpose in employees who handle and manage organisational information (Whitman
& Mattord, 2004). They should also point out to users the role they play in the
protection of the organisation’s information and teach them to recognise the
importance of information security (NIST). According to the Australian National Audit
Office audit report (2009), security awareness programmes should be designed to
 promote the need for security and provide individuals with an understanding
of their security responsibilities
 maximise individuals’ contribution to the organisation’s protective security
practices, including increasing adherence to security policies and controls
 explain the potential implications of security breaches, including the costs of
the compromise or loss of assets and information.
In meeting the above requirements, it must be ensured that individuals’ attitudes and
perceptions towards security are changed. If this is achieved, individuals will comply
with organisational policies and procedures, security practices and so on. Johnson
(2006) points out the benefits of security awareness programmes as follows:
 Improved protection of the confidentiality, reliability and correctness of the
organisation’s information
 Increased confidence of employees, suppliers, customers and shareholders in
the organisation’s security, thus improving employee morale and increasing
productivity
 Earlier detection of security incidents; as a result, there will be fewer internal
incidents, errors and omissions.
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6.4.2 Training
Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2008) distinguish the differences between training and
awareness in the following statement: “training seeks to teach a person skill’s in
order to perform a specific function, while awareness seeks to focus an individual’s
attention on an issue or set of issues.” Training is focused on providing relevant
knowledge, security skills and abilities specific to individuals’ roles and
responsibilities in the organisation. As such, training is more formal than awareness
programmes (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2008). Training requires learners to take an
active role when being taught (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 25). In terms of this
approach, learners can be more equipped to deal practically with security threats.
The aim of training is to improve employees’ job performance. Security training is
typically technical in nature and, as such, is directed mostly at security staff and IT
staff who have security-related responsibilities. Technology and systems are
constantly changing and evolving in unanticipated ways (Bishop, 2000). As a result,
the need to regularly educate end-users in technology has increased. Depending on
the skill requirements needed by individuals, training content can be classified into
different levels, such as beginner, intermediate and advanced.
In the context of information security training, the learner must be trained in how to
behave securely in an organisation. Bishop (2000) points out training can be in the
form of tutorials, which are hands-on and intensive. The benefit of tutorials is that
learners can directly apply what they have learnt to their daily tasks. Another benefit
of tutorials pointed out by Bishop is that learners will possess the material used in
the training, for example, books and slides. This is useful, as learners may not be
able to retain everything which is taught during their tutorials. They can then refer to
the materials at any given stage, and remember some information (perhaps from the
visuals) to refresh their memory. Training can also be done spontaneously at the
workplace. For this to be possible, an employee would need a mentor in the
workplace who is willing to answer any questions. For example, a trainee can be
shown how the systems are configured and reconfigured (Bishop, 2000). Bishop
adds that this technique is typically slow; however, it is effective because it educates
the employee on problems that are specifically related to the organisation or the
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system. Bishop (2000) further adds that this approach is also effective when
combined with a general tutorial.
6.4.3 Education
In section 4.4.2.1, it was indicated that Van der Merwe et al. (2005a) state that there
are five issues that have to be addressed in order to combat phishing, namely,
education, preparation, avoidance, intervention and treatment. Robila and Ragucci
(2006) believe that, within these groupings, education is given the least attention.
Employees have unique backgrounds, age, strengths and skill sets. As such, they
have different levels of understanding (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 5). To address the
latter, organisations usually provide further education to their staff through some
training or awareness programmes. This is because education is often the only
method to convince employees and managers of the need to do things differently
(Schein, 1999, p. 120).
Education can be considered an advanced form of training as it integrates all the
skills attained from training and awareness in a common body of knowledge (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 16; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2008). Employees must understand,
through knowledge, why information security is important for the organisation
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). To accomplish this, educational material should ideally
be tailored to the learning needs and styles of individual learners (NIST 800-16,
1998, p. 19; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004a). It is important for the trainer to
recognise the different methods by which individuals learn and memorise content
(Danchev, 2003). Some people learn by reading material, while others might learn
better by being presented with study material or other education approaches.
Therefore, a variety of activities should be used in the education process (Danchev,
2003). Diagrams, pictures and even cartoons can be effective ways to gain the
interest and participation of members. Cartoons, especially humorous ones, can be
effective as members will remember a funny situation representing a more serious
procedure (Danchev, 2003). However, caution should be exercised when using this
approach, as one does not want members to treat the training as a comedy show.
According to Danchev (2003), it has been proven that using this approach has a
positive outcome in employees’ understanding of content. As a result, this would
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appeal to the diverse learning styles important for effective education involving adults
(NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 20).
Literature describes many educational learning/teaching models that should be
considered when developing an information security educational programme. Five
well-known learning models include objectivism, constructivism, collaborativism,
cognitive information processing and socio-culturalism and the consideration of
these models can help to produce an effective educational programme. In Monk’s
(2011) study, he examined and discussed each of these learning models in the
context of information security education. Monk (2011) concluded that each of these
learning models presents problems when used to formulate an information security
educational programme. Therefore these specific five learning models will not be
considered although some of their principles have been integrated in the educational
programme.
This section distinguished differences between levels of awareness, training and
education, despite some researchers using these terms interchangeably. This
section also helped establish how these educational programmes are operated and
delivered. Education is the end-product of effective security awareness and training
programmes. Ultimately, all employees need to be educated as ‘education’ is the
entire process a learner undergoes to obtain the information they need to become
knowledgeable of the concepts of information security (Monk, 2011). Educational
principles influence the way awareness and training programmes are carried out and
it is also important for security awareness and training programmes to be monitored
and evaluated during and after their delivery.
Before implementing an educational programme, it is important for organisations to
recognise their employees’ background, specifically their strengths and weaknesses,
as well as their learning styles. Learning styles that support visual learners, auditory
learners and tactile learners can have an influence on how the educational content is
received. For example, a computer technician can be taught verbally or can be
taught while physically operating a computer terminal. If organisations understand
their employees, problems or potential problems can be identified and remedied
through some form of education, as such an understanding will determine the
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training requirements. This includes identifying whether employees need to have
their skills further improved or developed in order to perform their tasks or new tasks
correctly. It is also important that learners are motivated during and after training.
By analysing the way information security educational programmes are delivered, a
set of criteria can be created that could enhance the chances of a successful
education programme (Monk, 2011). This is also necessary to define the knowledge
and skills needed by various individual groups in the organisation. As such, the next
section discusses components for each of the HT, HO and OT linkages.
6.5 Educational Components Required to Strengthen Each
Linkage
This section will introduce the educational components (between HT, HO and OT) of
a holistic anti-phishing framework. The previous section distinguished the principles
of awareness, training and education. These principles will be integrated and used in
delivering the educational content required to strengthen each of the subsequent
linkages. Earlier chapters introduced the specific HOT controls needed to combat
phishing threats. However, these controls were mostly used in isolation of one
another. Therefore, theories and best practices studied in the previous chapter
further helped to identify the major components needed to address possible gaps in
phishing defences.
Furthermore, components from ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) were studied and taken into
account. There are an overwhelming number of components that can generally
address information security in each of these linkages; however, in this study
components are limited to addressing phishing only. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) document specifies the way learners should be
educated on information security (NIST 800-16, 1998). Many information security
education programmes are designed in accordance with specifications taken from
NIST 800-16. In line with this, the components in this document were studied to
determine how content can be suitably delivered to the relevant audience. The
educational components required for each of the linkages were evaluated by three
organisations. The findings of the evaluations are later discussed in section 6.7.
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It should be noted that, for the rest of this section, ‘users’ and ‘employees’ refer to
any person who could benefit from gaining knowledge from education on each of the
linkages. The term ‘users’ should not be confused specifically with end-users of
computer systems, but rather refers to the staff involved at all levels of the
organisation, including senior management, who are to receive training. It is noted
that literature does indeed describe content that should be taught to users to help
identify phishing attacks; however, in this regard it does not describe how to deliver
the educational content effectively (Robila & Ragucci, 2006). This section aims to
provide further guidance in this regard. The following subsections classify the
educational components according to the three main linkages under discussion,
which helps to structure the educational components more logically. Aligning these
three linkages will help reduce the gap that allows phishing to proliferate through the
other linkages. The next subsection begins by discussing the educational
components needed to address the HT linkage in phishing.
6.5.1 Human-Technology Linkage
Previous chapters discussed the fact that organisations and end-users apply a great
deal of attention to the implementation and use of technological controls to combat
general information security threats. Predictably, this approach has been expanded
to combat phishing attacks. Security-related educational programmes focus much
attention on training users in the use (i.e. functions and features) of technology and
neglecting, to some degree, whether users actually find the technology easy to use;
for example using a web browser to help the user identify spoofed websites. Chapter
2 pointed out that people are misusing technology and information and that this trend
is having a negative effect in that people are beginning to believe that this is
acceptable. As a result, a change in user attitudes and behaviour is absolutely
imperative and, to some extent, the goal of this study.
Despite the large number of technological tools available to fight phishing, it is clear
that current practice in the use of these controls is inadequate because these
technological controls are managed by individuals, who if not trained may leave the
system open to attack. Furthermore, the technological controls themselves can also
possess software vulnerabilities that phishers may exploit. To further add to this
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complexity, technology is constantly changing and, as such, users need to be
frequently educated on these changes. It may be argued that victims’ lack of
understanding in the use of such technologies is what exposes them to phishing
attacks the most. Therefore, education should aim to enhance users’ understanding
of what the threat of phishing entails and also the most efficient ways in which
technology can be used to combat this threat.
This subsection describes the components needed in this linkage to educate users
with an emphasis on using these technologies correctly. The overall objective of this
linkage is to ensure technology and its security controls are experienced by all users
as being useful and as easy to use as possible. This supports the objectives of the
TAM described earlier. This objective can be accomplished using a training
programme.
PHASE OBJECTIVES
Phase 1: Introduction to information
security and security threats
 To give users knowledge of the
dangers security threat agents present
for organisational assets.
 To distinguish between different types
of security threat agents.
 To identify phishing emails and spoofed
websites.
Phase 2: Technological controls used to
combat phishing attacks
 To give users the skills required to use
technological tools correctly to combat
phishing attacks.
Table 6.1: Using a phased approach for information security training
The content of such training programmes may differ, depending on the specific types
of software (application and system software) organisations use. The training of
individuals, especially in information security and supporting technologies can be a
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complex task given their diverse backgrounds. If organisations have the time and
resources, they can use a phased approach to their HT training. For example, they
could classify their training programme into two phases. Table 6.1 gives an example
of this approach. Phase 2 is of key importance here, as it specifically addresses
phishing. Appendix A outlines the components of these two phases in more detail.
To reduce costs and resources, the organisation can provide on-site training. In this
particular training, the training environment should include sufficient computers,
Internet availability and software relevant to the training. If an external facilitator or
institution is conducting the training, trainees should be evaluated and possibly
receive some certification or recognition on successful completion of the respective
training modules. Although this will cost the organisation money it will nevertheless
encourage employees to take the training more seriously as they stand to receive
benefits for their efforts. This supports Thomson and Von Solms’s (1998) technique
of operant learning described earlier. It is important that members are practically
assessed after their training. If members are not successful in their assessment, the
organisation should ideally make it compulsory for them to complete the training
within a suitable time frame. It should be noted that education in this linkage focuses
on components related only to phishing, in addition to factors that have an impact on
phishing education. As such, this section will elaborate more on such components
and less on others. The next subsection will discuss the foundational user training
component necessary before information security training takes place.
6.5.1.1 Information Security Training
Before users receive any training in information security aspects, they first need to
be taught the necessary skills and competency regarding computer systems (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 16). Section 2.2 established the important role of IT in
organisations: Today, most organisations use computers to manage their business
activities and processes and, accordingly, in this digital age, users are expected to
possess the skills needed to operate a computer correctly.
Nosworthy (2000, as cited by Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2002) states that each and
every employee in the organisation, from the CEO to the cleaning staff, must be
aware of and trained to exercise their responsibilities towards information security.
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The NIST 800-16 (1998) document is a good starting point to guide the development
of information security programmes. However, there are some prerequisites before
information security training can begin.
The employee’s role in the organisation shall determine the training requirements
needed by that individual. Accordingly, employees can be classified into three major
groupings, namely, top management, end-user staff and IT/technical staff. This
will create a comfortable environment for learners to participate in, thus supporting
Thomson and Von Solms's (1998) technique of “conformity”. The training programme
should be tailored to address these specific groupings (Thomson & Von Solms,
1998). End-user staff members should be able to use the technological control
features and functions of the email client, web browser and anti-virus program
correctly from the user-level. IT/technical staff, however, will receive specialised
training in the implementation and configuration of security controls and technologies
on an organisational level in order to help protect the organisation against phishing
attacks. The next section describes the components needed to address the
education of each of these groups.
Monk (2011) states that information security is viewed by many, as a boring topic to
study. Accordingly, participants firstly need to be motivated to increase participation
and, if possible, some rewards can even be given out after successful completion.
Thomson and Von Solms (1998) state that these rewards could be in the form of
coffee mugs, paper weights, mouse pads and so on. Secondly, information security
is a very broad and detailed subject and can focus on many specific areas (e.g.
network security, application security). Therefore it should focus on, or at least
address, aspects related to phishing.
The trainer, in the case of course presentation, should ideally be a qualified expert in
information security. If not, the audience may not accept or be convinced by the
trainer’s arguments (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). The trainer should ideally
possess certification, such as a Certified Information Systems Security Manager
(CISSP) appropriate for this type of training. It should be conveyed to all trainees
what the programme aims to accomplish and how vital education is for the survival of
the organisation (Danchev, 2003). Since each employee has a different role to play
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in the organisation, end-users may not be familiar with all the technical terms. The
following paragraph begins with information security training for end-users.
End-user Training
According to Hight (2005), end-users have access to the most vital information an
organisation possesses. Accordingly, depending on their knowledge and behaviour,
they could potentially put the organisation at risk. Phishing is not limited to any type
of user and targets any human behaviour regardless of status or position; thus, this
type of training can include top management, depending on whether the organisation
sees fit to do so. Training end-user staff can be challenging because such staff
believe it is the responsibility of security personnel to protect the organisation against
security threats. Therefore the training should consist of a number of short sessions
designed to introduce the user to the various security aspects that need to be
addressed in their daily routine (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). Training of special
security tools or features in applications should be offered by the organisation (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 16; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003) and, to this end, end-users need to
be trained in the following security features and applications which are specifically
needed to combat phishing.
File Types
Users should be familiar with the different file types of computer systems, as well as
their corresponding file extensions. In emails, there is a wide variety of attachments
that contain different file types such as images, presentations, zip files, documents,
pdf files and video. These different file types could cause confusion in users,
potentially creating an opportunity for phishers. To elaborate, if users do not
recognise these different file types then phishers could use this opportunity to attach
a virus to an email. Viruses attached to emails can be created by phishers who aim
to capture keyboard strokes and/or obtain screenshots of the victim’s activities on
the computer system. For example, it is common for executable programs attached
to emails to contain viruses in a zip file. Users then identify the contents of the zip file
only after it has been ‘unzipped’. Microsoft Word documents can contain a special
type of virus known as a macro virus. These viruses are sent by phishers with the
intention of stealing passwords and monitoring keystrokes and online activity. The
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passwords can then be used by the phisher to gain entry to any financial websites
used by the victim. Another problem is that, by default, Microsoft Windows XP and
Windows 7 operating systems do not have their file type extensions visible by
default. Therefore, users cannot distinguish file types easily unless they are trained
in how to view their properties. Thus users should be trained to uncheck the hidden
file extension settings of the operating system.
Security Threats
Thomson and Von Solms (1998) and NIST 800-16 (1998) motivate the use of role-
playing exercises. Since security threats are a technical subject, in helping members
to understand security threats the trainer can act out the activities of threats in role-
playing exercises. This can inspire humour among members, thus increasing
participation. In the context of this study, particular attention and detail must be given
to social engineers and phishers as the main security threat agent.
System Warning Alerts
In Chapter 4, the literature highlighted the fact that users often ignore or lack
understanding of web browser warning alerts. These browser alerts warn users that
they may be entering a website which has been identified as malicious, for example
a spoofed website. Similarly, the operating system and application software generate
alerts and require the involvement of users; for example, update now, submit,
cancel, and continue. Therefore if users can understand operating system alerts they
may be able to transfer this knowledge to understanding the alerts originating from
other software applications such as the web browser as well.
Users should also understand that computer systems can request users to update
the software, notably for the operating system and application software. Section
4.2.3 illustrated the fact that phishers can entice victims to update their software
through hyperlinks in emails. As a result, if users have knowledge of software
updates, they will recognise that this process is illegitimate; as such updates should
not originate from these hyperlinks provided in emails.
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Logging Off and Locking Computer Terminals
In times of absence users should be able to log off and lock their computer terminal
using a password. This is to safeguard against social engineers who may be in the
vicinity in the event of physical access control being compromised. If a computer
terminal or information is stolen, it can be used by the social engineer for improper or
illegal purposes. Users should also be taught to encrypt the information stored on
their computer devices and need to practise this security behaviour until it becomes
a habit. This specific best practice can be enhanced through ongoing awareness
created by the organisation.
Anti-malware Software
Users must be educated in the correct use of anti-malware programs. It is important
for users to understand that anti-malware programs must have their virus signatures/
definitions updated regularly (i.e. every day or hour) in order for it to be effective
against the latest threats. Most anti-malware programs are packaged so as to be
updated automatically. Chapter 4 established that phishers can disguise email
attachments to contain a Trojan in order to capture passwords from their victims. As
such, using the anti-virus program users can scan storage devices (e.g. flash disks)
and attachments contained in emails. Users should practise saving email
attachments to their local system directory so that the anti-malware program is given
an opportunity to inspect the file for viruses or other malicious content (Ollmann,
2008). Modern anti-malware programs have built-in phishing detection which is able
to detect phishing emails and spoofed websites.
Email Client
Wacaser and Mazzeo (2007) cite a 2005 survey conducted by the American
Management Association. The results of the survey indicated that 26% of employers
have terminated their employees for inappropriate use of email in the workplace.
Lack of understanding in the use of the email client is an area that phishers tend to
exploit. Section 4.2.2 described the characteristics of phishing attacks, specifically in
the way that they are methodically carried out. Trainees therefore need to be
educated in this regard. Special attention should be paid to technical details, such as
email address structure, the hyperlink structure contained in the email, social
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engineering techniques (the bait) used by the phisher and file attachment type. This
will help users to correctly identify and distinguish phishing emails from legitimate
emails.
Figure 6.1: Educating users on the characteristics of a phishing email
Actual real-world examples of phishing emails must be made available to users
instead of mere discussion. Figure 6.1 gives an example of how this can be carried
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out. Sections to pay attention to in phishing emails can be highlighted for users in
this manner. The email client’s function of block/mark as spam can be used to
prevent further phishing emails from the particular source. Users may also choose to
select a number of other options such as trust sender, junk mail and block sender.
Most importantly they should not respond to the email – just delete it.
Web Browsers
According to Ollmann (2008), web browsers may be the most technically
sophisticated software applications that employees use. Wadlow and Gorelik (2009)
believe that many security concerns relate to the user of the browser. This
emphasises the importance of users being well trained in web browser use.
Furthermore, using real-world examples users should be educated to distinguish
between spoofed websites and legitimate websites. Training should therefore focus
on the use of technical features and indicators on web browsers and web pages,
such as SSL icon and URL structure. Users must understand that before submitting
sensitive information on a web page, they should note the ‘padlock’ icon on the web
browser's status bar and not on the web page area. The padlock icon indicates that
the website is safe and secure (i.e. encrypted) in terms of transmitting confidential
information.
Another indication that the website is in a secure state is if the web address begins
with “https” instead of “http”. Web browsers also alert users by displaying warnings
indicating that they are either using an encrypted webpage or not. Most web
browsers warn users if they are in an unsafe, malicious or suspicious website. Some
spoofed websites may indicate that they are secure, using a phony padlock icon.
Therefore, for added security, users should be trained to view the security certificate
of that particular website in order to determine if it has been issued by a trusted
certificate authority and that it is valid (Ollmann, 2008).
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Ten Phishing Best Practices
Information security training for end-users can be concluded by highlighting the
following ten phishing educational best practices. It is important for members to
understand and remember these guidelines.
1. Do not trust strangers: This is one of the most important life rules one was
taught as a child. To be safeguarded from threats we were educated from an
early age not to talk to or trust strangers. The same rule applies when
receiving emails, instant messages, text messages or phone calls from
individuals you do not know. The argument that these technologies do not
provide face-to-face communication does not excuse ignorance of this rule.
Be more suspicious of anyone contacting you unexpectedly to request
personal information. Even if this person may sound legitimate and
trustworthy be wary as it may be a social engineer. Organisations and
financial institutions do not operate in this manner. This includes a department
within the victim’s place of work.
2. Scrutinise the contents of the email message: Firstly, if you are not the
customer of the organisation being imitated in the email, then delete it or block
the sender. Legitimate emails should address one by their name not as a
generic ‘Dear Customer’. Typically, phishing emails do not refer directly to the
person by name. Check for spelling mistakes or missing words. If any offer or
story seems too good to be true, it most likely is. Users must also not be
tempted by any cause or plea that preys on human emotions. For example,
people who are suffering from an illness or dreaded disease requiring funding
for assistance. These are email scams; use the email client features to report
it as spam mail.
3. Do not respond to emails that are in HTML format with embedded
submission forms. Any information submitted via email, even if it is
legitimate, will be sent in clear text and may be observed (Ollmann, 2008).
Images embedded in emails can contain a virus code and potentially be links
to spoofed websites. This process is known as click jacking (Shelly &
Vermaat, 2011, p. 405).
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4. Do not download email attachments from unknown sources. This is
similar to the first point. Pay attention to the type of file that is attached (e.g.
document or zip file), as attachments can contain viruses.
5. Do not reply to, or click on, hyperlinks or images contained in emails.
Delete the email especially if it warns you, with little or no notice, that an
account will be terminated unless one complies with demands. In this
instance, look out for the ‘bait’, as it is used to lure victims to comply with the
request. Therefore, do not fear the threat or warning.
6. Use the keypad to manually type URLs of website, instead of clicking on
hyperlinks. This is because some web page addresses are disguised to look
like the legitimate websites. In some cases, phishers make use of obfuscation
techniques to hide the source code of the website. Making use of the email
clients feature to ‘bookmark’ legitimate websites can help, so that one does
not have to type the URL again.
7. Do not submit any personal information such as passwords and PINs via
email, or telephonically, or on websites to any authority no matter how
enticing or credible the story may seem. Instead, confirm the authenticity of
the request by contacting the institution cited in the email using a contact
number or website address you know to be genuine (not the one provided in
the email). If it is necessary, email sensitive information to an individual one
knows, encrypting the email so that it is secure during transmission. Also look
out for the padlock icon in the web browser which indicates that the website is
protected with encryption technologies (SSL) to securely transfer personal
information. Also check whether the URL in the web browser address bar
begins with ‘https://’, which also indicates that it is a secure webpage. If one
believes that a webpage could be spoofed, type in a fake password. Usually a
spoofed website will accept it and redirect you to a webpage stating that the
website is experiencing technical difficulties. A legitimate banking website will
not provide such an opportunity.
8. Do not use identical usernames and/or passwords for different websites. If
one password is compromised by a phisher, they can then use it for other
websites. Think of this like having a universal key that will unlock the doors to
one’s house, office and vehicle. Instead, use different passwords for each
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website. If one’s password has been compromised, change it immediately.
Some organisations require that users change passwords regularly. A
password should consist of at least eight characters with a combination of
uppercase and lowercase letters, numerical and special characters (Shelly &
Vermaat, 2011, p. 278). Avoid using single word passwords and words that
are easy for a phisher to guess. For example, one’s first name. Phishers can
also make use of software known as ‘brute force password cracker’. End-
users often complain that they cannot remember all their passwords;
therefore, make sure that one uses a method to remember these passwords.
One can make use of Password Manager software to handle one’s passwords
safely. Do not write usernames and passwords on pieces of paper that are
readily available to people in the office;
9. Validate credit card and bank account statements as soon as one
receives them. This is to detect problems of unauthorised charges early on. If
a statement is late by more than a couple of days, contact the financial
institution as soon as possible to confirm billing, account and address
particulars (Ollmann, 2008).
10.Do not leave an unoccupied computer terminal logged in on websites,
especially a banking website. When exiting a website, users should log out
correctly and not merely close the window.
The above-mentioned educational guidelines, mostly involving the use of technology,
are concise and understandable (i.e. not too technical) and, if adhered to, can have a
significant impact in the battle against phishing. The ten phishing guidelines should
be taught to employees using real phishing examples to demonstrate each case in
point. These guidelines can also be used to form part of an organisational
awareness campaign. In this regard, the organisation can create security orientated
posters, screen savers, email reminders and mouse pads and display them in offices
to remind employees of them. After the training, it is important to measure the level
of impact of end-users’ information security awareness. This will help to improve the
quality for future implementation of these programmes, as common mistakes and
misunderstandings on the part of both employee and trainer can be identified. This
can typically be achieved by conducting a survey. It is important that employees are
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informed that their responses to the survey will be treated as confidential, in order to
maximise their candour and honesty.
An example of a proposed information security training programme for end-users is
attached in Appendix A. This programme is described in more detail and is tailored
to phishing. At this stage, the end-user staff training is complete. Should users
experience any challenges in using these technological controls, they should be
assisted by IT personnel in the ICT department, for example. This is supported by
Bishop’s (2000) approach to providing on-site training to employees through a
mentor. The next paragraph discusses training for IT/technical staff.
IT/Technical Training
The second target group for information security training consists of the technical
staff. This includes network administrators, IT technicians, software developers and
information security administrators, among others. When technical staff are
appointed, they are expected to possess the skills and experience relevant to their
job description. However, owing to the ever-changing nature of IT, they may need
further training. According to Payne (2003), there are many specialised training
materials and web resources available to support IT staff members. For example, the
SANS Institute provides IT professionals, including system administrators, network
administrators and auditors, with resources such as research reports, best practices,
trends, online training and certification programmes.
There are many other training institutes that provide training and support for
technical staff and the organisation can make use of these resources. It is
recommended that a trainer qualified in network security (e.g. Cisco certification)
conduct this type of training for technical staff. In addition, to reduce costs the
organisation could select individuals (based on some criteria) for specialised training,
instead of training everyone. These individuals could then transfer the skills gained
from the training to the other technical staff in the organisation. This can be regarded
as on-site training. Training should focus on technological vulnerabilities and the
techniques phishers use to gain unauthorised access to information. If members
understand these weaknesses, they can implement the controls necessary to reduce
risk. Members should be trained in technical details relating to the implementation
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and operation of the technological security controls. Special attention should be paid
to the technical details of phisher attack methods and how they are carried out.
Ollmann (2008) lists some phishing attack methods below:
 URL obfuscation attacks
 Preset session attacks
 Man-in-the-middle attacks
 Client-side vulnerability exploitation
 Cross-site scripting attacks
 Observing customer data.
Technical staff should be trained in the controls used to combat these methods.
They should also be willing to assist other employees (at all levels of organisation) in
the use of these controls. Technology changes frequently; therefore it is
recommended that a strategy be implemented in terms of which technical staff
receive training when necessary.
Both user groups previously mentioned require support from management. The next
paragraph describes the training required by top management.
Top Management Training
As mentioned earlier, top management should receive the same type of training as
end-users. However, the organisation will determine whether they would be trained
together with the operational staff. Firstly, it is important for top management to
support the idea of ensuring that information assets are adequately protected on an
ongoing basis. As such, training should take place in such a way that it convinces
management to take information security and phishing very seriously. Payne (2003)
states that when information security is explained to top management in familiar
business terms, it sheds its stigma of technical complexity. It is imperative that
management understand security threats to the organisation, the risks posed by
these threats, and what can be done to mitigate unacceptable risks (Payne, 2003).
This support and commitment will then filter down to other members of the
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organisation. The following components should be highlighted to management in
training.
Importance of Information Security
The importance of securing information and the reasons why such information is
sought after by threat agents should be emphasised in management training. In the
literature, information is often cited as being an organisational asset. Hence,
management needs to understand the value of information and their responsibility
towards ensuring it is protected. The training can furthermore explain how phishing
threats have affected high-profile organisations and their customers financially.
Actual case studies should be included. Management should appreciate that even
reputable organisations can fall victim to phishing despite their financial wellbeing
and large resources.
After training is complete, management should be committed to ensuring that the
organisation’s assets are protected and that information security behaviour is taken
very seriously. This will then positively affect the development and implementation of
the organisational policies and procedures, phishing training programmes and
technological controls aimed at information security and phishing.
This section pointed out that security training in the HT linkage can positively
influence attitudes towards the correct use of technology. They were also educated
in identifying phishing emails and spoofed websites using technology. After
completion of training in this linkage, it should be clear to all parties that information
security is everyone’s responsibility. According to Danchev (2003), a common
problem in information security education programmes is that employees maintain
that it is not their responsibility to improve the security of their organisation. They feel
that security concerns are the responsibility of the IT department or the information
security office (Danchev, 2003). Management and employees have a role to play
and are only as strong as their weakest link. Employees should understand that lack
of security systems for computers and networks, and a lack of concomitant
knowledge in the use of these systems, gives phishers an opportunity to attack them.
Employees must understand that these technological controls can be used as a
shield to guard against phishing attacks. It is important that employees work correctly
177
and accurately at all times and to not overlook anything that looks suspicious. Users
should be cognisant of the risks organisations face caused by their actions or lack of
action if technology is not applied and used correctly and which should be
documented in an information security policy. Identifying and safeguarding against
threats is dependent on the knowledge and skills developed from training. Therefore
users should see that the training they acquire benefits them personally as well as
the organisation. It is challenging to have employees repeatedly attend information
security training events especially if the same content is used in the training.
Motivation and creativity will have a major influence in this regard. The latter relies
on aspects described in the HO linkage. The organisation will have to determine a
strategy to ensure its members participate and, most importantly, understand the
training. The next section will focus on the educational components needed to
strengthen the HO linkage.
6.5.2 Human-Organisation Linkage
The previous section discussed educating members of an organisation specifically
on the use of technology associated with phishing, but also on the security of their
computer system and information. Besides gaining knowledge in the use of these
technologies, the aim was to influence attitudes technology in terms of being useful
and easy to use, thus supporting the TAM objectives.
This section focuses on educational aspects of the organisation and how they
govern information security in particular and its employees in general. This may
seem to be irrelevant to phishing; however, it does have influence the prevention of
phishing incidents. In section 5.5.1, agency theory posited that employees and the
organisation often have conflicting needs. These conflicting needs may be a result of
an employee’s attitudes, behaviour or needs. As such, the link between the human
and organisational (i.e. management) aspects requires strengthening and forms part
of this linkage main objective. In this linkage, much attention is paid to the factors
that affect user behaviour, specifically the changing of attitudes and behaviour to suit
the organisation’s needs. This is particularly important because phishers take
advantage of ignorant or irresponsible human behaviour. For example, while at the
organisation employees are supposed to be engaged in work-related activities, and
not participating in social networking websites that create opportunities for phishers
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to target them. If an employee’s behaviour is not managed at the correct level, the
organisation can be at risk of security threats, which most definitely include phishing.
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 23) classifies this linkage as human resources security.
Similarly, COBIT 4.1 (2007, p. 55) describes it as IT human resources management.
In comparing the principal and agent entities described in agency theory, the
stakeholders affected in this linkage are the organisation and its employees. Top-
level management and human resource management represent the organisational
aspect and management is, typically, entrusted with formulating these policies. The
‘employee’ aspect consists of all other staff on whom organisational policies and
procedures are imposed. The following paragraph describes what needs to be done
to ensure that organisational policies and procedures are drafted and complied with.
6.5.2.1 Organisational Policies and Procedures (including Information Security
Policy)
Chapter 3 described the importance of organisational policies and procedures and
why they are used to manage employee behaviour. One method organisations use
to enforce information security is through policies and procedures. The drafting of
policies and procedures is vital to such an extent that COBIT 4.1 (2007) and ISO/IEC
27002 (2005) regard this as core to the relationship between the organisation and its
employees. Policies and procedures define the relationship between the organisation
(i.e. management) and its employees. More importantly, these policies and
procedures dictate employee behaviour in the organisation (Mitnick & Simon, 2002;
Ohaya, 2006). For a change in behaviour to take place, employees need to firstly be
made thoroughly aware of policies and procedures. Merely signing that policies have
been read does not change human behaviour. Contractors and third-party users
should also receive appropriate security awareness training as well as regular
updates in organisational policies and procedures, as are relevant for their job
function (ISO/IEC 27002, p. 26, 2005). If this is done, there will be fewer
opportunities for phishers to exploit human behaviour.
Herath and Rao (2009) point out that research and field surveys suggest that
employees seldom conform to information security procedures. Unfortunately,
information security policies are not taken seriously enough because they are seen
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as mere guidelines or general directions to follow rather than actual rules (Herath &
Rao, 2009). As a result, research in information security behaviour has started
focusing on employees’ intentions to conform to security policies. It has been
revealed that even in cases where users have knowledge of a specific security
policy, they may still deliberately ignore it because they do not understand why it is
needed (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Furthermore, organisations do not put more
resources into educating their employees in policies and procedures. Instead, the
traditional approach used by organisations is to merely inform their employees that
they have policies and that they should be obeyed or else they will face disciplinary
action. According to Siponen (2000), this approach is not likely to increase employee
motivation or improve attitudes. This will consequently put the organisation at risk as
users will not necessarily behave securely in the organisation (Van Niekerk, 2005).
This is highlighted by agency theory which describes the conflicting relationship
between the organisation and its employees. Seen in the light of agency theory, it
may be more sustainable to help employees understand how their actions in
protecting information assets will empower them, instead of just making them follow
orders (Du Plessis & Von Solms, 2002).
Awareness and training relating to the organisation’s policies and procedures must
be carried out before user access and services are granted (ISO/IEC 27002, p. 26,
2005). This can be done on appointment of employees, and then be continued on an
ongoing basis. Furthermore, it should inform employees of known threats, who to
contact for further security advice and the proper channels for reporting security
incidents (ISO/IEC 27002, p. 26, 2005).
A security awareness programme must ensure that employees understand how their
behaviour may endanger the information assets of the organisation and also how
this can personally affect them. This requires employees to be educated in activities
that are regarded acceptable and unacceptable by the organisation, details which
can be outlined in organisations’ security policy documents. Employees require
training in the security threats and protection methods that were addressed in the
information security training in the HT linkage. Once employees have been educated
in this regard, they will understand the importance of policies and procedures and
will therefore be positively influenced to abide by them.
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To further enhance awareness of security policies and security threats, the
organisation can place security posters conspicuously in offices and corridors. These
posters will make employees aware of crucial points in policies, as well as well-
known security threats. Thus, the opportunity is created for employees waiting for a
meeting or having a tea break to read these posters. In this regard, awareness is
used to continually remind people to comply with organisational policies. Employees
should understand that it is their responsibility to acquire knowledge of the
organisation’s policies and procedures and they should not plead ignorance when
accused of misconduct in this regard. Hence, employees should understand that the
organisation can institute disciplinary proceedings if policies are not followed,
regardless whether the misconduct was unintentional. This could be addressed by a
general misconduct policy which further describes the procedures for the disciplinary
process.
This subsection pointed out that, by educating employees on the purpose of security
policies, employee attitudes, work ethic, knowledge and behaviour can be positively
influenced. Motivation will play a vital role in ensuring that employees perform their
tasks at an acceptable level. This statement is supported by ISO/IEC 27002, (2005,
p. 26), which states that motivated personnel are likely to be more reliable and as a
result will be less inclined to cause security incidents. However, there are other
factors worth mentioning that also have an influence in strengthening the relationship
between the organisation and its employees. ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 23) terms
these factors human resources security. These factors are generally targeted at
recruiting trustworthy staff and shaping their behaviour towards the needs of the
organisation. If these factors are not managed correctly, they can pose security risks
to the organisation. These factors include the following:
 Recruitment of new staff members – interviews, background security
checks/screening, employing suitable candidates that are qualified and/or
experienced
 Job descriptions – integrating information security into job descriptions.
Employees will then recognise that it is their responsibility to ensure
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information security. Clearly defined roles can have a significant impact on
people attitudes (Lacey, 2009);
 Skilled staff – it is important to have staff have the skills needed for their job
responsibilities. If staff members are not adequately skilled for their tasks,
they may pose security risks to the organisation. The Deloitte cyber security
study revealed that a lack of skilled staff remains one of the top concerns for
organisations (Deloitte, 2012)
 Employment contract – employees agree to binding organisational policies
 Induction/orientation programmes – extensive security briefings in policies,
security procedures and access levels, training in the use of information
systems
 Fair compensation – employees will feel that they are treated fairly if they
receive adequate compensation (i.e. money) for their work (Lacey, 2009, p.
240). Incentives can also be used to reward employees for their work
performance, as well as to motivate employees.
 Monitoring and evaluation – incorporating information security evaluation as
part of job performance evaluation. Furthermore, monitoring Internet usage in
order to protect the organisation’s internal systems from threats (Danchev,
2003).
 Termination or change of employment – often referred to as an exit
strategy, is the removal of employee access rights, including physical and
logical access, keys, identification cards and information processing facilities.
This includes the returning of assets supplied by the organisation. A formal
disciplinary process for misconduct must be undertaken.
The manner in which these factors are implemented and managed can be described
in organisational procedures. Poor management may result in employees feeling
undervalued, thus having a negative impact on the organisation in terms of security
(ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 26,). For example, poor management may lead to security
being neglected or the potential abuse of the organisation’s assets. Ideally, if
employees are motivated they will treat information security programmes differently,
as they understand that the objective of having such programmes is to protect both
them and the organisation. The survival of the organisation is dependent on its
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employees support and vigilance toward organisation policies and procedures. If this
does not happen, it can potentially put the organisation at risk. Employees should be
mindful of the disciplinary action the organisation can take against them, should they
fail to comply with policies. Accordingly, employees should also be educated in this
regard.
COBIT 4.1 regards managing IT human resources as one of the factors necessary to
ensure that the organisation has competent and trustworthy staff. As such, COBIT
4.1 points out that a motivated and competent staff complement should be acquired
and maintained for the efficient creation and delivery of IT services to the
organisation. This is achieved by following defined and agreed legal practices
supporting recruitment and training, evaluating performance, and promoting and
terminating service. Employee roles should correspond with skills by establishing a
defined review process and creating job descriptions. Staff performance will have to
be reviewed and the outcomes based on these reviews will determine whether staff
requires further training to meet their job needs. Failure to achieve this can result in
staff becoming demotivated, as a result of poorly defined roles and responsibilities.
Furthermore, if staff is not trained they can pose security risks as they have not been
made aware of security threats.
The next subsection discusses the components necessary to strengthen the
organisational and technology (OT) linkage.
6.5.3 Organisation-Technology Linkage
In section 5.5.3, COBIT 4.1 was identified as a suitable best practice to manage
aspects related to the organisation and technology. In this subsection, important
components taken from COBIT 4.1 will be used to strengthen these two aspects.
COBIT 4.1 defines requirements for the control and security of sensitive data and
therefore provides a reference framework. In addition, security awareness, training
and education are needed to strengthen each of the linkages. In the COBIT 4.1
guidelines, there is no section explicitly dedicated to information security awareness
and training; however, they do make specific reference to these in the following
sections.
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6.5.3.1 Communicate Management’s Aims and Direction
Firstly, the organisation (i.e. management) should develop an organisational IT
control framework and communicate policies. To accomplish this, management must
approve and support an awareness programme to express its mission, service
objectives and policies and procedures. Achieving this will ensure accurate and
timely information on current and future IT services, the associated risks and the
responsibilities of staff.
6.5.3.2 Ensuring Systems Security
The organisation’s security should be managed at the highest appropriate
organisational level. This is to ensure that security actions are aligned with business
requirements (COBIT 4.1, 2007, p. 127). The IT security plan must be implemented
in organisations’ security policies and procedures, together with suitable investments
in services, personnel, software and hardware.
The CEO should be informed of this process and the security policies and
procedures should be communicated to all stakeholders. A management process is
required to establish and maintain IT security roles and responsibilities, standards,
policies and procedures. Therefore, management should ensure that technical staff
is trained to implement up-to-date security patches and anti-virus solutions to protect
the organisation’s information systems and technology from malware (viruses,
worms, spyware, spam, etc.) and phishing. The organisation should ensure that its
security-related technology is protected from tampering and damage. Network
security should be in place (e.g. firewalls, and intrusion detection systems) as this
may be an entry point for phishing attacks. Security controls must be used to
authorise access and control information that flows in and out of the organisational
network. Furthermore, it should be assured that the organisation’s data transactions
are exchanged over trusted paths or media. Controls should be in place to provide
authenticity of content, which is particularly important for customers who engage in
online banking, which is a concern for phishing victims. The organisation should also
ensure that it’s critical information is withheld from unauthorised users (e.g. social
engineers and phishers) and that measures are in place to protect and recover
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information in the case of system failures, human error, disasters or deliberate
attacks.
It should be noted that if employees are too restricted by security controls, employee
productivity may be curtailed (Thomson, 2003). For the organisation to ensure that
the requisite activities are carried out, the organisation should
 understand security requirements, vulnerabilities and phishing threats
 manage user identities and authorisations in a consistent manner
 assess its security levels regularly.
Section 4.3 pointed out that phishing has damaged the reputation of many reputable
organisations. To prevent this, the organisation can measure its security levels by
the number of security incidents affecting the public and themselves. This will include
the monitoring and evaluation of internal controls.
6.5.3.3 Monitor and Evaluate Internal Controls
The organisation should ensure that the security controls it has in place to combat
phishing attacks are monitored regularly by the relevant staff to ensure their
effectiveness. The cyber security study by Deloitte (2012) revealed that only 8% of
organisations (i.e. CISO) actually measure the value and effectiveness of their
respective organisation’s security activities. Any concerns should be reported to
management for any further intervention.
6.5.3.4 Establish Regulatory Compliance
Compliance also plays a role in IT governance. This is supported by Brown and
Yarberry Jnr (2009, p. 25), who state that “[r]egulatory compliance is one of the core
governance disciplines”. To ensure positive compliance and to reduce the risk of
non-compliance with IT laws and regulations, an independent review process is
necessary. Such as a process includes defining an audit charter, auditor
independence, professional ethics and standards, planning, performance of audit
work, and reporting of and following up on audit activities. To ensure compliance, the
organisation should firstly identify IT-related legal and regulatory requirements, then
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assess the impact of regulatory requirements and, finally, monitor and report on its
compliance with regulatory requirements.
A popular compliance regulation is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). However,
mere compliance with SOX regulations (i.e. passing section 404) does not imply that
an organisation or IT department can now successfully manage its business
correctly and that an optimal level of control exists (Brown & Yarberry Jnr, 2009, p.
25). Indeed, SOX compliance should be understood as a minimum standard only
and not as the optimum (Brown & Yarberry Jnr, 2009, p. 25). An organisation will
need to demonstrate its SOX compliance effectively and honestly. In this regard,
COBIT 4.1 can be used as a starting point to meet this objective. A few typical steps
towards SOX compliance, as identified by Brown and Yarberry Jnr (2009, p. 25), are
listed below:
 Identify an organisational framework. Although legislation does not
specifically require CobIT compliance, it is accepted by most organisations as
a good starting point for objectives.
 Develop a list of controls. These controls are vital to the successful
operation of IT and support the key requirements alluded to earlier.
 Categorise the control list. The controls can be divided into general
controls, which are pervasive across all or most platforms and applications,
and application controls.
 Review control list with external auditor. This is so as to avoid too many
controls (some redundant) which can result in excessive costs. Controls
should be tested and documented and, if found ineffective, remediated and
then tested again.
This section discussed the components required to strengthen each of the respective
linkages. To ensure that these components are understood by all users on different
organisational levels, a security awareness, training and education programme is
necessary. The HT linkage defined an information security training programme
aimed at training end-user staff in the use of technological controls to combat
phishing threats. It also presented ten important phishing guidelines that should be
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followed by all users in the organisation. Technical staff training is necessary to
ensure that the organisation has the appropriate tools to combat security threats.
Moreover, top management requires training to understand their responsibility in the
protection of the organisation’s information. The aim of such training is to convince
management that their responsibility towards security is not limited to technical staff
or the IT department.
The HO linkage is concerned with the organisation’s management of employee
behaviour. The introduction of policies and procedures is one method used by
organisations to ensure that their employees demonstrate the correct behaviour.
However, employees are often unfamiliar with such policies, and therefore do not
understand why it is needed. As such, policies and procedures should be
communicated to employees through an awareness campaign. Such a campaign
will ensure that employees understand the policies and procedures in place, know
where to locate them and understand their importance in terms of the safety of the
organisation. Whitman and Mattord (2010, p. 154) recommend that a set of tests or
quizzes can be developed to determine if employees understand important points
covered in the information security policy.
In the OT linkage, management has to ensure that it has the requisite staff and
technological tools to support the organisation and protect it from phishing attacks.
Technical staff will require training in this regard but raising awareness will also
ensure that staff is aware of their roles and responsibilities. Ensuring enterprise
security is even more important for organisations providing a service to their
customers. In such cases if customers’ information is compromised in any way, it
would consequently affect the organisation’s reputation.
The next section discusses the evaluation and findings from the interviews.
6.6 Evaluation of the Anti-Phishing Framework
The discussion on the anti-phishing framework in the previous section and the
associated security awareness, training and education components has now been
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concluded. This section will describe the process used to evaluate the anti-phishing
framework.
As stated in section 1.5, Hevner et al.’s (2004) design science guidelines were used
to assist in the design of the anti-phishing framework. Hevner et al. (2004) state that
research in the field of information systems can typically be divided into two
paradigms, namely, design science and behavioural science. The design science
paradigm aims to extend the boundaries of human and organisational capabilities by
creating new and innovative artefacts to solve an identified organisational problem
(Hevner et al., 2004). This requires knowledge and understanding of a problem
domain and the solution to the problem is achieved through the construction and
application of the designed artefact. The artefacts are then evaluated in terms of the
utility they provide in solving those problems (Hevner et al., 2004). In this study, the
problem domain encompasses the fact that phishing penetrates organisational
security controls by exploiting human behaviour. To address this problem, a
behavioural science paradigm would seek to develop and verify theories that explain
or predict human or organisational behaviour. In this study, the behavioural paradigm
focused on identifying suitable theories and best practices, such as the TAM, agency
theory and COBIT 4.1, to help understand human behaviour in each of the HT, HO
and OT linkages. Hence, the intention was to help strengthen the organisation’s
security defences by focusing on educating humans in each of these areas.
This study has made use of both paradigms. This is supported by Hevner et al.
(2004), who believe that both paradigms are fundamentally necessary for
understanding people, organisations and technology. Indeed, the elements cited by
Hevner et al. (2004) relate to the same foundations used in this study, namely, the
HOT dimensions.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), evaluation is a vital component of the research
process. The business environment establishes the requirements upon which the
evaluation of the artefact is based. Hence, the anti-phishing framework was
evaluated by personnel responsible for security in their respective organisations.
This satisfies Hevner’s third guideline for ‘design evaluation’. In this respect, IT
artefacts can be evaluated in terms of their functionality, completeness, consistency,
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accuracy, performance, reliability and usability in the organisation environment. In
this study, the aim is to establish the perceived usefulness (usability) of the IT
artefact (i.e. anti-phishing framework) in the business environment. Accordingly, a
design artefact is complete and effective when it satisfies the requirements and
constraints of the problem it was meant to solve. In this study, the problem is to
effectively educate humans to prevent them from falling victim to phishing attacks.
Hevner et al. (2004) categorise the evaluation methods that should be aligned
appropriately to the designed artefact and the selected evaluation metrics. For this
purpose a ‘descriptive’ evaluation method is used that includes ‘informed argument’
and ‘scenarios’ and both of these were applied to this study. Using the informed
argument principle, information from relevant research was used to build a
convincing argument for the need for an anti-phishing framework. In section 5.3,
scenarios were also used to demonstrate the gaps in each of the linkages caused by
human involvement. This contributed towards the development and utility of the anti-
phishing framework (artefact).
As mentioned in section 6.5, senior staff members responsible for information
security in three organisations were selected to evaluate the components of the anti-
phishing framework during semi-structured interviews. The interviews were arranged
beforehand with the participants who scheduled a time that was suitable for them. A
semi-structured interview was chosen as the appropriate research method, as it is
flexible and allows new questions to be asked during the interview process in
response to what the interviewee says (Dawson, 2002). Semi-structured interviews
require an interview guide containing prearranged questions. The interview guide for
this research can be found in Appendix B. Participants gave permission for the
conversations in the interview to be recorded. Note-taking was also used to record
relevant key points during the interview (Dawson, 2002). The diagrams provided in
the interview helped interviewees in terms of giving them a graphical representation
of the anti-phishing framework. The diagrams illustrate the framework’s beginnings
as a single-layer defence model and it ultimate development into a multi-layer
defence model.
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6.7 Findings
All participants interviewed agreed that all three dimensions should be considered in
an anti-phishing framework and they agreed that most of these dimensions operate
in isolation from one another. However, Company C felt that the dimensions are not
‘completely’ isolated from each other, but certainly they need to be improved in terms
of cooperation. As such, all participants stated that a holistic model is needed to
address phishing instead of one comprising a single-layer defence. Company C
stated that a multi-layered defence would have to focus in each of the HOT
dimensions. All parties, without hesitation, felt that some form of education is
necessary mostly on the part of humans to reduce this gap between each of the
dimensions.
Company A pointed out that even if technology fails and users ignore policies, the
human element is still the point where most security weaknesses occur. As such,
Company A felt that the human element requires awareness raising and training to
address these concerns. Company A maintained that the best way for an
organisation to educate users on phishing is to carry out mock tests without the
knowledge of its employees. The respondent added that induction programmes,
brochures, flyers, emails, intranet, and posters on walls are all methods that make
employees aware of pertinent security issues. However, Company A stated that,
although people may read the information, they will only internalise it once they have
suffered the consequences of a policy breach. Therefore, Company A’s approach is
to conduct external threat assessments of their employees by sending them phishing
emails. Company A also believed that the organisation can implement firewalls and
block certain websites to a certain extent; nevertheless, users will try to circumvent
these controls. Company A felt that informing employees that the organisation has
technological controls in place is even more risky. The respondent maintained that
users should rather be informed about the technological controls the organisation
has in place and the extent of the protection they offer and where the risks lie
thereafter. The respondent further added that, today, phishing emails and spoofed
websites are so sophisticated that even employees of Company A were unable to
distinguish such emails as phishing attacks.
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All participants agreed that there are linkages between each of the HOT dimensions.
Most participants were not familiar with the TAM and agency theory. However, after
having explained the theories, they accepted that they fit the context of each of the
linkages appropriately. Company C, however, felt that it was necessary to
understand how the TAM model could be applied backwards so as to be T and H
instead of H and T. To elaborate, the respondent felt that the focus should be placed
on increasing user involvement in technology in terms of combating phishing. They
mentioned an example of an organisation having a policy where web browsers are
configured to behave in such a way that users understand them more easily.
All participants agreed that training in the HT linkage should be classified into
different user levels. The educational components in this linkage originally included
basic computer literacy training offered by the organisation. However, all participants
did not agree that end-users should be offered computer literacy training, as they felt
strongly that employees are expected to possess such general, basic skills prior to
appointment. Company A mentioned the following example: if an organisation is
employing a software developer in Java, they would assume that the individual can
perform the tasks using Java. All participants were adamant that in this digital age
everyone should be computer competent. However, Company C stated that, should
there be an instance where a new technology or feature is introduced, then
employees would be trained accordingly. Moreover, members of top management
who do not necessarily have the required security knowledge should be given basic
information security training. One of the reasons for this is to lend management
support for such programmes. The members of management who are responsible
for information security should already have such knowledge and skills.
Company A was rather pessimistic about whether or not organisational policies and
procedures would be able to change human behaviour. The respondent felt that
human behaviour is so complex that for awareness of policies to be effective, they
should be made more personal for employees; in other words, how the
consequences of disobeying policies can affect them personally, for example, in
terms of loss of income.
Company C believes that policies and procedures must exist as they set the
boundary or scope of what employees are expected to do and how they do it.
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However, Company C felt that this is still uncontrollable. Company C mentioned the
following example: A working hours policy requires that one works from 8 to 5 every
day. However, employees can choose to work slowly in their work environment.
Accordingly, employees’ ethics and behaviour become an issue. Thus, even though
there may be boundaries created by the policies, people are still able to make
decisions within those boundaries which consequently indirectly violate what the
organisation expects from their employees.
Company C felt that employees are not likely to respond to policies unless there is a
major consequence or reward. As such, Company C believes an awareness
programme can inform users on these two aspects so that they can influence their
behaviour. Company C felt that if employees behave in the best interests of the
organisation, then they should be rewarded. Consequently, they can be used as an
example to other users and therefore help to grow the culture.
Company C stated that comprehensive policy documents will not be read and,
furthermore, that too much information given too quickly is not desirable. The
respondent further stated that the amount of information people can internalise is
limited. Therefore, they felt that it is beneficial to give less information to users more
often. They also felt that awareness raising in terms of policies should not happen
once, but should take place on a constant basis. They felt that actual training on
policies will not be effective because the very nature of a training workshop may
imply that training will take a few days and, as a result, will demotivate employees.
Company C supports short work sessions during which employees are made aware
of certain security aspects. This would mean that training takes less time and users
know what to expect. In terms of policies, users should be made aware why they are
in place and management should be able to justify the policies instead of taking an
approach of “this is what you can or cannot do”.
All participants have knowledge and experience in using COBIT. Participants were
provided with the COBIT 4.1 guidelines. All participants believe that COBIT 4.1 is the
appropriate linkage between O and T. Company A further maintained that they feel
even more strongly about COBIT 5, in which risk and Val IT are combined and which
has elements of ISO 27002. Companies A and B selected monitoring and evaluation
guidelines ME2. Company C felt that merely ensuring systems security is an
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operational item and can lose its importance over time if it is not regularly
maintained. Company C therefore felt very strongly that monitoring and evaluation
guidelines (ME2 and ME3) should be favoured above all other COBIT 4.1 guidelines.
They felt that putting in place (i.e. delivering) technological controls is relatively
simple, but if these controls are not monitored their effectiveness will decrease,
especially since such technological controls are constantly evolving. Company C
mentioned that there needs to be some level of feedback on the control levels and
that if monitoring is performed, then the outcomes from monitoring will determine
what areas need to be addressed through security awareness, training and
education programmes.
Companies A, B and C did not feel that best practices, such as ISO 27002, should
be a separate component of the linkages. Company C stated that such best
practices “live” in each of the linkages.
On the question of whether this framework will help to protect an organisation
against phishing attacks, Company A and B supported the notion that integrating the
three main dimensions can help to address the phishing problem. Company C felt
that putting these elements together would certainly be effective in improving the
organisation’s current risk level. However, Company C felt that there would a need
for an implementation strategy for the security awareness and training components
to be put in place. Table 6.2 below summarises the finding of these interviews.
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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
 All three HOT dimensions in an anti-phishing framework are required to combat
phishing.
 Security awareness, training and education are necessary to strengthen each of
the linkages.
 Ongoing awareness, using the requisite methods, of organisational policies and
procedures must be made personal to employees.
 Computer literacy training offered by the organisation is not necessary in this
Digital Age.
 All users should receive security training related to their roles and
responsibilities.
 Monitoring and evaluation of the organisation’s technological controls should be
performed regularly.
 Management should openly demonstrate their support for information security.
Table 6.2: Summary of key findings
Taking the recommendations gleaned from the interviews into account, the
implementation guidelines were adapted accordingly and therefore can be used in
an anti-phishing framework. Applying a security awareness, training and education
programme in each of the respective linkages would assist in forming a holistic anti-
phishing framework. Figure 6.2 presents the anti-phishing framework together with
its dimensions and attributes which function optimally in each of these linkages.
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Figure 6.2: Aspects in an organisation related to an anti-phishing framework (adapted from
Frauenstein & Von Solms, 2011)
In Figure 6.2, technological controls are typically the organisation’s first line of
defence against phishing attacks even though humans are involved in the process.
Accordingly, humans should be regarded as the first and last line of defence.
Constant communication (concentric circles & arrows) takes place between the HOT
dimensions and, as illustrated, the linkages (arrows) are now reinforced. This serves
as a multi-layer defence, as all the components are now operating in harmony with
one another. The human dimension is an entry point (if technological controls failed)
for phishing attacks and is the common link that influences all the other dimensions.
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As such, security awareness, training and education aimed at addressing human
attitudes and behaviour help to strengthen the interdependencies between each of
these linkages.
6.8 Conclusion
When attempting to combat phishing in an organisation, more is needed than merely
educating employees on how to identify phishing emails and spoofed websites.
Despite the different backgrounds and learning styles of employees, the attitudes
and behaviour of users still remain an influential factor in the way education is
received. A great deal of influence stems from the human and organisational (HO)
linkage, as it directly affects the other linkages. This is because most of the activities
described in each of the HOT linkages are managed by organisational policies and
procedures, which are the management’s way of communicating acceptable
behaviour and practice to the organisation. However, if these policies are ignored,
the operations in each of the linkages will ultimately be affected. To a certain extent,
such policies and procedures educate users on what they should and should not do
in the organisation, which is the reason education in this regard is so important.
The next chapter concludes the study by briefly summarising the chapters of this
dissertation and, further, presenting possible future research directions that have
emanated from the work in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 7CONCLUSION
197
7.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to formally conclude the research study. The chapter
begins by providing a brief summary of the important aspects and conclusions of the
previous chapters leading up to the establishment of the anti-phishing framework.
Furthermore, the research objectives, identified in section 1.4, will be examined to
determine if they have been indeed met. Publications originating from this research
will be then revealed. Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing further
conceivable enhancements and research in this field.
7.2 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the problem area of the study. It revealed that humans
are the target area for phishers, primarily because of their behaviour and their lack of
knowledge concerning the dangers posed by phishing. Based on this problem, the
research objectives were formulated. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the
methodology used to meet these objectives.
Before phishing could be investigated, it was important to understand areas relating
to information security. To start with a broad literature investigation into information
security was undertaken in Chapter 2. Information is understood to be an asset to
organisations and IT is understood to be the infrastructure supporting the storage
and dissemination of information. As such, it is necessary for IT systems to be
protected by various control measures, as the protection of IT systems will
subsequently protect the information. This chapter briefly discussed the controls
used to combat general security threats, with most of the controls stated in
information security literature focusing on technology. In this study, controls were
classified into three dimensions, technological, human and organisational. These
three control dimensions are core to the study and, as such, were expanded on in
more detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 discussed a range of general information security controls that could be
applied by an organisation. Once more, these controls were classified into
technological, human and organisational dimensions. The chapter revealed that
humans are an influential factor in operations in each of these dimensions. Human
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factor issues were also discussed as being the main weakness that modern threat
agents focus on.
Chapter 4 conducted an extensive literature study on phishing, the main research
problem area of the study. It pointed out that phishers are making effective use of
social engineering techniques in order to manipulate humans into giving up
information willingly. This indicated that technological controls applied by
organisations are inadequate as a defence against phishing attacks. Phishers are
making use of technological tools to carry out their attacks. The chapter revealed a
number of examples of phishing emails and showed how users can identify these
emails if they are taught to identify certain features.
Phishing poses a great danger for organisations and users worldwide. As such, the
core focus of this dissertation was to develop a holistic anti-phishing framework that
considers human, organisational and technological dimensions. As far as could be
determined, there are no frameworks, or models, in existence that combine these
areas to combat phishing threats. The chapter pointed out that there are gaps
between each of these linkages caused by limited interaction between them, hence
resulting in a single-layer defence model. Therefore, there was a need to change this
approach.
Chapter 5 proposed aligning each of the linkages. The chapter revealed, through the
literature studied, that there is no solution to address the gaps in the linkages. In fact,
some researchers state that further research is needed in this regard. To achieve
this, scenarios were used to establish linkages between each of the dimensions. The
linkages are, namely, HT, HO and OT. Furthermore, to understand the variables
related to each of these linkages, theories and best practices were identified and
examined. TAM was discussed to address the HT linkage, agency theory for the HO
linkage and finally, COBIT 4.1 for the OT linkage. In each of these linkages problems
concerning human attitudes and behaviour can be identified, thus creating a gap.
As a result, Chapter 6 identified security awareness, training and education in each
of the linkages as a solution in terms of strengthening these linkages. NIST 800-16
provided guidance in this regard. Components for each linkage were identified from
best practices and guidelines such as ISO/IEC 27002 and COBIT 4.1. These
components were used to establish the anti-phishing framework. Chapter 6 also
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discussed the methodology used in conjunction with Hevner et al.’s design science
guidelines. The effectiveness of the anti-phishing framework was verified by
conducting semi-structured interviews with security individuals from three companies
in Buffalo City. The responses from the interviews were used to validate the
components of the anti-phishing framework. The final framework, or artefact,
comprises a holistic defence model to strengthen the human, organisational and
technological dimensions.
7.3 The Problem Area and Research Objectives Revisited
Protecting information is one of the most important activities an organisation can be
involved in. Moreover, of the risks that general information security threats pose to
organisations, phishing is certainly one of the most serious and can have severe
financial implications for organisations and users. Moreover, it is difficult for
organisations to protect themselves, because phishers are able to circumvent
technological defences by targeting the human element. Technically minded
phishers are also able to exploit software vulnerabilities in systems. Phishers also
recognise that humans have psychological vulnerabilities in their knowledge,
attitudes and behaviour and tend to exploit such vulnerabilities. Humans are
vulnerable because they tend to trust people and want to be helpful, often trusting on
sight. Humans, generally, lack knowledge relating to security risks and they also tend
to disregard policies and procedures because of their attitudes. These factors all
contribute to this security weakness and, as a result, humans are referred to in
information security literature as being the weakest link.
Phishers make use of technologies, such as email and websites, in their attacks.
Therefore, technological controls can also perform a role in combating phishing
emails and preventing access to spoofed websites. However, there are a number of
factors that can impede this process. Humans have to be equipped to use these
technological controls correctly and phishers can potentially exploit software
vulnerabilities if they exist.
Typically, organisations expect their employees to behave in a certain manner, which
is managed by rules in the form of policies and procedures. However, if employees
do not obey such policies they may also be exposed to phishing attacks. As such,
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there is a need for a holistic anti-phishing framework that considers all of these
variables.
In this study, an anti-phishing framework classified these different areas as the
dimensions of human factors, organisational aspects and technological controls
(HOT). Between these dimennions, three linkages were established. Each of these
three linkages has human involvement and as such there would predictably be gaps
in the form of educational vulnerabilities between them, vulnerabilities that phishers
would exploit. This reveals that an anti-phishing solution would have to consider
educating humans as a means of aligning each of these areas to reduce the gap.
The primary objective of this study was to develop a framework to assist in
effectively combatting phishing in an organisational context. The primary objective
was accomplished through the following secondary objectives:
 Identify, through literature, those areas that phishing threat agents exploit.
 Identify current protection measures that have been put in place by
organisations to guard against phishing attacks.
 Identify the major elements that should play a role in protecting organisations
against phishing attacks.
 Identify any weakness in these major elements.
 Identify, through a literature review, how to integrate these elements into a
single holistic approach.
The first three of the secondary objectives were achieved in Chapter 4. However,
Chapters 2 and 3 did play a role in this process as they introduced the background
leading up to Chapter 4. To achieve each of these objectives, an extensive literature
review was conducted and reported on in all three chapters. The fourth secondary
objective was achieved by means of Chapter 5. Chapter 5 revealed that each of the
HOT dimensions operates in isolation as a result of the human involvement or a lack
thereof. The final secondary objective was achieved in Chapter 6. The elements
were integrated through a security awareness, training and education programme.
By achieving each of these objectives, it can be argued that the primary research
objective has been met.
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7.4 Significance of this Research Study
This study can be considered significant because as far as it could be determined in
the literature studied, no research has classified an anti-phishing solution by
considering the HOT dimensions. When the literature did identify these dimensions,
it was in the context of addressing general information security threats only.
Moreover, these dimensions were also not holistically addressed. Although
researchers admittedly pointed out that more research is required to understand the
relationships between each of these dimensions (Werlinger et al. 2008), most of the
literature studied addressed phishing by focusing on educating users in identifying
phishing emails and interpreting web browser warnings.
Other research focused on improving technology mostly in terms of web browser
plug-ins to protect users on a personal level against phishing attacks. To a certain
extent, both of these areas have been proven unsuccessful. This study considered
all of these areas in a holistic manner in order to create an anti-phishing framework.
One of the respondents commented that the anti-phishing framework could be
adapted to any security threat. This creates an opportunity for future researchers to
make use of the model and further enhance it.
7.5 Publications Originating from this Research Study
The following peer-reviewed papers have been accepted and presented at
conferences during the course of the study:
 Frauenstein, E. D. & Von Solms, R. (2009). Phishing: How an organisation
can protect itself. Information Security South Africa (ISSA). Johannesburg,
South Africa.
 Frauenstein, E. D. & Von Solms, R. (2011). An Enterprise Anti-Phishing
Framework. Proceedings of the 7th World Conference on Information Security
Education (IFIP WISE7 TC11.8). Lucerne, Switzerland: Springer.
These research papers can be located in Appendix C.
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7.6 Possible Future Research
This study did not consider investigating organisations targeted by phishing attacks
because there is much evidence in the literature that demonstrates the impact
phishing has on most users and organisations. Moreover, the study did not test the
effectiveness of organisations implementing the components of the anti-phishing
framework. It would be fascinating to measure an organisation affected by phishing
with a ‘before and after implementation’ analysis. Only three organisations were
used to evaluate the components of the anti-phishing framework, therefore is would
be ideal to expand the scope to include organisations outside the Buffalo City region.
7.7 Conclusion
Phishing attacks pose a significant threat to both organisations and users. In order to
combat phishing attacks, this study presented a holistic, anti-phishing framework that
takes into account the human, technological and organisational (HOT) dimensions.
Each of the HOT elements has human involvement. The current phishing defence
model, described in literature, is treated as a single-layer defence. Therefore,
phishers can exploit the human element. In each of these areas, the implementation
of security awareness, training and education strategies in an organisation is
necessary and should be treated as an ongoing process. This will help reduce the
‘gap’. All stakeholders will have to be made aware of phishing through a specific
education intervention programme which should ensure that all users in the
organisation understand the risks of phishing, know how to use technology to
combat phishing attacks, and understand organisational policies and procedures as
well as the risks of not complying with them. Moreover, it is imperative that
management demonstrates its support and commitment to these security education
programmes.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Example of Information Security Training Programme
This appendix provides an example of an information security training programme
overview aimed at addressing phishing. This programme is divided into two phases:
the first phase is theoretical, focusing on explaining information security terms and
threats, while the second focuses on giving employees the skills needed to use
technology correctly to combat phishing attacks. The contents indicated in bold are
the training components necessary to educate users on phishing.
Appendix B: Semi-structured Interview Guide
This appendix contains the interview guide that was used in the interview process.
Individuals responsible for information security at three organisations were
interviewed.
Appendix C: Published and Presented Conference Papers
Peer-reviewed conference papers related to the study that were published and
presented are provided in this appendix and is described further below:
Published Paper 1
Frauenstein, E.D. & Von Solms, R. 2009. Phishing: How an organization can
protect itself. In: Proceedings of Information Security South Africa (ISSA)
conference held at University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa from 06-08 July
2009, pp. 253-268 (ISBN: 978-1-86854-740-1).
Published Paper 2
Frauenstein, E.D. & Von Solms, R. 2011. An Enterprise Anti-Phishing
Framework. In: Proceedings of the 7th World Conference on Information Security
Education (IFIP WISE7 TC11.8), conference held at Lucerne, Switzerland, 09–10
June 2011, pp. 80-88 (ISBN: 1-933510-94-3).
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Phase 1: Information Security & Security Threats Training
1. Importance of information
Types of information (information assets: personal records, organisational
records)
The purposes for which information can be used by threat agents
2. Information security
What is information security?
Confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA)
How can information be protected? (human factors, organisational aspects,
technological controls)
Examples of organisations that have fallen victim to threats
3. Types of security threats
Humans
Cyber criminals (spammers, fraudsters, crackers, hackers)
Outsiders
Employees/insiders
Terrorists
Social engineers (phishers)
Environmental hazards
Fires, floods, earthquakes
Technological failures (hard drive crash, voltage surge)
4. Activities carried out by threat agents
Spyware, malware and worms
Cybercrime (Web forgery, identity theft, fraud)
Denial of service attacks (DoS)
Website defacing
Unauthorised system intrusions (hacking)
Social engineering techniques
Email attacks
Malicious programs (viruses, spyware, key loggers, Trojans)
Unsolicited mail (spam)
Phishing
5. Phishing education
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Identifying a phishing email
Email address structure
Message contents (fabricated story, attachments, HTML images,
and hyperlinks)
Identifying a spoofed website
Security indicators: padlock icon, URL structure, browser
warnings
Ten Phishing Best Practices
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Phase 2: Technological Controls Used To Combat Phishing Attacks
1. The role technology plays in our lives today
2. Can technology be useful and easy to use?
3. Technological controls used to combat phishing threats
3.1 Email client
Terms and concepts
Blocking phishing emails
Encrypting email messages
3.2 Web browser
Choosing a web browser
Terms and concepts: filters, ActiveX, cookies, add-ons/ plug-ins, cache
memory, advertisements etc.
Browser plug-ins
Pop-up blocker
Phishing filters
Responding to phishing warnings, pop-up blocking
Deleting browser history, temporary Internet files, cookies, cache
memory
Encryption (SSL)
3.3 Anti-virus programs
Scanning files, folders, web links and storage devices
Shield types
Program and virus definition updates
Responding to virus warning alerts
3.4 Software updates
Application software and operating system updates
3.5 Password managers
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INTERVIEW GUIDE
The objective of this interview is to evaluate the components of the anti-phishing
framework created as a result of the literature studied. The purpose of the interview
is not to analyse the phishing experiences in terms of your current organisation, but
rather to obtain your opinions and recommendations based on your work experience
and knowledge.
Phishing is the act of attempting to acquire personal information, such as
usernames, passwords, and credit card details, by means of deception by
disguising the phishing attacker as a trustworthy entity in email. These emails
contain links that direct the user to a website which looks identical to the
original website. The user unsuspectingly enters their credentials which are
captured by the phisher. Phishing emails are effective because they make use
of social engineering techniques to target weak human behaviour and
emotions.
1. After explaining human factors, organisational aspects and technological
controls in the context of phishing, do you agree that these HOT dimensions
should be considered as the three main areas in an anti-phishing framework?
2. Do you agree, from the diagram provided, that each of these three dimensions
is evidently operating in isolation, thus forming only a single-layer defence
against phishing?
3. Do you agree that each of these three dimensions have the common element
of human involvement?
4. From this human involvement, three linkages can be established between the
dimensions namely: HT, OT and HO. In this regard, do you agree that security
awareness, training and education programmes are core to strengthening
each of these linkages in order to form a holistic model?
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5. Having established these linkages, theories and best practices were identified
relating to each of these linkages. These theories and best practices helped in
understanding the variables involved in each of these linkages. The
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is concerned with two factors related to
the way humans perceive technology:
 easy to use
 useful in its purpose.
As such, do you agree that the TAM would serve as the most appropriate
linkage between humans and technology?
6. Having understood the brief description of the TAM, do you agree with the
following training requirements for the HT linkage:
 End-users should be competent and be trained by the organisation in
using a computer system correctly, i.e. computer literacy training.
 End-users should be given information security training focusing
particularly how to use technology, such as the email client, web
browser and anti-virus programs, to combat phishing threats.
 Technical staff should receive specialised training in configuring and
managing the relevant technological controls for the organisation
 Top management should receive the same training as end-users.
7. Do you feel that, after such training, all users will perceive technology as
being easy to use and useful for accomplishing their task?
8. Agency theory is concerned with the variables affecting the relationship
between management and employees. Agency theory is concerned with
resolving two problems:
 The conflicting desires or goals of the principal and agent
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 Verification of the agent’s activities is too difficult or expensive for the
principal.
As such, do you agree that agency theory would serve as the most
appropriate linkage between the organisation and the human dimension?
9. Do you agree that organisational policies and procedures comprise the main
component needed to addresses the H and O linkage?
10. How do you think organisational policies and procedures should be
communicated to employees? Through awareness and/or actual training?
11. Do you think this would be sufficient to change their behaviour? If not, what
would you suggest to improve this?
12. Looking at the CobiT guidelines (provided), which of the following do you feel
is the most appropriate linkage for the O and T dimension, also considering
phishing?
13. Do you agree that the CobiT guideline of ‘ensuring systems security’ is the
most appropriate linkage between the O and T dimension?
14. How do you feel this guideline could be addressed through a security
awareness, training and education programme?
15. Where do you think organisations’ application of best practices (e.g. ISO
27002) should be featured in the anti-phishing framework?
16. Can you identify any other components that should be considered in the anti-
phishing framework?
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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to report on research to construct a model, which should
provide guidance to an organization on how to address all dimensions associated with
phishing and assist in solving the problem holistically. The emphasis will be placed on the
human and organizational dimensions. Most research in this area has shown that only certain
dimensions used to combat phishing attacks, in an organization, are addressed in isolation
and not holistically. Anti-phishing research literature studied has either focused on algorithms
for detecting phishing attacks in web browsers (Egelman, 2008; Fette, 2007; Garera, 2007;
Patel, 2007) or on evaluating the user interfaces of anti-phishing web browser toolbars (Wu,
2006). From research studied, there has been little work conducted on preventing users from
falling for phishing email messages. It has been proven that phishing does indeed pose an
ongoing threat to an organization through its employees. Therefore, a suitable solution to this
problem should be devised.  This paper attempts to present such a holistic solution in the
form of a model.
KEY WORDS
Phishing, social engineering, information security model, e-mail scams, spoof-websites
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PHISHING: HOW AN ORGANIZATION CAN PROTECT ITSELF
1. INTRODUCTION
Information in the modern electronic world can be viewed as the most important asset in a
global market. Individuals, businesses, organizations and governments depend on information
to be embedded in secure, private and trustworthy IT infrastructures
(http://www.thedacs.com/techs/enhanced_life_cycles/). Individuals within an organizational
environment often tend to rely on an organization to take responsibility and have these well
defined controls to protect the integrity and availability (ICT Standards Board, 2007) of their
personal data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or
destruction (IBM Business Consulting Services, 2006). However, these controls alone cannot
avert information security threats. An alternative technique of gaining unauthorized access of
information, apart from the common procedure of hacking, is Phishing.
The objective of this paper is to report on research to construct a model, which should
provide guidance to an organization on how to include all dimensions associated with
phishing and assist in solving the problem holistically. The emphasis will be placed on the
human and organizational dimensions. This paper also addresses, from research studied, the
problems that phishing poses to individuals and organizations (Orgill, 2004).
2. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM OF PHISHING
There is much evidence in literature that proves that phishing is a growing problem in the
current global industry and poses an ongoing threat that may affect every individual in an
organization (Ohaya, 2006; Orgill, 2004; Safecode, 2008; Threat Insight Quarterly, 2005).
Phishing is a social engineering technique through which an individual attempts to solicit and
steal confidential information from a user or employee by masquerading as a legitimate entity
(Kumaraguru, 2007). Today, phishing has become much more sophisticated in techniques
using technology, advantageously, as a tool through a combination of spoofed emails,
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and instant messages to lure individuals (Ohaya, 2006).
Since most organizations are conducting business transactions through the Internet, IT is
rapidly changing the world through information and communication technology (Alkadi,
2004). Today most communication occurs through electronic mail. According to Badra
(2007), there are many various forms of phishing attacks however, common phishing
schemes mostly use spoofed e-mails to lure users to fake websites designed to capture the
sensitive information (Ohaya, 2006). The spoofed- email normally tends to have a slightly
threatening message or tone to increase the effectiveness of luring the victim to avoid any
further consequence. An example of this could be that the user’s bank account details would
be terminated if failing to respond. Phishing is not only based on obtaining user account
details, but includes access to all personal and financial data. When individuals respond to
such messages, they are putting themselves and their respective organizations at risk. This is
caused primarily due to a lack of knowledge in information security protocols and
carelessness regarding the consequences which may follow.
Recently, social attraction networks (e.g. MySpace, Facebook and Friendster) have gained
popularity in phishing attacks (Brown, 2008; Unisys, 2008) and are being used as sources to
lure individuals to give out their personal information. The latter substantiates the point that
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threats are constantly finding new weaknesses in technology and using more sophisticated
techniques to gain entry through this modern, technological age (Orgill, 2004). Since people
can be considered to be the weakest link in a very technologically secure computing
environment (according to current standards), they are consequently targeted by social
engineering attacks (Orgill, 2004). Much emphasis is placed on making computer systems
more secure (technology aspect) and thus, the human element is often forgotten, ignored or
neglected. Each new threat adds to the difficulty of securing an information system. The
attacker does not have to have any prior knowledge into hacking systems to understand and
use social engineering techniques. Human emotion and manipulation are used to trick victims
into giving up personal information. The social engineer attempts to exploit the natural
desires of humans to trust others and strangers, to assist in other’s labours and to gain favor in
their eyes (Orgill, 2004). PayPal, eBay, American Online and the South African Revenue
Services (SARS) are well known examples of organizations that have all claimed victim to
having been financially affected by phishing attacks
(http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=42736).
People and organizations, especially in a South African context, may not be aware of the
dangers that phishing presents or how to detect these threats. This is indeed the case, even
though much literary sources educate users on how to effectively identify these threats (Fette,
2007; Garera, 2007; Patel, 2007). People seem too dependant on IT systems to manage
security concerns. This lack in responsibility exposes this weakest link, the human factor
(Orgill, 2004; Patrick, 2005; Robila, 2006).
3. CURRENT PROTECTION MEASURES IN ORGANIZATIONS
Organizations can effectively manage and protect their information from unauthorized
access, by following the internationally accepted and recognized Code of Practice for
Information Security Management i.e. ISO 27002
(http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27002.html).  This international standard is but one
‘best practice’ that provides recommendations in terms of what companies should implement
to protect their information assets. The standard also addresses many issues and concerns
relating to information security. Applying only an international standard may not be adequate
as even these generally accepted Information Security (IS) standards and best practices do not
effectively address the Social Engineering aspect of Information Security defences and may
leave gaps for phishing attacks. The document does not particularly focus on the term
“phishing” attacks but does indeed mention that it is a problem. However, it merely gives
general guidelines that one shouldn’t exchange information with unknown parties or open
emails from unknown sources etc. The fact that emails appear to be from a legitimate source
is what allows phishing attacks to be so effective. The email seems relevant in context and
seems legitimate, in design, to the individual (Egelman, 2008). The latter is regarded as a
spear phishing attack (Microsoft, 2005). Therefore, spear phishing attacks have the potential
to pass through strong company regulations and seemingly secure technology controls,
relying mostly on the human element for protection (Orgill, 2004).
There are many reasons why individuals fall susceptible to phishing attacks. According to
Ohaya (2006) some of the reasons include a lack of knowledge of computer systems, lack of
security and security indicators, lack of attention to the security indicators, lack of attention to
the absence of security indicators, and the sophistication of spoofed sites seem to be the
greatest threat. If the site looks authentic, users have confidence in it as they could not tell the
difference between a genuine or spoofed web-site. Ohaya (2006) states further that security
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managers should take the following steps to protect the organization and employees from
phishing attacks:
1. “Ensure privacy and security are perceived at a macro level in the organization.
2. Create security policies, standards, and procedures that are part of an ongoing
overall security management framework
3. Ensure that all employees in the organization have security education, training and
awareness about phishing and other threats in addition to following security policies
and procedures.”
Orgill (2004) substantiates this in stating that employee education should cover the
company’s strong policy statements, including penalties for non-compliance. In fact,
researchers (Ohaya, 2006; Orgill, 2004; Robila, 2006) have shown that user education is the
most important aspect of preventing phishing attacks. Kumaraguru (2007) designed and
evaluated an embedded training email system that teaches people the dangers of phishing
during their normal use of email as he feels that people simply ignore security notices and
warnings. Sheng (2007) developed a game that teaches people not to fall for phishing, thus
getting them more interested in the fun educational aspect. According to Badra (2007),
reducing the phishing threat can be achieved if a given solution could meet the following
functions: monitoring potentially malicious activity, authenticating email messages, detecting
unauthorized use of trademarks or logos or other proprietary imagery, improving the security
patching infrastructure to increase resistance to malware, using personalized information to
authenticate an email directly to a user and detecting a fraudulent web site and alerting the
user.
According to O’Brien (2000) there are 3 major types of controls that must be developed to
ensure the quality and security of information systems
 Information System controls (input, processing, output and storage controls)
 Procedural Controls (standard procedures, documentation, authorization
requirements, auditing)
 Facility Controls (physical protection, computer failure controls, network security
and biometric controls).
These above-mentioned controls merely focus on the management aspect of the information
system in relation to normal everyday conditions of business transactions, specifically the
input, processing, output and storage activities in an information system. This approach
focuses more on the technological and organizational measures in place rather than an
unforeseen human error. It does not encompass provisions for the idiosyncratic nature of the
human element, especially within a social context. Phishing has few technical boundaries. Its
strength lies in its ability to trick any individual irrespective of experience, knowledge or
position in the organization. This method of acquiring sensitive information from the
individual could then lead to the entire organization’s confidentiality or individual’s personal
information being put at risk.
While technology is important, organizational and human factors also play a crucial role in
achieving information security (Dutta, 2008). These dimensions should play a role in
constructing a holistic approach to protect information assets against phishing attacks. The
technological dimensions would typically involve anti-phishing software, spam filters,
firewall etc. The human dimension calls for effective awareness and education to assist in
strengthening the ‘human firewall’ and to ideally cultivate a culture of information security
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behavior.  On the other hand, sound organizational measures, e.g. policies and procedures,
need to be in place to put everything into perspective. Of these dimensions, the human factor
is probably the most important since this is the area that phishing exposes the most. Research
suggests that if human behavioral response can be understood, then one may have a solution
to the issue of why people fall susceptible to phishing attacks (Downs, 2007). Information
Security should not be regarded as a technical issue but rather a multi-dimensional issue.
Therefore is a need for all of these dimensions to be considered. In doing so, this should
provide for adequate overall risk mitigation against phishing attacks.
Below are main components that will be addressed in the anti-phishing model and
recommendations for each of these components:
International Standards, Guidelines and Best Practices: As mentioned, numerous
international standards, best practices and guidelines refer to the effective protection of
information assets, e.g. ISO 27002 (http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27002.html),
COBIT (COBIT, 2000), the King II Report (King Report, 2001), etc. Such standards, best
practices and guidelines should play an integral role in the eventual plan to protect
organizational information assets against phishing attacks.
Technology Controls: As earlier discussed in this paper, threats are finding new weaknesses
in technology. Therefore it is considered a dimension that compromises the integrity of an
organization’s information security. It is important to address its role in the model. Phishing
attacks can breach a weak technological barrier. The “phisher” may rely on the individual or
organization to have an outdated or ineffective web browser, outdated anti-virus program due
to poor organization policies. The phisher may lure individuals through websites like
Facebook, Twitter etc. The use of IRC and Instant messengers are a new breeding ground for
phishing attacks. Most organizations should have anti-virus programs installed. However, an
effective anti-virus program is only as good as the currency of its virus definition updates that
it receives. Besides its primary function of scanning for virus signatures, some anti-virus
programs can also detect most phishing websites (http://anti-virus-
tools.software.informer.com/). The anti-virus program can also remove key-logger Trojans- a
virus designed by ‘phishers’ to monitor keystrokes from the keyboard.
Organizations use firewalls, in a network environment, to filter incoming emails as well as to
block unauthorized entry from outsiders. If properly defined through procedures, the firewall
also prevents employees from accessing illegal or unwanted websites, in this regard phishing
websites.
(http://www.security-forums.com/viewtopic.php?p=5787&id=db1bca5dcddd4bff0
5dd056501b7e922).
The internet web browser also forms an important role, in security, in having the built-in
capacity to identify spoofed websites. Common web browsers such as Microsoft Internet
Explorer 7, Opera 9.5, Firefox 3, and Safari 3.2 etc. can detect most phishing websites.
However, each reacts differently to suspicious spoofed-websites in the manner it displays
active phishing warnings to the user (Egelman, 2008). This presents a problem in the sense
that it may confuse the individual when presented with such a warning. An organizational
standard should be set as to identify which browser would best be suited in such a case of an
individual falling susceptible to a phishing website.
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The operating system (e.g. Windows XP, Windows Vista, etc.) should be regularly updated
for software enhancements (updates, patches, hot-fixes etc.) either automatically or by
relevant staff. Failure to do so creates an opportunity for viruses to either pose as an
application or as a warning notification thus luring the victim to submit confidential
information. The latter is another technique of phishing that acquires personal
information(http://computing.vassar.edu/safecomputing/security/ospatch.html).  Phishing
attacks can also be in the form of malicious code-based or Trojan-based attacks, in which
malicious software causes data compromises (Badra, 2007)
Technological aspects form an imperative part in the eventual anti-phishing model. Clear
guidelines need to be provided as to which controls should be implemented in this regard.
Organizational Aspects: Human Resource related aspects play a major role in the
recruitment of skilled and trustworthy staff. This can be done through effective screening etc.
Newly appointed staff must be made aware of company policies and procedures. This can be
defined in a policy document by the organization requiring employees to sign upon
appointment. Failure to comply with these procedures should result in penalties by the staff
member. Some of these policies may have a relationship with technology aspects e.g. do not
install pirated software, individuals must encrypt sensitive files when emailing clients,
software updates must be done regularly by IT staff, downloading of files not relative to
organization needs is not permitted  etc. The organization needs to adopt an information
security culture. The organization needs to realize the importance of strengthening and
securing their information, and lead the way in ensuring that future security threats are
prevented and controlled. This can be done through effective physical and software
procedures. It is critically important that the organization should ensure that proper policies,
regarding protection against phishing attacks, are defined and that sound procedures are put
in place. Once in place, this will then have an effect on the technological aspects and human
aspects.
Human Factors: As mentioned throughout this paper, the weakest target phishing attacks
focus on is through the human aspect. Through education, employees can be made more
aware of the activities involved in a phishing attack (van der Merwe, 2005) and how it may
affect them and the organization. This can be done through regular training workshops. The
training needs to have some incentive or humour in gaining effective participation from its
employees. The training should also give relevant examples in context of daily issues that
plague employees in the organization, specifically in emails from unknown sources. The
latter should address how to identify these threats and what procedures to follow. An added
benefit, through training, allows employees to also learn of other current and future threats of
information security aspects instead of phishing attacks alone. According to van der Merwe
(2005), there are five issues that a company or individual should be aware of in phishing:
education, preparation, avoidance, intervention and treatment. All of the latter issues have
been considered and addressed in the proposed model.
As previously mentioned, three very important dimensions should form part of the protection
model against phishing attacks. These are; technological, organizational and human related
dimensions. These dimensions should be governed by applicable international standards,
guidelines and best practices. Below, figure 1, graphically represents the anti-phishing model
with the above-mentioned dimensions to be considered in protecting company information
assets from phishing attacks.
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Figure 1: The anti-phishing model highlights major aspects, in an organization, that must be
considered to form a complete barrier of defense against phishing attacks
4. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The proposed solution will be refined and tested, using design science, through further
literature studies as well as a case study in an organization to determine its effectiveness.
Sound methodologies will also be utilized to ensure that the model is developed with rigor to
result in a trustworthy artifact. Of the three dimensions, through research studied, the human
dimension has been established to be the weakest aspect in which phishing threats breach
information security.
The detailed, eventual, model will help make an organization more aware of the dangers of
phishing and educate them to prevent phishing attacks by addressing all dimensions required.
5. CONCLUSION
As more organizations provide greater online access for their customers, phishers are
successfully using more social engineering techniques to steal personal information and
conduct identity theft at a global scale. By understanding the tools and technologies that
phishers use, organizations and their customers can take a proactive approach in defending
themselves against future phishing attacks. To make this possible, it is imperative that
organizations and its employees, across the entire organization, be properly educated about
the dangers of phishing thus addressing the human dimension. It must be understood that all
dimensions, as a whole, should be considered in the model and not just one in isolation. This
will form a complete barrier against phishing attacks. Although an organisation may have
well defined policies and procedures that employees could read and sign every year, it has
proven to be insufficient (Gragg, 2002). The latter can be due to large amounts of policy
documentation that employees aren’t keen to read and consequently merely signing it. Given
a predicted increase in tools available to fight phishing, it is expected that future attacks will
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continue to be more refined in terms of targeting the user and even specificity (Robila, 2006).
The latter such case of an employee within the organization attempting to acquire information
illegally through another employee is known as spear phishing. Therefore, the proposed
solution to this problem needs to be designed through an effective, rigorous model.
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Abstract. The objective of this paper is to report back on an organizational framework, which consisted of
human, organization and technology (HOT) dimensions in holistically addressing aspects associated with
phishing. Most anti-phishing literature studied either focused on technical controls or education in isolation
however; education is core to all aspects in the above-mentioned framework. It is evident, from literature,
that little work has been conducted on anti-phishing preventative measures in the context of organizations
but rather from a personal user-level. In the framework, the emphasis is placed on the human factors in
addressing phishing attacks.
Keywords: Information Security, social engineering, human factors, phishing, email scams, spam, spoofed-
websites
Introduction
It is evident that as more organizations provide greater online access to their customers, phishers are
successfully using social engineering techniques and technology advantageously to steal personal information
and conduct identity theft on a global scale [20]. Organizations financial information is at risk, because most
information-workers are vulnerable to social engineering techniques as the organizations possess financial
information [29]. Fraudulent emails, such as phishing, can harm their victims as well as organizations resulting
in financial losses, damaged reputation [27] and identity theft. Given a predicted increase in the tools available
to fight phishing, it is expected that future attacks will continue to be more refined in targeting users i.e. spear
phishing [24] incorporating greater elements of context to become more effective and thus more dangerous for
society. Hence, by understanding the tools and technologies that phishers use, organizations, users and their
customers can take a proactive approach in defending themselves against future phishing attacks [20]. Although
this paper presents a holistic framework which requires all dimensions to be of key importance however,
education is indeed a major component of protection against phishing. Thus, the objective of this paper is to
emphasis how education, awareness and training are required to effectively strengthen the dependencies
between the dimensions in the framework. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give a
background of phishing and explain its effectiveness. In Section 3, we illustrate the need for a holistic
framework. In Section 4, we demonstrate the anti-phishing framework focusing on human factors. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Phishing Explained
“Phishing” is a hacker’s term that originated from fraudsters whom are “fishing” for confidential information,
mostly conducted through using fake emails and spoofed websites acting as the “bait”, and the victim’s accounts
as the netted “phish” [27]. Phishing is a component of social engineering through which an individual attempts
to solicit and steal confidential information from a user or employee by masquerading as a legitimate entity,
usually from well-known financial or e-commerce institutions [27] as the primary of objective is to fraudulently
obtain money. PayPal, eBay, American Online, ABSA, Standard Bank, Google, Microsoft and the
South African Revenue Services are a few popular cases of organizations, and its clients, that have financially
been affected through phishing attacks. Although most cases are financial related, phishing includes
unauthorized access to all types of data e.g. social security number. Besides email, there are a number of other
phishing variations such as spear phishing, wi-phishing, vishing, baiting, whaling and pharming. Phishing
techniques have become more sophisticated [27], making use of a range of modern technologies such as:
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), instant messengers (IM’s), social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, MySpace)
[10],[17],[19] and Trojan horse [6],[27]. The effectiveness of using social engineering techniques do not require
much prior technical knowledge or education into hacking information systems; instead human emotion, deceit
and manipulation are tools used to trick victims into giving up their personal information.
From the description of phishing above, typically five main processes are used to carry out a phishing attack:
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Planning: Phisher determines who and how to attack and the information to be obtained from the victim.
According to Orgill [21], social engineering attacks usually entail two facets namely: the physical aspect (e.g.
workplace, online) and the psychological aspect or a combination using both aspects to gain desired
information.
Email Design: The illusion based by email appearance (e.g. email address structure, subject header and
content), is made to appear more legitimate by using institution logos, terminology etc. to create authenticity in
the mind of the victim.
Fabricated Story: Is used to gain the victims attention, supposedly in their best interest, that a problem
exists e.g. customer accounts has been hijacked. The email can also perceive to have a friendly tone e.g.
thanking you for your co-operation. Using reverse social engineering, before the problem is resolved, the target
feels indebted to the attacker.
Threatening Tone or Consequence: The user is lured by the fake warning and enticed to click on a
hyperlink which is usually disguised as text or an image e.g. Click here for verification. The tone, together with
reverse psychology, is used e.g. the user fears that if they choose not to verify, consequently result in their
account being automatically deleted. Ironically, it is “human nature” not to want any further undesired
consequences or hassles e.g. renewing accounts etc.
Spoofed-Website: After the user selects/clicks the hyperlink embedded within the email message, they are
directed to a spoofed-website which also appears authentic and legitimate in design, and subsequently the
victims personal details are captured unsuspectingly.
The Need for a Holistic Anti-Phishing Framework
Organizations are at risk caused through their employees’ actions and behavior [28]. If human behavior could be
understood, one may suitably address why humans fall for victim to phishing emails [1],[5]. According to
Hinson [13], it can be argued that technical flaws themselves are the product of human errors. Even so,
companies concerned with information and data security are increasingly dedicating more technological
resources to evaluate and protect their information systems [13] thus ignoring employees as the source of their
most prevalent exposure. It is often easier for attackers to exploit human and social weaknesses of the defences
than to defeat the technological countermeasures [18]. This is also evident in anti-phishing literature as most
research focused on technical solutions such as: developing browser toolbars/plug-ins [23] preventative
measures, characteristics and email structure [6],[20],[22], algorithms for detecting, identifying and measuring
phishing emails and sites [8],[11],[32] and evaluating the effectiveness of web browser toolbar
warnings/indicators [4],[7],[12],[31]. Many employees cannot identify the difference between a genuine and a
spoofed website [4],[21]. Furthermore, many users are too preoccupied with their primary work duties that they
hardly remember to pay attention for web browser security indicators [19]. Information security is far more than
applying a range of physical and technical controls [13] and technically knowledgeable specialists often make
the mistake of believing that technical measures succeed in protecting them and average consumers [14]. Social
engineering attacks and lack of compliance of organizational security policies are increasingly cited as security
concerns. Technical solutions are only as good as the people that use and operate them because information
security is a multi-dimensional issue and only be achieved if a holistic approach is taken [3].
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Fig. 1. Organizational dimensions targeted by phishing
Generally information security threats exploit human behavior and thus, in an organizational context, require
a framework consisting of human, organizational and technological dimensions (HOT) to address against such
threats [9]. Illustrated in Fig 1, HOT dimensions are operating in isolation of one another (dotted lines), caused
from limited communication and interaction between each of them thus forming only a ‘single layer’ oriented
defense. As a result, if one of the dimensions is weakened, phishing attacks may proliferate compromising the
other dimensions respectively. Ideally, it is suitable to move towards an ‘in-depth’ defense oriented model (see
Fig. 2), thus allowing several barriers to serve a defense.
Anti-Phishing Framework: Phishing for a Solution
Technology controls have proven to be inadequate in protecting against phishing especially when applied in
isolation of other organizational aspects. While technology is important, organizational and human factors also
form a crucial role in achieving information security [1]. Understanding of how different human, organizational,
and technological elements interplay could explain how different factors lead to sources of security breaches and
vulnerabilities within organizations [15],[30]. Since each dimension has human involvement, even if the
organizational dimension is added, protection may not be sufficient as both the organizational and technology
dimensions depend on the H dimension. In the organizational dimension, best practices, policies, procedures and
international standards (e.g. ISO 27002, King III, COBIT 4.0); fully depend on humans obeying them.
Furthermore, they need to be in place to guide the other dimensions. Technology dimensions would typically
involve any technical controls such as: anti-phishing browser plug-ins, anti-virus software, spam filters, web
browsers, network firewalls, etc. and is dependent on humans to follow the procedures to ensure the technical
controls are functioning and applied correctly.  The human dimension calls for effective awareness, education
and training to assist in strengthening the ‘human firewall’ and to ideally cultivate information security behavior
in the organization. Of these dimensions, the human dimension is the area that phishing exposes the most and as
a result, compromises the technology and organizational dimensions. Thus, there is a need for the education
element to be present in all of the above-mentioned dimensions to ensure that all HOT dimensions are
functioning optimally. In doing so, this should provide for adequate overall risk mitigation against phishing
attacks (see Fig.2). Further research will validate these findings through an expert review.
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Fig. 2. Aspects in an organization, holistically related to an anti-phishing framework
Illustrated in Fig 2, continual communication (concentric circles & arrows) between the HOT dimensions
serves a stronger defense. The human dimension is the entry point for phishing attacks and the common link
(the glue) which influences all the other dimensions. It requires education to strengthen the interdependencies
between the other areas e.g. staff must be knowledgeable enough of policies and technical aspects to ensure that
operational procedures are obeyed and implemented correctly. The following section focuses on the components
required to address the human factor dimension.
Information Security Management & Culture: Information security management requires, as a minimum,
participation by all employees, shareholders, suppliers, third parties, customers or other external parties [25]. It
is the responsibility of all employees to protect information thus defending the reputation and financial well-
being of the business [2]. Effective interactions and communications are required to reach a mutual
understanding about security risks among different stakeholders [30]. An information security culture needs to
be adopted to ensure that information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily practice of every employee.
Educate Staff in Recognizing Phishing Emails and other Online Threats: Staff security education and
training is one of the most important aspects of an organizations security posture and perhaps the greatest non-
technical measure available and cost-effective solution for human factors and security [2]. Security topics and
requirements need to be integrated into normal business behaviour, through clear policy and staff education [2].
Through a regular and comprehensive user education programme, staff can resist and be made more aware of
the design (e.g. the address bar, SSL icon, web browser warning indicators, fake websites), activities and
dangers involved in a phishing attack [14],[16],[26] and to report such attacks. This is substantiated by Ohaya
[19] that many users do not have the underlying knowledge of how operating systems, e-mails and websites
work as employees cannot tell the difference between a genuine and spoofed-website. In some cases, users
frequently ignore phishing warning messages from anti-phishing tools [7],[19],[31]. For effectiveness, the
training could have some incentive, fun (e.g. gameplay [26]) or humour to gain participation from staff. An
added benefit, through training, allows employees to also learn other current and future threats of information
security aspects e.g. scams, viruses instead of phishing attacks alone especially since attack methods are
evolving. Third parties may also require education equivalent with full time employees however, effective
education may prove difficult in outsourced environments where providers are growing rapidly [2]. It is
essential for all employees to be an above-average computer user, especially in using email and internet, as it
exposes the user and organisation to other potential threats. This requirement can be enforced in the recruitment
policy (Organisation Aspects).
Awareness Programmes: According to ISO/IEC 27002 [25], critical success factors, based on experience,
have shown that information security awareness is important. Awareness programmes should aim to enhance
levels of trust between employer and employee by developing an understanding of the reasons for the security
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policies and controls that have been applied, as it will help staff be more aware of the issues [3] thus reducing
the likelihood of accidental breaches and increase the probability of malicious activity being detected and
reported. Staff needs to understand the implications of not obeying such policies.
Staff Lack in Security Behaviour: Unacceptable, non-malicious behaviour by staff should be taken
seriously. Organisation policies can ensure that employees cannot plead ignorance to the rules as many insider
problems stem from ignorance rather than malicious motivation [2]. However, mere accidents can potentially
cause large implications e.g. social networking sites are a playground for social engineers [10] thus, if staff are
spending excessive time on social network sites during office hours, this may put the organisations reputation
and financial well-being at risk.
Technical staff must be educated in their duties and define proper technical procedures and apply the relevant
technological controls to implement those procedures e.g. prevent users from accessing risky sites.
Monitoring: Some organisations emphasise that monitoring can benefit staff where employees are reassured
that the organisation is safeguarded against confidential leaks and hence possible damage to its reputation or
financial loss.
Conclusion
It has been established that HOT dimensions in an organization require strengthening to address phishing [9].
Human factors have been mentioned to be the greatest risk and as such require the most focus. Much research
has been placed either on education, training and awareness [14],[16],[21],[26] or technical controls. Although
each HOT dimension has its own weaknesses or vulnerabilities, as all encompass some human involvement,
education can close the gap between all the dimensions (e.g. should the technical controls fail; humans can be
aware and knowledgeable in addressing a phishing attack) thus resulting in a multi-level defense model.
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